THOMAS AQUINATUS AND DESCARTES: IDEA AS COGNITION’S OBJECT
AbstractDescartes’ definition of idea is too general, therefore many researchers are of the opinion that ideas’ problematique is secondary in the Cartesianism. But the author prove what Descartes (in contrast to F. Suarez) denies the conception of idea as intellect’s action. Descartes accepts Duns Scott’s conception of idea as the representation generated by action of the human mind. Following that an idea is freed of ontological premises and appears as an object of the trustworthy cognition. That wording had the most important influence on the postcartesian philosophy. References
How to Cite
SeсundantS. (2008). THOMAS AQUINATUS AND DESCARTES: IDEA AS COGNITION’S OBJECT. Sententiae, 19(2), 43-70. Retrieved from https://sententiae.vntu.edu.ua/index.php/sententiae/article/view/13
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