Sententiae 2022-04-30T16:36:45+03:00 Oleg Khoma Open Journal Systems <p>Journal created by Modern philosophy's research group (Pascalian society).<br />Founded in 2000. Published thrice a year, on April 30, on July 30, and on November 30.<br />Journal DOI: <a href=""></a></p> German philosophy in the Ukrainian context (70-80s of the 20th century). Part I 2022-04-26T22:01:31+03:00 Anatoliy Yermolenko Vsevolod Khoma Illia Davidenko Kseniia Myroshnyk <p>Interview of Vsevolod Khoma, Illia Davidenko and Kseniia Myroshnyk with Anatoliy Yermolenko.</p> 2022-04-30T00:00:00+03:00 Copyright (c) 2022 Commenting as a genre. Tehilim. (2020). Tehilim - Psalms. Commentary by Rabbi Shimshon Raphael Hirsch (Vol. 1-2). Kyiv: Duh i Litera. 2022-04-29T23:55:20+03:00 Vsevolod Kuznetsov <p>Review of Tehilim. (2020). <em>Te</em><em>hilim - Psalms. Commentary by Rabbi Shimshon Raphael Hirsch</em> (Vol. 1-2). Kyiv: Duh i Litera.</p> 2022-04-30T00:00:00+03:00 Copyright (c) 2022 What is a historian of philosophy looking for? Marion, J.-L. (2021). Questions cartésiennes III: Descartes sous le masque du cartésianisme. Paris: PUF. 2022-04-30T16:36:45+03:00 Oleg Khoma <p>Review of Marion, J.-L. (2021). Questions cartésiennes III: Descartes sous le masque du cartésianisme. Paris: PUF.</p> 2022-04-30T00:00:00+03:00 Copyright (c) 2022 Discourse on the philosophical and ethical method of Aristotle. Karbowski, J. (2019). Aristotle’s Method in Ethics: Philosophy in Practice. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. 2022-04-26T21:15:32+03:00 Yevheniia Butsykina <p>Review of Karbowski, J. (2019). <em>Aristotle’s Method in Ethics: Philosophy in Practice</em>. Cambridge University Press.</p> 2022-04-30T00:00:00+03:00 Copyright (c) 2022 Buddhist philosophy in India: from the ontology of Abhidharma to the epistemology of pramāṇavāda. Westerhoff, J. (2018). The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2022-04-26T21:28:10+03:00 Olena Kalantarova <p>Review of Westerhoff, J. (2018). <em>The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy. </em>Volume 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</p> 2022-04-30T00:00:00+03:00 Copyright (c) 2022 The problem of the freedom of will: historico-philosophical topics in the analytic perspective. Hausmannn, M., & Noller, J. (Eds.). (2021). Free Will. Historical and Analytic Perspectives. Cham: Springer; Palgrave Macmillan. 2022-04-26T21:49:55+03:00 Dmytro Sepetyi <p>Rewiew of Hausmannn, M., &amp; Noller, J. (Eds.). (2021). <em>Free Will. Historical and Analytic Perspectives.</em> Cham: Springer; Palgrave Macmillan.</p> 2022-04-30T00:00:00+03:00 Copyright (c) 2022 Reasoning about Plagiarism in Europe before Jacob Thomasius 2022-04-26T19:16:44+03:00 Roman Kyselov <p>The paper provides an overview of the early considerations regarding the phenomenon of plagiarism – from Greco-Roman antiquity to the time when a thorough study examining literary theft in its textual, legal, and moral manifestations was printed, i.&nbsp;e. “Philosophical Dissertation on Literary Plagiarism” (1673) by Jacob Thomasius. Although the issue of plagiarism was very vital in ancient times, all the oldest considerations concerning the appropriation of other people’s texts were essentially pragmatic moves or reactions rather than purposeful theoretical interpretations of the subject. However, in addition to the situational grounds of the accusation, they can reveal certain principles that, according to estimations of the time, could prevent or refute allegations of plagiarism. It was enough if the author stated, albeit generally but clearly, that the fragments of other people’s texts, whether altered or not, were used. It was also acceptable if the reader believed that the author considered his borrowings recognizable to educated readers. Another reason for the elimination of possible accusations was the factor of competition – the author’s desire to adapt the achievements of another cultural environment in his own one, significantly improving them. The medieval and early modern materials generally testify to the relevance of ancient views and reveal some new problems. This is, in particular, the incompatibility of new more formalized ideas about authorship and traditional educational practices, which encouraged the uncontrolled use of others’ texts. Some authors also emphasized that plagiarism was an obstacle to the development of science. The paper ends with examples that show how European ideas about the rules of using others’ writings may help interpret the writing methods of the early modern Ukrainian authors, including philosophers.</p> 2022-04-30T00:00:00+03:00 Copyright (c) 2022 Quine, Goodman, Putnam: the Harvard Philosophical School 2022-04-26T20:30:59+03:00 Anna Laktionova <p>The article offers formal and doctrinal reasons that prove the existence of the “Harvard Philosophical School” as a real historico-philosophical phenomenon. The author includes Willard Van Orman Quine, Nelson Goodman, and Hilary Putnam in this school. The aim of this article is to compare the conceptualism, relativism and anti-realism of Quine, Goodman and Pantem, on the basis of (neo)pragmatic tendencies in their philosophical studies.</p> <p>Formal reasons: all these philosophers were professors at Harvard University; in addition, Quine was a teacher of Goodman and Putnam, Goodman was a teacher of Putnam.