The Event of Primary Experience and Philosophy. Metatheory of Experience in Kant and Quine’s Epistemologies

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22240/sent33.02.064

Keywords:

Kant, Quine, dogma, empiricism, experience, cognition, transcendentalism, holism, consistency

Abstract

The author argues that Quine’s criticism of Kantian analytical/synthetic distinction, as well as transcendentalist reductionism, is not entirely adequate. Furthermore, the author states that Kant’s and Quine’s theories of experience and cognition (transcendentalist and holistic) are based on a common dogma, the one of consistency. Taking into account their uncritical acceptance of experience as a system that is able to adjust new and old elements to each other, both philosophers have much more in common than Quine and his followers might have expected. 

Author Biography

Mykhailo Minakov, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

doctor of sciences in philosophy, associate professor, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies

References

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Published

2015-12-16

How to Cite

Minakov, M. (2015). The Event of Primary Experience and Philosophy. Metatheory of Experience in Kant and Quine’s Epistemologies. Sententiae, 33(2), 64–74. https://doi.org/10.22240/sent33.02.064

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