ROUSSEAU IN NARRATIVES OF KYIV ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHERS OF THE LATE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

Introduction

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that nowadays the figure of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his philosophical and pedagogical works establish the canon, that every competent educator should master. Articles on Rousseau are contained in well-known encyclopaedias, and special articles dealing with his legacy are usually included in encyclopaedias and specialised dictionaries. Detailed records of Rousseau’s pedagogical ideas can be found in widely used manuals and tutorials on the history and philosophy of education. It is clear that these records reflect the results of previous philosophical studies and are based on the assessments of reputable scholars for a certain educational community. The authors of studies devoted to Rousseau emphasise that the Swiss thinker had a huge impact on modern European intellectual history [Wokler 1995], and the ideas contained in his novel “Emile, or On Education”, one of the most influential works in philosophy and history of education [Chambliss 1996: 566-571], still remain a source of humanistic pedagogy and the philosophic basis of the modern school [Bloom 1977: 3-4]. As Bernadette Baker notes, the canonization of Rousseau’s “Emile” in English-speaking philosophical and pedagogical literature occurred in the second half of the 20th century, and in today’s philosophy of education, the highest degree of this work’s significance is considered granted [Bernadette 2001: 1-43]. However, since the beginning of the 21st century, articles criticising this narrative have appeared in several Western journals that specialise in the philosophy of education. In particular, the studies authored by Bernadette Baker [Bernadette 2001], Jürgen Oelkers [Oelkers 2002], Laurence D. Cooper [Cooper 2002], Fritz Osterwalder [Osterwalder 2012], and others, revealing the ideological sources and historical context of Rousseau’s creativity and further reception of his ideas, show that his innovative works are significantly overvalued. These authors argue that the reason for the canonization of Rousseau’s works was not so much the thinker’s genius as the quite specific and immediate ideological attitudes of the narrators.

We will notice a certain difference if we compare this tendency with the “Rousseau narratives” that prevail in modern Ukrainian humanities. Authors of Ukrainian encyclopaedic editions on education undoubtedly refer to Rousseau’s works calling them pedagogical classics, noting that he left a great mark on the history of all humankind [Kravets 2008: 792-
At the same time, in manuals and tutorials on the history of pedagogy, essays on the author of “Emile” and his pedagogical ideas are accompanied by such assessments that testify that the problematic nature of Rousseau’s status as a philosopher of education has not been realised in Ukrainian science yet. Thus, one of the fairly common narratives is laid within the framework of the Marxist paradigm of class struggle, inherited from Soviet manuals on the history of pedagogy. From the educational texts of this type, easily accessible through the Internet, one can get to know that Rousseau “as a representative of the revolutionary petite bourgeoisie used to sharply and consistently criticise feudal education and put forward the idea of upbringing a free person” [Levkivskyi 1999: 69]. Moreover, his system, despite having some flaws, in particular idealising the children’s natural development and free education, was permeated with deep democratism [Levkivskyi 2011: 34-36]. Another narrative, while presenting Rousseau’s theoretical gains as “one of the greatest peaks of human thought” and “a source of renewal of the educational theory and practice,” calls Jan Amos Komenský (Comenius), “the father of modern pedagogy”. But, as it turns out, such a view on Rousseau has its source in a manual written by a Russian author and then translated into Ukrainian [Dzhurynskyi 1998]. Therefore, it should be noted that the figure of Rousseau in the Ukrainian manual and tutorials on the history of pedagogy is present not because his ideas are philosophically reconsidered through the prism of modern Ukraine’s values, but because of cultural inertia and/or passive following of the Russian-speaking models.

Meanwhile, nowadays the Rousseau narrative, as has been noted, occupies a central place in educational discourse and is of great importance in philosophic validating the concepts of modern schooling and upbringing. The assessment of the pedagogical ideas of the Swiss thinker is a litmus test reflecting the assessing person’s own attitude to childhood as a special period of human life and the child’s right to free development. Of course, when such assessments circulate in the field of pedagogical education that aims to serve a particular society and its school needs, then one should take into account something more that modern cultural trends. It is also important to pay attention to the experience of the adoption of Rousseau’s ideas by this society’s philosophical culture.

