Kant and the “awakening” from the rationalist principle of sufficient reason

Keywords: antinomy, causal maxim, dogmatic slumber, Hume, Spinoza

Abstract

The paper inspects Anderson’s central thesis that Kant’s dogmatic slumber was interrupted by Hume’s critique of metaphysics (rational theology) in his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, namely, by his critique of the rationalist principle of sufficient reason, which lies at the heart of dogmatic proofs of God’s existence. I recreate the meaning of “Hume’s objection,” define the larger role the principle of sufficient reason plays in Kant’s philosophy, and evaluate the explanatory potential of Anderson’s interpretation in view of Kant’s early and critical texts, as well as his other autobiographical statements (such as his famous letter to Garve). Although Anderson’s hypothesis seems well-founded and even explicates the hidden connection between the entire critical project and the refutation of Spinozism, I argue it is almost impossible to reconcile it with the current research in Kant’s Entwicklungsgeschichte.

Author Biography

Victor Chorny, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

undergraduate student

References

Al-Azm, S. J. (1972). The Origins of Kant’s Arguments in the Antinomies. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Anderson, A. (2020). Kant, Hume and the Interruption of Dogmatic Slumber. New York: OUP. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096748.001.0001

Bayle, P. (1697). Dictionaire historique et critique, Tome Second, Seconde Partie: P-Z. Rotterdam: chez Reinier Leers.

Beck, L. W. (1978). A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant. Essays on Kant and Hume. (pp. 111-129). London: YUP.

Boehm, O. (2015). Kant’s Critique of Spinoza. New York: OUP. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199354801.001.0001

Boehm, O. (2016). The Principle of Sufficient Reason, the Ontological Argument and the Is/Ought Distinction. European Journal of Philosophy, 24(3), 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12130

Boer, K. de. (2019). Kant’s Response to Hume’s Critique of Pure Reason. Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie, 101(3), 376-406. https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2019-3003

Falkenstein, L. (1995). The Great Light of 1769 - A Humeian Awakening? Comments on Lothar Kreimendahl’s Account of Hume’s Influence on Kant. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 77(1), 63-79.

Henrich, D. (1965). Über Kants Entwicklungsgeschichte. Philosophische Rundschau, 13(3-4), 252-263.

Henrich, D. (1967). Kants Denken 1762-63: Über den Ursprung der Unterscheidung analytischer und synthetischer Urteile. In H. Heimsoeth, D. Henrich, & G. Tonelli (Hrsg.), Studien zu Kants philosophischer Entwicklung (S. 7-36). Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

Hinske, N. (1965). Kants Begriff der Antinomie und die Etappen seiner Ausarbeitung. Kant-Studien, 56(3-4), 485-496. https://doi.org/10.1515/kant.1965.56.3-4.485

Hume, D. (2007). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding And Other Writings (Buckle S., Ed.). Cambridge: CUP.

Jacobi, F. (1998). Schriften zum Spinozastreit. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. https://doi.org/10.28937/978-3-7873-3373-8

Kant, I. (1961). Vorlesungen über Philosophische Enzyklopädie. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.

Kant, I. (1998). Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Hamburg: Meiner. https://doi.org/10.28937/978-3-7873-2112-4

Kant, I. (2001). Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können. Hamburg: Meiner. https://doi.org/10.28937/978-3-7873-2114-8

Kant, I. (2015). Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. http://doi.org/10.28937/978-3-7873-2183-4

Kant, I. (2018). Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Present Itself as a Science. [In Ukrainian]. (Ed. & Trans. V. Terletsky). Kharkiv: Folio.

Kemp-Smith, N. (2003). A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230595965

Kreimendahl, L. (2015). Eine neue Hypothese zu Kants früher philosophische Entwicklung? Erwiderung auf Wolfgang Kienzler. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 69(1), 43-60. https://doi.org/10.3196/004433015814697861

Kreines, J. (2008). Metaphysics without Pre-Critical Monism: Hegel on Lower-Level Natural Kinds and the Structure of Reality. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 29(1-2), 48-70. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026352320000077X

Kuehn, M. (1983a). Dating Kant's «Vorlesungen über Philosophische Enzyklopädie«. Kant-Studien, 74(3), 302-313. https://doi.org/10.1515/kant.1983.74.3.302

Kuehn, M. (1983b). Hume’s Antinomies. Hume Studies, 9(1), 25-45. https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0520

Kuehn, M. (1983c). Kant’s Conception of Hume’s Problem. Journal of History of Philosophy, 21(2), 175-183. https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1983.0051

Longuenesse, B. (2001). Kant’s Deconstruction of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 9(1), 67-87. https://doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview2001917

Reid, T. (1782). Thomas Reid’s, DD. Lehrer der Moral auf der Universität zu Glasgow, Untersuchung über den menschlichen Geist: nach den Grundsätzen des gemeinen Menschenverstandes. Leipzig: Schwickert.

Spinoza, B. (1999). Ethik in geometrischer Ordnung dargestellt. (W. Bartuschat, Hrsg.). Hamburg: Meiner.

Watkins, E. (2004). Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality. Cambridge: CUP. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614217


Abstract views: 226
PDF Downloads: 63
Published
2020-12-22
How to Cite
Chorny, V. (2020). Kant and the “awakening” from the rationalist principle of sufficient reason. Sententiae, 39(2), 104-123. https://doi.org/10.31649/sent39.02.104
Section
DISCUSSIONS

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.