Problematic Reflection on Awareness of Scepsis` Nature: Sextus Empiricus and Kant

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https://doi.org/10.31649/sent03.01.058

Abstract

The author`s aim is to prove, that scepsis in aspects of scepticism can be compared in wider perspective with other philosophical movements. Because Sextus Empiricus says about sceptical abiloty in general, then he says about its transcendental dimension. Hence we can speak about scepsis as such. Fundamentality of sceptical ability allows it to stay the same in thinking of Sextus Empiricus, Kant, Descartes, Plato. Scepsis differs from scepticism as general from local. Scepsis arguments, in contrast with scepticism arguments, are universal, hence actual for philosophers of any movement or time. Therefore sceptics lack prioritized acces to scepsis. Sceptics can be called victims of scepsis, because scepsis has to be considered regardless of scepticism. Sceptical way of thinking is included in Kant`s thought adequately, in its prior form, nonetheless it does not lead to scepticism. Hence, Sextus Empiricus is not writing everything real about himself: his words do represent essence of scepsis. Kant has won.

References

Kant, I. (1967). Regarding the question proposed for the prize by the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences: what real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the times of Leibniz and Wolff? [In Russian]. In I. Kant, Works in 6 vol. (Vol. 6, pp. 177-256). Moscow: Mysl.

Sextus Empiricus. (1976). Works in 2 vol. (Vol. 2). [In Russian]. Moscow: Mysl.

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Published

2001-06-25

How to Cite

Kiriienko, S. (2001). Problematic Reflection on Awareness of Scepsis` Nature: Sextus Empiricus and Kant. Sententiae, 3(1), 58–67. https://doi.org/10.31649/sent03.01.058

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