THOMAS AQUINATUS AND DESCARTES: IDEA AS COGNITION’S OBJECT

  • Sergiy Seсundant I. Mechnikov Odessa National University

Abstract

Descartes’ definition of idea is too general, therefore many researchers are of the opinion that ideas’ problematique is secondary in the Cartesianism. But the author prove what Descartes (in contrast to F. Suarez) denies the conception of idea as intellect’s action. Descartes accepts Duns Scott’s conception of idea as the representation generated by action of the human mind. Following that an idea is freed of ontological premises and appears as an object of the trustworthy cognition. That wording had the most important influence on the postcartesian philosophy. References

Author Biography

Sergiy Seсundant, I. Mechnikov Odessa National University
PhD in philosophy Associate professor at the Department of Philosophy and basics of the the humanities
Published
2008-12-16
How to Cite
SeсundantS. (2008). THOMAS AQUINATUS AND DESCARTES: IDEA AS COGNITION’S OBJECT. Sententiae, 19(2), 43-70. Retrieved from https://sententiae.vntu.edu.ua/index.php/sententiae/article/view/13
Section
ARTICLES