Descartes’ Notion of Meum Corpus and Jean-Luc Marion’s Challenge to “the Myth of Cartesian Dualism”

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31649/sent42.02.006

Keywords:

Descartes, Cartesian dualism, mind, soul, body, substance, substantial union

Abstract

Jean-Luc Marion, in his latest book, “Sur la pensée passive de Descartes,” recently published in an English translation, challenges something he refers to, in the English subtitle, as “the Myth of Cartesian Dualism” and counters it with his original interpretation of Descartes’ notion of meum corpus. This article explores the reasons he adduces for this purpose. The case is made that Marion fails to provide sufficiently solid argumentative and textual support for his construal in this respect and that traditional substance dualistic interpretative resources allow for a more straightforward and systematic reading. It is argued that Marion’s central dualism-deflecting claim, that in the Meditations, “my body” is not an extended thing but a mode of thought, is undermined by an analysis that carefully considers the context of those Descartes’ statements to which Marion appeals.

Author Biography

Dmytro Sepetyi, Zaporizhzhia State Medical and Pharmaceutical University

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Social Studies

References

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Published

2023-08-29

How to Cite

Sepetyi, D. . (2023). Descartes’ Notion of Meum Corpus and Jean-Luc Marion’s Challenge to “the Myth of Cartesian Dualism”. Sententiae, 42(2), 6–22. https://doi.org/10.31649/sent42.02.006

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