Skeptical expressions in “Outlines of Pyrrhonism” and Descartes’ project of “Meditations on First Philosophy”
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31649/sent41.02.024Keywords:
dogmatism, certainty, hyperbolic doubt, equipollence, suspension of judgement, persuasivenessAbstract
The paper aims to prove the hypothesis that Sextus Empiricus’ Neo-Pyrrhonism is significantly influenced by the Cartesian meditation as a genre of philosophizing. It refutes theses about (1) the non-predicativity of Sextus’ language and about (2) Sextus’ epochê as an automatic result of the action of opposite things or statements, and it argues that both Sextus and Descartes distinguish between (a) internal (forced) agreement with clarity and (b) the personal acceptance of this agreement which depends on a volitional decision. Sextus’ recognition of the clarity of appearance as appearance gives Descartes the only chance to refute the skepticism of Sextus, which is invulnerable to external criticism. Therefore, Descartes developed meditation as a special model of purely immanent criticism (the very word “skepticism” is never mentioned in the Meditations), focused on dealing with states of clarity and evidence. The author’s hypothesis is that the key elements to which this model appeals are the “history of a skeptic” set out in Outlines of Pyrrhonism and the conception of skeptical expressions. This hypothesis can be tested further by proving or disproving the thesis that the discourse of I, II, and at least partially of III Meditations is based on the pattern of skeptical expressions, focused on the internal states of the speaker, and not on clarifying the “objective” state of affairs (i.e. not on dogmatic inferences).
References
Burnyeat, M. F. (2012). Can the sceptic live his scepticism? In M. F. Burnyeat, Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy (Vol. I, pp. 205-235). Cambridge: Cambridge UP. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511974052.011
Descartes, R. (1996). Œuvres de Descartes (Vol. I-XI). (Ch. Adam & P. Tannery, Eds.). Paris: Vrin.
Descartes, R. (2013). Étude du bon sens, La recherche de la vérité et autres écrits de jeunesse, 1616-1631. (V. Carraud & G. Olivo, Eds.). Paris: PUF.
Frede, M. (1998). The Sceptic’s two kinds of assent and the question of the possibility of knowledge. In M. Burnyeat & M. Frede (Eds.), The original Sceptics: A controversy (pp. 127-151). Indianapolis: Hackett.
Kambouchner, D. (2005). Les “Méditations métaphysiques” de Descartes. I. Introduction générale: Méditation I. Paris: PUF.
Khoma, O. (2017). The Role of Skeptical Evidence in the First and Second “Meditations”. Article 2. Certitudo. Sententiae, 36(2), 18-29. https://doi.org/10.22240/sent36.02.018
Khoma, O. (2021). Historico-philosophical Stereotypes and Contemporary Reading of Descartes’ Meditations. In O. Khoma (Ed.), Descartes’ Meditations in the Mirror of Modern Interpretations (pp. 341-365). [In Ukrainian]. Kyiv: Duh i Litera.
Khoma, O. (2022). What is a historian of philosophy looking for? Marion, J.-L. (2021). Questions cartésiennes III: Descartes sous le masque du cartésianisme. Paris: PUF. [In Ukrainian]. Sententiae, 41(1), 130-140. https://doi.org/10.31649/sent41.01.130
Marchand, S. (2010). Le sceptique cherche-t-il vraiment la vérité? Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 65(1), 125-141. https://doi.org/10.3917/rmm.101.0125
Marchand, S. (2011). Sextus Empiricus’ Style of writing. In D. Manchuca (Ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism (pp. 113-141). Leiden: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004207769.i-207.38
Marion, J.-L. (2021a). Le doute comme jeu suprême - Descartes sceptique. Les Études philosophiques, (136), 5-36. https://doi.org/10.3917/leph.211.0005
Marion, J.-L. (2021b). Le doute, jeu suprême. J.-L. Marion, Questions cartésiennes III: Descartes sous le masque du cartésianisme, (pp. 17-55). Paris: PUF.
Montaigne, M. (1965). Essais: Livre second. Paris: Gallimard.
Montaigne, M. (2006). Essais: Book II. (A. Perepadya, Trans.). [In Ukrainian]. Kyiv: Duh i Litera.
Sextus Empiricus. (1933). Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Vol. I-IV). (R. G. Bury, Trans.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP. https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.sextus_empiricus-outlines_pyrrhonism.1933
Sextus Empiricus. (1997). Esquisses pyrrhoniennes. (P. Pellegrin, Trad.). Paris: Seuil.
Sextus Empiricus. (2020). Outlines of Pyrrhonism (I, 1-13). [In Anc. Greek & Ukrainian]. Sententiae, 39(2), 125-137. https://doi.org/10.31649/sent39.02.125
Sextus Philosophus. (1569). Pyrrhoniarum hipotyposeon libri tres. In Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicogs (pp. 399-542). (H. Stephanus, Trans.). Parisiis: M. Iuuenem.
Smith, P. J. (2022). Sextus Empiricus’ Neo-Pyrrhonism: Skepticism as a Rationally Ordered Expe-rience. São Paulo: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94518-3
Svavarsson, S. H. (2019). Les actions du sceptique selon Sextus Empiricus (PH I 21–24). In D/ E. Machuca & S. Marchand (Dir.), Les Raisons du doute. Études sur le scepticisme antique (pp. 29-51). Paris: Classiques Garnier. https://doi.org/10.15122/isbn.978-2-406-07737-4.p.0029
Downloads
-
PDF (Українська)
Downloads: 319
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
- Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:
- Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication.
- Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgment of its initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).
.jpg){kind=logo}
.png){kind=logo}
