Редукціонізм, нейронаука і Декартова метафізика

Oleg Khoma

doi:10.31649/sent44.01.073

Authors

Oleg Khoma Vinnytsia National Technical University https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8249-8281

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31649/sent44.01.073

Keywords:

mind, consciousness, brain, tree of philosophy, Nicolas Malebranche, Pierre Gassendi, António Damasio

Abstract

The article criticizes reductionist approaches in contemporary historico-philosophical studies of Cartesian brain physiology. The author states that in general these studies one can divide into two directions. The difference between these directions lies in the attitude towards Cartesian metaphysics. Representatives of the first of them are focused on filling research gaps within the complex relationship between Cartesian metaphysics and physiology. Representatives of the second seek various kinds of “reexaminations of traditional approaches” in order to recognize the “central” place of brain physiology in Cartesianism. I qualify the second of these approaches as reductionist. Its main shortcomings are a significant distortion of the structure of Cartesian philosophy and the predominance of prejudices over objective analysis. The results of such an approach are usually a pretentious proof of something long proven as something new. I also demonstrate that this type of reductionism has ideological reasons and is a direct continuation of a tradition that categorically fails to accept the Cartesian concept of the mind as a thinking thing.

Author Biography

Oleg Khoma, Vinnytsia National Technical University

Doctor of sciences in philosophy, Professor, Head of the Department of Philosophy and Humanities

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