</p> <p>Doctrinal reasons: (1) Quine, Goodman, and Putnam, each in his own specific pragmatic way, stood on the positions of relativism, anti-realism, conceptualism, and tried to separate themselves from “cultural relativism”; (2) common touchstone concepts and tendencies in particular in their philosophical investigations are: conceptual scheme, indeterminacy of translation, internal criteria, ontological relativity and others; (3) the obvious analogy between Quine's standards of similarity, Goodman's standards of correctness, and standards for Putnam's conceptual schemes.</p> <p>Thus, we have strong reasons to consider Quine, Goodman and Putnam as representatives of a common philosophical school. The role played in their doctrines by the ideas of William James, who also taught at Harvard, at least hypothetically allows us to expand the boundaries of this school.</p> 2022-04-30T00:00:00+03:00 Copyright (c) 2022 On the Notion of Linguistic Convention (samaya, saṃketa) in Indian Thought 2022-04-26T20:39:17+03:00 Ołena Łucyszyna <p>Linguistic convention (<em>samaya</em>/<em>saṃketa</em>) is one of the central notions of Indian philosophy of language. The well-known view of <em>samaya</em>/<em>saṃketa </em>is its conception as the agreement initiating the relationship between words and their previously unrelated meanings. However, in Indian philosophy of language, we also encounter two other important but little-researched interpretations of <em>samaya</em>/<em>saṃketa</em>, which consider it as the established usage of words.&nbsp;</p> <p>I present a new classification of traditions of Indian thought based on their view of linguistic convention. This classification is to be verified and expanded in further studies. As far as I know, such a classification has never been undertaken before. 1) Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, and later classical Yoga of the <em>Tattvavaiśāradī </em>accept <em>samaya</em>/<em>saṃketa </em>as an agreement initiating the relationship between words and their previously unrelated meanings. 2) Bhartṛhari the Grammarian and the continuators of his thought acknowledge <em>samaya</em>/<em>saṃketa </em>as the established usage of words that is rooted in the natural relationship between words and their meanings; the convention manifests (makes known) the relationship. This view was probably also shared by Mīmāṃsakas and Advaitins. 3) Classical Yoga of the<em> Yogasūtrabhāṣya </em>and probably also earlier Grammar thought of the <em>Mahābhāṣya</em> accept linguistic convention as the established usage of words, but this usage, though having neither a beginning nor an end, is not based on any natural and necessary word–meaning relationship. In this view, linguistic convention not only manifests the word–meaning relationship but also keeps it in existence.&nbsp;</p> <p>Another new contribution of this research is my explanation for why the same Sanskrit term<em> samaya</em>/<em>saṃketa</em> was applied to the different ways of understanding linguistic convention. I explain this through the common aspects of all three kinds of <em>samaya</em>/<em>saṃketa</em>. The first aspect is the content of all these kinds of <em>samaya</em>/<em>saṃketa</em>. Irrespective of how linguistic convention is understood, its content is the same: “such and such a word has such and such a meaning”. The second aspect is the crucial role of linguistic convention in language acquisition, communication, and transmission.</p> 2022-04-30T00:00:00+03:00 Copyright (c) 2022 The concept of «suffering» in Buddhism: ontological problematics 2022-04-26T20:47:44+03:00 Anastasia Strelkova <p>Unlike the most common in the modern studies – the psychological, ethical, socio-cultural – approaches to the problem of suffering, in this paper the philosophical problematics of ontological dimension of the suffering in the Buddhist philosophy is raised.</p> <p>Many modern scholars are inclined to think that a more adequate translation for the Sanskrit term <em>duḥkha</em> is “unsatisfactoriness”. However, from the material presented in the article follows that this rendering does not feet the sense of the notion of <em>duḥkha</em> when it is examined in the ontological plane, and thus the traditional translation “suffering” in this sense remains more adequate. It is also shown that the etymology of the Sanskrit term <em>duḥkha</em> as a «improperly installed» axle of the wheel of a cart has strong connotations with the metaphor of the wheel and the symbol of swastika in the Buddhist cultural tradition (wheel of being, three turnings of the Wheel of Dharma etc.).</p> <p>In this paper the main causes of suffering (self, body, ignorance, desire and other afflictions) exposed in Buddhist texts and scholarship are revised, and on the example of the <em>Cūḷasuññata-sutta</em> it is demonstrated that the real final cause of suffering in the Early Buddhism is our body and not our “self” and ignorance. While in the Mahayana Buddhism based on the philosophy of emptiness and the principle of nonduality, the dichotomy of soul and body is removed, the attainment of nirvana becomes possible in this body and the real cause and source of suffering becomes the ignorance. On the other hand, the paper argues that just the ontological view on the problem of suffering (under the angle of the principle of nonduality) provides us with understanding of the fact that the suffering can be overcome despite its indestructible ontological status.</p> 2022-04-30T00:00:00+03:00 Copyright (c) 2022