Depth of Sharpness, or The Twists and Turns of the Phenomenological Self-reflection

Keywords: Phenomenology, Method, Experience of Consciousness, Pre-reflective Attitude.

Abstract

The article deals with the problem of phenomenological method. It is examined through its application for overcoming the metaphysical disconnection of ontology, epistemology and anthropology. The author demonstrates that interpreting phenomenology as an outcome of transcendentalism means return to pre-reflective attitude, which challenges universality of the phenomenological philosophy theses. This is so because experiences being described by phenomenologist are non-reflective themselves and that is why they require the reflective origins of their unity. Thus, phenomenological conception of an experience, as the experience of consciousness, is inconsistent.

Author Biography

Vyacheslav Tsyba, Mykola Gogol Nizhyn State University
PhD in Philosophy, lecturer at the Department of History of Ukraine and Political Sciences

References

Husserl, E. (2001). Cartesian meditations. [In Russian]. St. Petersburg: Nauka.

Husserl, E. (2009). Experience and judgment. Research of genealogy of logic. (V. Kebuladze, Trans.). [In Ukrainian]. Kyiv: PPS-2002.

Kebuladze, V. (2011). Phenomenology of experience. [In Ukrainian]. Kyiv: Duh i Litera.

Lembek, K.-H. (2000). "Natural Motivation of Transcendental? of the transcendental installation? On the Issue of Method in Phenomenology. [In Ukrainian]. In A. L. Bogachov (Ed.), Phenomenology and the philosophical method (pp. 195-212). Kiyv: Tandem.
Published
2012-12-16
How to Cite
Tsyba, V. (2012). Depth of Sharpness, or The Twists and Turns of the Phenomenological Self-reflection. Sententiae, 27(2), 208-213. https://doi.org/10.22240/sent27.02.208
Section
REVIEWS