From this point of view, the legacy of the intellectual tradition formed by the Kyiv academic institutions in the 19th and early 20th centuries, i.e. Kyiv Theological Academy and Saint Volodymyr University, should be interesting for the modern philosophy of education in Ukraine. Hereafter, I will call it “the Kyiv academic tradition.” It is clear that this tradition sometimes included thinkers with extremely different worldviews. The Kyiv academic tradition can tentatively be divided into two branches that corresponded with these two higher educational institutions. One was theologically oriented, academic, conservative, and rooted in the Eastern Orthodox/Christian ideological ground, and the other was more university-type, liberal, and West-oriented.

Representatives of this broad tradition made a significant contribution to the institutionalisation of pedagogy as an academic discipline not only in Ukraine but also in the Russian Empire in general. Kyiv academic philosophers were the first in the history of national higher education to start teaching systematic pedagogy courses from the pulpit of the university and/or theological academy. Thanks to these courses, the problems of upbringing and education became the object of special philosophic theorising and the subject of academic teaching. The logic and content of the pedagogy courses of Kyiv professors differed, but all of them were based on the philosophic concept of pedagogical education. This approach implied that pedagogical education was a preparation for well-thought creative activity that was expected to support comprehensive personal development based on an integral philosophic
and pedagogical worldview. Therefore, in their teaching and research, these Kyiv academic philosophers understood and practised pedagogy as a philosophy of upbringing and education. They did not claim to create educational projects based on any specific philosophical system but focused on the understanding of specific phenomena – childhood, upbringing, education, socio-pedagogical institutions, their essential and cultural features, and especially the problem of freedom in education. A dialogue with thinkers of the past and the present, as well as a critical review of common attitudes and ideas, were the features of their philosophising style. That is why historical material was widely used in their teaching and discussions of pedagogical problems.

Certainly, Rousseau was one of the thinkers whose ideas the Kyiv academicians studied. Unfortunately, among their works, we cannot find papers specially dedicated to the Swiss thinker, but instead, we find essays on him in course notes, manuals, and reviews. Nevertheless, these scattered historical and pedagogical texts contain a certain cognitive potential, which could be revealed through the use of methodological tools developed in the works of the Polish thinker Jerzy Topolski [Topolskyi 2012] and his followers. These tools, targeting detection of the historical narrative structure, allow one to see its direction and hidden motive forces (values, motivation). Therefore, this study aims to analyse the semantic dynamics of narratives about Rousseau in the Kyiv academic philosophy by separating the informational layer from the rhetorical one in their content and identifying hidden (unarticulated) elements that determined both the general nature of an essay and the value judgments of the narrators.

Rousseau through the eyes of Kyiv Theological Academy’s community: the Stranger and the Other

Pamfil Yurkevych

It is well known that Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ideas and works were known to the Russian-educated public since the 18th century. At that time, his works circulated usually in their French versions. The Russian translation of the Swiss thinker’s main pedagogical work, the novel “Emile, or On Education”, was published in 1807 in Moscow [Russo 1807]. However, his ideas were not the subject of either professional research or academic teaching until the late 19th century.

Speaking about the higher educational institutions of the Russian Empire, one should say that the first time when Rousseau’s pedagogical ideas became the object of academic review was when thinkers formed in the intellectual environment of Kyiv Theological Academy turned to his writings. In particular, professor of philosophy Pamfil Yurkevych [Tkachuk 2016] began to analyse Rousseau’s theory of education in detail in his pedagogy course he taught at Moscow University in the late 1860s [Yurkevych 1866]. This course was not published, but the professor published his thoughts on Rousseau’s philosophical and pedagogical ideas in the form of journal reviews [Yurkevych 1865, 1870]. The mentioned sources allow us not only to reconstruct Yurkevych’s narrative about Rousseau but also to single out its informational, rhetorical, theoretical, and ideological layers.

