TY - JOUR AU - Bondar, Oleg PY - 2021/11/30 Y2 - 2024/03/28 TI - Gödel`s Ontological Argument, Positive Properties, and Gaunilist Objection JF - Sententiae JA - Sent VL - 40 IS - 3 SE - ARTICLES DO - 10.31649/sent40.03.056 UR - https://sententiae.vntu.edu.ua/index.php/sententiae/article/view/598 SP - 56-67 AB - <p>The article is devoted to Gödel’s ontological argument, its place in the history of philosophy, and the current debate over the validity of ontological proof. First, we argue that Gödel's argument is a necessary step in the history of the development of ontological proof. Second, we show that Gödel’s argument (namely, its core concept of “positive property”) is based on implausible axiological principles (this fact raises many objections like Hajek’s counter-argument), but can be appropriately reformulated in terms of plausible axiological principles (Gustafsson’s argument). Also, we consider the debate over the validity of Gödel’s argument between contemporary neo-Gaunilist Graham Oppy and the advocate of Gödel’s ontological proof Michael Gettings. We conclude that Gödel’s ontological argument is immune to Oppy’s neo-Gaunilism. Finally, given the fact that Oppy’s parody is arguably the most fine-grained Gaunilo-style argument in the history of philosophy, we conclude that Gaunilist line of argumentation, even if successful in refuting Anselm’s ontological proof of God’s existence, does not work against Gödel’s ontological argument (what is evidenced by the results of the debate between Oppy and Gettings).</p> ER -