Sellars’ Epistemological Lexicon

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22240/sent33.02.041

Keywords:

Wilfrid Sellars, ought-to-be rules, language entry transitions, epistemic powers, guidedness, conceptual response, representation

Abstract

The article contextualizes the usage of the main concepts of Sellars’ philosophy and determines Sellars’ attitude to Kant’s philosophy of subjectivity. The author proves that difficulties in translation of the concepts are caused by the two conditions: (1) the complexities of Sellars’ epistemological position that tries to combine naturalism and conceptualism, and (2) his intention to improve Kant’s transcendental doctrine by introducing its linguistic interpretation. 

Author Biography

Vyacheslav Tsyba, Nizhyn Gogol State University

PhD, Lecturer, Department of History and Law Sciences

References

DeVries, W. (2005). Wilfrid Sellars. Chesham, UK: Acumen Publishing.

McDowell, J. (2009). Having the World in View. Essays on Kant, Hegel and Sellars. Cambridge, & London: Harvard UP.

Sellars, W. (1963). Some Reflections on Language Games. In W. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (pp. 321-358). Ridgeview: Atascadero.

Sellars, W. (1968). Science and Metaphysics. Variations on Kantian Themes. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York: Humanities Press.

Sellars, W. (1973). Autobiographical Reflections. Wilfrid S. Sellars Papers (ASP. 1991.01, Box 17, Folder 38). Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Special Collections Department, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. Retrieved from http://digital.library.pitt.edu/u/ulsmanuscripts/pdf/31735060477803.pdf

Sellars, W. (2002). Kant’s Transcendental Metaphysics. Cassirer Lecture Notes and Other Essays. (J. Sicha, Ed.). Ridgeview: Atascadero.

Strawson, P. F. (1964). Introduction to Logical Theory. London: Methuen.

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Published

2015-12-16

How to Cite

Tsyba, V. (2015). Sellars’ Epistemological Lexicon. Sententiae, 33(2), 41–50. https://doi.org/10.22240/sent33.02.041

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