In his lectures on pedagogy, Yurkevych represents Rousseau as Plato’s antagonist in the philosophical understanding of education. Having described Rousseau’s biography, he focuses on the key philosophic and pedagogical innovations the Swiss thinker introduced. In particular, Yurkevych explores statements about the radical goodness of a child’s nature, as well as about religious education based on universal religion. In fact, Yurkevych presents these theses, so to speak, in broad strokes, focusing on their detailed philosophical criticism.
In particular, the Kyiv academician calls the thesis about the radical goodness of a child’s nature the “main delusion” of the entire Rousseauist pedagogical system [Yurkevych 1866: 86]. If a child’s moral corruption is caused by the influence of corrupted adult generations, then, he asks, what responsibility does Rousseau place on parents and educators? It is not a specific person who is guilty of misconduct and crimes, but the people and society that brought him up, because, by providing bad examples, surrounding children with all kinds of superstitions and prohibitions, they misdirected their development. Yurkevych believes that this is where the pedagogy of abstract humanity originates, the false values of which, demanding to “follow the child”, deny the need for requirements and discipline [ibid.: 156, 170]. To illustrate it, Yurkevych compares the moods and aspirations of young people brought up according to the pedagogical systems of Plato and Rousseau. When, according to Plato, the Kyiv thinker notes, a young man was ideally brought up to be energetic, confident in the victory of good, capable of being “a guardian of society” and sacrificially serving it [ibid.: 42-43], then Rousseau’s Emile in his green years is “a cold boy who was trained to become independent, without feelings for humanity and God. He submits to necessity and seeks only what is useful, does not need love, is prepared for earthly existence, with strong muscles and a flat understanding of the sensual world, without the need to know what its essence is” [ibid.: 128-129].

Yurkevych also criticises Rousseau’s statement that there is no metaphysical corruption by original sin in the human heart; rather, it is the culture that corrupts a person. The Kyiv philosopher agrees that the aim of upbringing and school training depends on whether the child is considered to be corrupted by original sin. However, he does not seek to rehabilitate culture or show the usefulness of the dogma of original sin for pedagogical consciousness. Considering the very question about the naturalism or supernaturalism of children’s propensity to some kinds of evil (which is itself unnatural), Yurkevych thinks that the contradictory character of human mental life is quite obvious, and therefore he goes into theological reasoning based on the orthodox Christian tradition to explain it. According to its doctrine, good is the eternal principle of the human spirit, while evil is a state, a position, a fact, and a possibility to have judgments of the mind. Therefore, the child, being the bearer of a portion of the divine spirit, is full of love from birth. It results in his having a natural sense of his emotional inseparability, first from the mother and then from the family. That is, it is natural for a child to feel like a part of the human community and it is unnatural to grow up outside of a social environment. That is why Yurkevych says that the Rousseauist idea of growing

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1 Rousseau, in fact, denied the Catholic doctrine of man’s creation and original sin, which states that the Creator empowered man with two opposite principles – sensual and rational, and so that they did not conflict, imposed on man “the blessed bonds of righteousness.” When the original sin occurred and the “bonds of righteousness” were lost (human nature was radically corrupted), sensuality turned into a nest of sin and started to dominate the mind. Therefore, the task of earthly life is to establish the power of reason over sinful sensuality. In this context, it is clear that a child, whose mind has not been developed yet and cannot control sensuality, is logically considered as being prone to sin. Therefore, it is logical to try to protect him from evil by restraining sensual urges. On the other hand, there is the doctrine of man as God’s image that cannot be destroyed by any sin that prevailed in the dogmatics of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Here, more attention is paid to the triad “body-soul-spirit,” in which the spirit dominates his counterparts from the very creation, and even after the fall of the first people, no part of human being has been damaged. Instead, the original hierarchy is broken and the spirit hides in the depths of the subconscious. From now on, a person must learn to recognise and realise its needs and desires. In such a coordinate system, it is quite a logical question how to help children feel the needs of their own spirit and follow them.
up as “a man of nature” outside of civilization and culture is unnatural and, once we give it up, upbringing in a social environment will become not something outside or around nature, but a natural environment for children, like water for fish [ibid.: 89].

The second part of Yurkevych’s narrative that presents Rousseau’s philosophic and pedagogical doctrine is the concept of religious upbringing and education. The Rousseauist project insists that we should abandon the books of Divine Revelation and, instead, help the child to “discover” God on his own, through the study of nature. Then, in the spirit of social agreement and for the sake of universal peace, people should create a common cult (universal religion) from the three world religions and make children join it at school. As an attempt to implement these ideas, the Kyiv philosopher mentions Philanthropinum. However, in his opinion, Bazedov’s project failed, because it ignored the truth of the “tremendous importance” of pedagogy [ibid.: 92]. What are these truths that are obvious to Yurkevych?

