“Wittgenstein’s Perspective” and the Problem of Practical Normativity

Keywords: Wittgenstein, strategy of «an immanent frame», practical and philosophical immanentism, practice, practical normativity, language-games, strong evaluations


The author of article makes a start from the thesis that “Wittgenstein’s perspective” is considered today as the most successful strategy of the thinking offering quite developed version of the immanent justification of the practices (conditionally speaking, strategy of “the immanent frame”). The task of article consists in offering possible arguments against such rational strategy as one of modern forms of a practical and philosophical immanentism. At first, in the context of Wittgenstein’s understanding of practice, it is extremely difficult to distinguish the regular behavior of participants of concrete language-game from the imitation of this regular behavior (for example, from “behavior” of the computer which possesses a body similar to a human body and which has with us gallant conversation). Secondly, the behavior coordinated with language statements is absolutely insufficient condition for understanding of these statements. Thirdly, from Wittgenstein's position it is impossible to solve a problem of the practical normativity as if we share his approach, we have no accurate criteria for distinction of healthy and sick language-games (practice). The concept of implicit rules to which we follow spontaneously, being guided by the settled standards and behavior schemes, doesn't consider that circumstance, what even implicit rules assume certain procedures of their justification. At last, an immanent justification offered by Wittgenstein the practices (language-games and forms of life) in general does impossible so-called “strong evaluations” (distinction between good and evil, justice and injustice). And without this strong evaluations the practices can exist unless at the most primitive level.

Author Biography

Andrii Baumeister, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv
PhD in philosophy, Doctoral Candidate of the Philosophy Department,


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How to Cite
Baumeister, A. (2013). “Wittgenstein’s Perspective” and the Problem of Practical Normativity. Sententiae, 29(2), 91-100. https://doi.org/10.22240/sent29.02.091