Conciliatorics and eclecticism: philosophy on the way to a concept of open system

Abstract

The recent historic-philosophical tradition which has its roots in the Hegelian school usually mixed conciliatorics with eclecticism and considered the last as a main opponent of systematics (Ch. Wolf and his followers). By reduction of eclecticism to syncretism, Hegel and his school gave negative sense to the term "eclecticism", which was fashionable in 17-18th cent., completely denying its progressive role in the history of philosophy. Contrary to this view the author shows the need for distinguishing eclecticism from syncretism and conciliatorics, and tries to show its crucial role in the formation of a philosophical concept of system.
The author argues that syncretism, conciliatorics and eclecticism rejected not the idea of system but only attempts of aprioristic creation of systems (B. Keckerman, C. Timpler, Ch. Wolff). Despite the general starting point of philosophizing (opinion of philosophers) and a common goal (the aspiration to reduce variety of the views to unity), these currents disagree as to the way of the achieving of their goal. The author shows that only syncretism noncritically combines different views. Conciliatorics, on the contrary, tries to estimate and reconcile them, and eclecticism tries to select the best opinions on the basis of experience and reasoning.
It is inadmissibly to consider a conciliatorics as a kind of eclecticism. Conciliatorics is focused not on the truth, but on the unity of views. Its epistemological and methodological principles are not firmly defined. Eclecticism, on the contrary, accurately formulated its principles and has its own methodological program which is focused on growth of knowledge. Knowledge considered here as the collective, dialogical and historically developing process of gradual approach to truth