The Role of Skeptical Evidence in the First and Second “Meditations”. Article 1. The Doubt according to Descartes and Sextus Empiricus
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22240/sent35.02.006Keywords:
Sextus Empiricus, Descartes, Scepticism, Evidence, Phenomenon, Doubt, Will, EpochéAbstract
The first article of the cycle “The role of skeptical evidence in the First and Second ‘Meditations’” compares the Cartesian and Sextus Empiricus’ concepts of doubt in, respectively, “Metaphysical meditations” and “Outlines of Pyrrhonism”. The article starts with the current state of the problem “Descartes and skepticism” and admits the existence of consensus about Cartesian perception of skeptical tradition: Cartesius (1) was influenced by all skeptical movements, known in his time, and (2) created a generalized notion that contains elements of both Academic and Pyrrhonian origin. This consensus is the source of many contemporary studies on how different skeptical doctrines influenced certain parts of Cartesian philosophy. This article attempts to analyze possible Descartes’ use of Sextus Empiricus’ notion of phenomenon. Sextus clearly states in “Outlines of Pyrrhonism” that one cannot doubt phenomenon as something perceived directly. The article proves that (a) Sextus’ thesis about the “sensory” nature of phenomenon is metaphorical, so far as it includes (without distinction) both sensuality and the experience of thinking; (b) the phenomenon is realized through a wide range of passive states of mind that all have irresistible force of influence; (c) the impact of phenomena is always mediated by our self, because all skeptical phrases are strictly correlated with the first person singular. Some researchers distinguish Sextus’ isostenia, as one of such insurmountable states, from Cartesian doubt at the First Meditation, which is allegedly based on a purely volitional decision. The article proved that this argument is artificial, since Descartes’ volitional decision is caused by initial inability to take the dubious as if it were certain. Thus, Cartesian approach can be considered a specific kind of isostenia. Such parallelism is a reason to assume a key role of Sextus’ understanding of insurmountable power of phenomena in Cartesian anti-sceptical argumentation. This assumption will be tested in the following articles of the cycle.References
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Broughton, J. (2002). Descartes's Method of Doubt. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.
Descartes, R. (1996). Œuvres complètes in 11 vol. (Сh. Adam, & P. Tannery, Eds.). Paris: Vrin.
Descartes, R. (2014). Meditations on First Philosophy. Metaphysical meditations. [In Latin, French, & Ukrainian]. In O. Khoma (Ed.), Descartes’ “Meditations” in the Mirror of Contemporary Interpretations. Kyiv: Duh i Litera.
Duncan, S. M. (2008). The proof of the external world: Cartesian theism and the possibility of knowledge. Cambridge, U.K.: James Clarke.
Eva, L. (2013). Montaigne et les Academica de Cicéron, Astérion, 11. Retrieved from http://asterion.revues.org/2364
Giocanti, S. (2002). Descartes face au doute scandaleux des sceptiques. Dix-septième siècle, 217(4), 663-673.
https://doi.org/10.3917/dss.024.0663
Giocanti, S. (2006). Descartes s’est-il débarassé du scepticisme? Cahiers philosophiques, 106, 71-83.
Giocanti, S. (2011). Hériter de Montaigne à l'âge classique: les exemples de Descartes, Pascal et La Mothe Le Vayer. Littératures classiques, 75(2), 27-50. https://doi.org/10.3917/licla.075.0027
Giocanti, S. (2013). Comment traiter de ce qui n’est pas “entièrement certain et indubitable”. Descartes héritier des Académiques de Cicéron. Astérion, 11. Retrieved from http://asterion.revues.org/2371
Gouhier, H. (1999). La pensée métaphysique de Descartes. Paris: Vrin.
Kambouchner, D. (2005). Les "Méditations métaphysiques" de Descartes. I. Introduction générale: Méditation I. Paris: PUF.
Maia Neto, J. R. (1997). Academic Skepticism in Early Modern Philosophy. Journal of the History of Ideas, 58(2), 199-220. https://doi.org/10.1353/jhi.1997.0018
Maia Neto, J. R. (2003). Charron's epoche and Descartes' cogito: the sceptical base of Descartes' refutation of skepticism. In G. Paganini (Ed.), The Return of Scepticism. From Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle. Dordrecht: Springer.
Maia Neto, J. R. (2014). Academic Skepticism in Seventeenth-Century French Philosophy: The Charronian Legacy 1601-1662. Cham: Springer.
Maia Neto, J. R. (2014). Academic Skepticism in Seventeenth-Century French Philosophy: The Charronian Legacy 1601-1662. Cham: Springer.
Navarro, J. (2010). Scepticism, Stoicism and Subjectivity: Reappraising Montaigne's Influence on Descartes. Contrastes: Revista Interdisciplinar de Filosofía, 15(1-2), 243-260.
Paganini, G. (2008). Skepsis: le débat des modernes sur le scepticisme: Montaigne, Le Vayer, Campanella, Hobbes, Descartes, Bayle. Paris: Vrin.
Paganini, G. (2009). Descartes and Renaissance skepticism: The Sanches case. In J. Maia Neto, G. Paganini, & J. Laursen (Eds.), Skepticism in the modern age. Building on the work of Richard Popkin, (pp. 249-268). Leiden: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004177840.i-390.57
Panych, O. A. (2007). Exploration on the history of skepticism in the British-American epistemolo-gy. Part 1: British modern philosophy (Hobbes, Locke, Barkley, Hume, Reid). [In Ukrainian]. Donetsk: DonNU.
Perler, D. (2004). Was There a Pyrrhonian Crisis in Early Modern Philosophy? A Critical Notice of Richard H. Popkin. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 86(2), 209-220. https://doi.org/10.1515/agph.2004.009
Popkin, R. (2003). The History of Scepticism: from Savonarola to Bayle. Oxford, & New York: Oxford UP.
Scribano, E. (2008). Guida alla lettura delle Meditazioni metafisiche di Descartes. Roma: Laterza.
Secundant, S. G. (2013). Leibniz’ Epistemology in its normative and critical bases. [In Russian]. Odessa: Pechatnyi Dom.
Sextus Empiricus. (1569). Adversus Mathematicos. Pyrrhoniarum Hypotyposeon. (H. Stephanus, & G. Hervetus, Trans.). Parisiis : Apud Martinum Iuvenem.
Sextus Empiricus. (1621). Sextou Empeirikou ta sōzomena. = Sexti Empirici Opera quae extant. Geneuae: Sumptibus Petri & Jacobi Chouët.
Sirven, J.-E. (1928). Les Années d’apprentissage de Descartes, 1596–1628. Albi: Imprimee Cooperative du Sud-Quest.]
Sosa, E. (1997). How to resolve the pyrrhonian problematic: A lesson from Descartes. Philosophical Studies, 85(2-3): 229-249.
Westphal, K. R. (1987). Sextus Empiricus Contra René Descartes. Philosophy Research Archives, 13, 91-128. https://doi.org/10.5840/pra1987/19881330
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2016-12-16
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Khoma, O. (2016). The Role of Skeptical Evidence in the First and Second “Meditations”. Article 1. The Doubt according to Descartes and Sextus Empiricus. Sententiae, 35(2), 6–22. https://doi.org/10.22240/sent35.02.006
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