Firstly, he notes, there is no doubt that faith in Divine Providence and governance of the world is hidden in the depths of the human spirit. However, only a few geniuses manage to understand this eternal nature, and for a child who thinks by concrete images, it is inaccessible as a speechless dogma and a distant abstraction. Therefore, by implanting in education the religion of “pure reason,” the religion of philosophers, we violate Rousseau’s requirement of correspondence between education itself and the children’s nature, i.e. their mental capabilities.

Secondly, Yurkevych notes, we as humanity, while reading “The Book of Nature,” are still too ignorant to understand nature’s Creator. To support this idea, he quotes Blaise Pascal when he admits his own inability to substantiate his faith in the Creator as exclusively empirical (“But seeing see too much to deny and too little to affirm, I am in a pitiful state in which I have wished a hundred times that, if a God is upholding it, nature should proclaim him unequivocally; and that, if the signs it gives of him are deceitful, it should suppress them completely; it should say all or nothing, so that I could see which course I ought to follow” [Pascal 1999: 165-166]) [Yurkevych 1866: 92]. If such a great thinker accepts his inability to know the Creator through “the Book of Nature”, what about a child’s ability to do it?

At the same time, Yurkevych again following Blaise Pascal has other arguments against universal religion at school (“All that we need to know is that we are wretched, corrupt, separated from God, but redeemed by Jesus Christ. And that is what we have wonderful proofs of on earth. And so the two proofs of corruption and Redemption are drawn from the ungodly, who live indifferent to religion, and from the Jews, who are its irreconcilable enemies” [Pascal 1999: 166]). He emphasises that Christians cannot give up their faith in God who out of his love for a man sacrificed His Son [Yurkevych 1866: 93]. Moreover, the Christian Church, as a truly moral union of God and humanity, protects the absolute rights of man (to eternal life and bliss, to truth and justice) and does not put up with injustice in its absolute sense. In this sense, the state is an institution that is much weaker ideologically, as it can guarantee the protection of only some rights [Yurkevych 1999: 56]. That is why the state always seeks the support of churches and must delegate to the Local Church the right to religious education at school. After all, the church expresses and embodies the perception of Christianity in the experience, holidays, and rituals of a certain historical community, the concrete idea of which is quite understandable to both ordinary people and children. Therefore, the children’s religious education should be based on the specifics of the faith of their fathers and not on the abstractions of universal religion (which is also supported by the fact that this is the parents’ natural right).
As we can see, in Yurkevych’s lecture course the informational core of the historical and philosophic narrative on Rousseau is limited to the necessary minimum. Instead, powerful rhetorical layering aims to convince students of the immaturity and artificiality of the Swiss thinker’s pedagogical assertions. To do this, Yurkevych uses almost the entire arsenal of classical rhetoric’s techniques, such as logical argumentation, reference to authorities (quotation of Blaise Pascal, church dogmas), appeal to common sense and students’ life experience, use of rhetorical tropes (such as: “cold boy, ... without feeling... seeking only the useful things”), etc. Unfortunately, from the handwritten notes of Yurkevych’s pedagogy course, one can only guess about the ideological basis of Rousseauism’s criticism. However, another Kyiv academician’s review of one of the first Russian-speaking manuals on the history of pedagogy, being a paraphrase of the works of German researchers Karl Schmidt and Karl Raumer [Modzalevskyi 1867], provides a unique opportunity to reveal the theoretical and methodological layer of this narrative. This manual was written by Leonid Modzalevskyi, and, in particular, contains an essay on Rousseau and his pedagogical ideas. Although Schmidt and Raumer gave opposite assessments of the Swiss thinker’s personality and doctrine, Modzalevskyi prefers Schmidt’s panegyric and, following him, declares Rousseau the founder of a new, humane, doctrine on upbringing. Reacting to the claim that makes Rousseau one of the key figures in the history of pedagogy, Yurkevych considers it necessary to expose the reasons for the extraordinary popularity of this outstanding writer and explain why his theory of philosophy of education should not be taken as the cornerstone of modern pedagogy.

