Neo-Pyrrhonism: a contemporary version of skepticism

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31649/sent42.03.047

Keywords:

dogmatism, suspension of judgment, everyday life, skeptical view of the world

Abstract

This paper presents and argues for a contemporary version of skepticism: neo-Pyrrhonism. Interest in the history of skepticism engendered a new, more complex and attractive conception of skepticism. Accordingly, many philosophers now claim they are skeptics. In line with what they say, I develop neo-Pyrrhonism as I see it. It has a negative part, in which dogmas are criticized, and a positive one: first, the neo-Pyrrhonist lives his life according to his skeptical principles and following everyday life, and, second, he is able to describe philosophically his skeptical view of the world, thereby offering possible solutions to philosophical problems empirically conceived.

Author Biography

Plínio Junqueira Smith, Federal University of São Paulo (Brazil).

PhD, associate professor

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Published

2023-11-30

How to Cite

Smith, P. J. (2023). Neo-Pyrrhonism: a contemporary version of skepticism. Sententiae, 42(3), 47–66. https://doi.org/10.31649/sent42.03.047

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