Undoubtedly, the main reason for the wide popularity of Rousseau’s philosophical and pedagogical ideas, as has been pointed out by Yurkevych, is his strong faith in man’s original purity and his considering the conscience to be not an accidental mental phenomenon, but the evidence of the higher and eternal spiritual existence. It is these moral truths that, despite being mixed with sophisms, add to Rousseau’s works an attractive, magical power [Yurkevych 1870: 182]. This is also enhanced by the extraordinary literary gift the Swiss thinker has as well as his brilliant literary style. Together with his boundless courage to make assertions and formulate objections, it fascinates the reader and hinders critical vision. On the other hand, Rousseau’s success was caused by the fact that he had met the needs of a wide, usually half-ignorant educated audience that had tended to “feel uncomfortable without the wind in their heads.” These were the people who did not understand the relations between things like noise and its effect and believed that fortress walls could fall because of a powerful outcry [ibid.: 689, 692].

Meanwhile, as Yurkevych emphasised, we can discover the true significance of Rousseau’s figure in the history of upbringing and philosophy of education when we clearly and simply identify norms, models, and ideas for comparing historical facts because we penetrate the essence of human history only by distinguishing the phenomena of good and evil, truth and delusions, perfections and weaknesses [ibid.: 3]. Considering this, Rousseau’s biography written by Karl Raumer is an exemplary one for the Kyiv thinker. Yurkevych accepts the assessment Raumer gives of the “weird and wild” personality of the Swiss thinker in his biography as fundamentally correct. Here, Rousseau is described as selfish, extremely morally corrupt, narcissistic, and unscrupulous [ibid.: 7-11]. Moreover, the Kyiv philosopher refutes the arguments that try to vindicate Rousseau’s status. Yurkevych notes that any attempt to explain all of Rousseau’s moral faults with the “delusions of the age” deprives the thinker’s personality of his subjectivity and denies his identity. The Kyiv academician also considers the assertion that Rousseau’s works deserve a non-judgmental perception to be...
crude sophism. Instead, he asks whether the scientific study of Rousseau’s writings would be a true one if it did not distinguish between true views, exact observations, false conclusions, and elegant sophisms. In the end, he notes, the source of such arguments is the statement that passions should not be lamented or ridiculed but explained as a mathematical task. But still, it is worth remembering that apart from this, a person is neither a thing nor an event in a chain of causes and effects, but a moral individual who has self-responsibility [ibid.: 9]. Therefore, the Kyiv philosopher asserts that, when evaluating Rousseau’s pedagogical doctrine, it makes sense to focus on the exhortation that comes from the Sermon on the Mount: “By their deeds, you will know them. Does a man gather grapes from thorns or figs from briars?” (Matthew, 7:16). Thus, he emphasises, one should not expect absolutely and unequivocally true pedagogical ideas from a person in a moral state similar to that of Rousseau, who without remorse tells how he has sent his own children to an asylum for certain death.

Moreover, one cannot make him into a “pedagogical idol”, declaring him to be a proclaimer of a new, Christian-humane era in upbringing, because the ideological basis of such upbringing, according to Yurkevych, was formed by completely different thinkers. These are the Greek Plato and the Slav Jan Amos Komenský, who introduced new and higher ideas into the pedagogical world and defined the fundamental principles of truly human education [ibid.: 16].

So, summing up all the mentioned above, one needs to conclude that Yurkevych deliberately formulates some theoretical and methodological principles upon which one can create a philosophic and pedagogical narrative about Rousseau. For the Kyiv philosopher, it is obvious that such a historical-pedagogical narrative should be based on Christian values, which are the yardstick for distinguishing between good and evil, truth and delusion, not only in the philosophic and pedagogical theories themselves but also in the moral characters of their authors. According to Yurkevych, one should look at the philosophical aspect of the history of education through this prism. Only this prism can provide a holistic vision of the process of development of the pedagogical consciousness of humanity and an adequate understanding of the individual thinkers and figures’ role in it. Given this consideration, Rousseau and his pedagogical postulates should be evaluated not at all as the beginning of a new era, but simply as an interesting case study in the history of the development of philosophic and pedagogical ideas.

**Sylvester Gogotskyi**

Attempts to create narratives on Rousseau and his philosophical theory of education were made by another graduate of Kyiv Theological Academy Sylvester Gogotskyi [Tkachuk 2015], professor of philosophy at the Saint Volodymyr University and the author of the first Russian-language encyclopaedic dictionary of philosophy [Gogotskyi 1857-1873].

This Kyiv philosopher composed an article on education in his dictionary where he opposed the three fundamental principles of Rousseauism, not always, however, naming their author directly. In particular, postulating that a person’s life should be an active embodiment of the laws of verity, truth, and love, he asks whether “the natural state [our italics. – S.K., L.B] of the person is such as to be able to fulfil his assignment without the help and assistance of others?” He then answers that it would be impossible to achieve such a degree of internal moral development without other people’s assistance. By these people, he means those specifically prepared for the difficult task of upbringing not only outside the educated society but even inside it [Gogotskyi 1857: 553]. It is obvious that here Gogotskyi refers to Rousseau’s assertions that the ideal for a person is his natural state, i.e. one intact by civilization.
Therefore, since the child, as a creature not yet corrupted by civilization, is radically good from birth, the whole secret of upbringing is not to bring up.

Secondly, the Kyiv academician argues against Rousseau’s imperative that the only skill that should be developed in a child is the absence of any skills. The goal of education, as stated by Gogotskyi, is not only the understanding and acceptance of higher truths and rules but also the implementation of “intelligent, moral skills” in various forms of life and activity. It is desirable that these skills become automatic, and a person acts morally similar to the usual movement of a musician’s fingers over an instrument’s strings.

Thirdly, Gogotskyi speaks out against Rousseau directly and categorically: “Rousseau’s pedagogical cosmopolitanism is pure nonsense” [ibid.: 557]. He grounds his objection on the fact that upbringing outside of “people’s life” deprives the child of any moral basis for future activity.

In the article “Pedagogy” in the same philosophical dictionary, Gogotskyi refers Rousseau (along with Michel Montaigne and John Locke) to the thinkers of the 18th century who managed to develop “original new views” on education. The Kyiv philosopher specifies his assessment of Rousseau in a dictionary article devoted specifically to the Swiss thinker [Gogotskyi 1872: 291-297]. In this article, Gogotskyi adds biographical information about Rousseau. After that, in a section where he presents and describes the Swiss thinker’s works, Gogotskyi notes that the unique solutions to the problems of knowledge, upbringing, religious, moral, and social life proposed by Rousseau have “some value in the history of philosophy and mainly in the history of general intellectual development” [ibid.: 293]. Gogotskyi says that Rousseau’s higher beliefs are based not on the principles of abstract thinking, but on personal feelings, internal states, and moods, resulting in paradoxical, illogical, inconsistent statements presented in his works. Despite being a drawback, it adds an emotionally attractive personal colouring to everything the Swiss thinker wrote.

Gogotskyi expresses himself with restraint in the essay on the pedagogical novel “Emile”. On the one hand, the Kyiv academician admits that this work contains many excellent thoughts, such as attention to a child’s physical condition, the need for direct parental care, and the creation of space for natural personality development. On the other hand, he reproaches Rousseau that in defending his ideas he has gone to the extremes by denying the necessity of “positive requirements” to the child (by this, he means obedience and discipline) and the connection of education with social institutions. Therefore, Gogotskyi concludes, due to the exaggeration of the idea of natural development, Rousseau’s pedagogy acquires a somewhat dreamy, detached-from-reality character [ibid.: 287].

Hence, summing up the observations of Gogotsky’s essays on Rousseau, one should see that his polemical orientation is similar to that of Yurkevych. The information core of Gogotsky’s historical-philosophical construct on Rousseau is as concise as possible, and its dominant rhetorical layer, though not so categorically, is aimed at convincing the reader of the contradictions and inappropriate radicalism of the philosophic and pedagogical theory of the famous Swiss man.

Markellin Olesnitskyi and Mykola Makkaveiskyi

The view on Rousseau presented by Yurkevych and Gogotskyi was further specified and developed in the pedagogy courses of professors Markellin Olesnitskyi [Kuzmina 2016b] and Mykola Makkaveiskyi [Kuzmina 2016a] of Kyiv Theological Academy. Unfortunately, we have only manuscripts containing curricula of their lecture courses on the history of pedagogy. But based on them, we can get a certain overview of what and how Rousseau and his
philosophical and pedagogical ideas were presented to the students of this educational institution in the second half of the 1870s–1910s [Olesnitsyi 1874-1875, 1875-1876, 1886-1887, 1889-1890; Makkaveiskyi 1898-1899, 1904-1905].

First of all, Olesnytskyi and Makkaveiskyi in their lectures paid attention to the ideological context where the philosophic doctrines on education used to appear and function. Accordingly, their essays referred to Rousseau chronologically and in the cultural-historical aspect of the French Enlightenment. Both professors saw the worldview origins of Rousseau’s philosophical and pedagogical theory in the ideological current represented prominently by John Locke. The only difference was that Olesnitskyi labeled this current “realism,” and Makkaveiskyi “subjective naturalism.” An essential component of their lectures is a description of Rousseau’s personality, as well as a description of the key philosophic ideas of his novel “Emile, or On Education”. Olesnitskyi considers it necessary to give his comments on Sofia’s upbringing. And, in conclusion, both professors present their criticism of Rousseau’s philosophy of education.

The studied sources allow us to conclude that in the Kyiv Theological Academy of the 1870s–1910s, Rousseau entered the canon of pedagogy teaching despite the negative evaluations of his personality and his philosophy of education. The narrative on him was formed according to the academic norms of the 19th century, which required factual accuracy of the historical presentation, insisted on the connection with the cultural context, and valued chronological sequence and emotional detachment. Thus, we see in it an information core that conveys key information about the personality and philosophical and pedagogical ideas of the Swiss thinker. At the same time, the available sources, which are limited just to the curricula of lecture courses, do not allow us to get a complete picture of the rhetorical layer of this historical construct. Referring to the composition of the courses, we can only guess that Olesnitskyi and Makkaveiskyi did not consider Rousseau a revolutionary in philosophic and pedagogical theorising or a proclaimer of a new era in education.

As we can see, during the late 19th–early 20th centuries the figure of Rousseau and his pedagogical ideas were an integral component of the historical and philosophical discourse of the Kyiv spiritual-academic tradition. At the same time, Kyiv Eastern-Orthodox professors were not Rousseau’s adherents, on the contrary, they were sceptical of him. We can outline a certain paradigm within which they presented the image of the Swiss thinker. It is obvious that the basis of this paradigm was the principle of value judgement through the prism of Eastern Orthodox Christian dogmatics, which did not allow the possibility of forming neutral statements and abstracting ideas from the facts of the author’s biography, moral instructions, attitudes, and actions (“you will know them by their fruits”). And since from this point of view both Rousseau himself and his educational theory looked quite extravagant, and therefore attractive to the public at large, the conservative spiritual and academic community considered it their duty to prevent the spread of pedagogical illusions through thorough theological, philosophical, and psychological criticism. At the same time, it is impossible to overlook how Rousseau with his sermon on the child’s freedom was interesting for the professors of the Kyiv Theological Academy. It was so because the issue of delineating the space of freedom in education was the key one for them. Probably, these two factors determined the position of Rousseau in the history of education, as well as the appearance of specific semantic and evaluative accents in their essays on him. However, based on the available sources, we see how the heated rhetorical layer of the Rousseau narrative in the Kyiv spiritual and academic tradition had gradually been cooling down over time. While in the essays by Yurkevych and Gogotskyi, he appeared in the image of the Stranger, later, in
the courses of Olesnitskyi and Makkaveyskyi, the emotional temperature decreased significantly, and he became almost an image of the Other. At the same time, the intention to form a reader’s critical attitude toward Rousseau and his philosophy of education remained unchanged.

Rousseau in the discourse of Kyiv University professors: the Self

Oleksandr Selikhanovych

We can see a completely different picture in the liberal branch of the Kyiv academic tradition, which developed in Saint Volodymyr University’s environment. Oleksandr Selikhanovych [Kuzmina 2006] widely articulates the narrative on Rousseau in the guidelines for the history of pedagogy [Selikhanovych 1917]. As for the manual, this is a rather long essay with 17 pages of thick text. It is clearly structured following the requirements for educational literature and consists of a biography, a general description of creativity and worldview, an analysis of the Swiss thinker’s pedagogical theory, and, in the end, a concise assessment of his achievements, creative insights, and delusions is presented. As for its detailing and scope, this narrative is comparable with the fragment of Yurkevych’s above-mentioned lecture course at Moscow University, where the basic philosophic and pedagogical postulates of Rousseauism are analysed as well. However, the principles of presentation radically differ. While Yurkevych provides substantial criticism of every aspect of Rousseau’s philosophy of education, Selikhanovych chooses the position of a distant observer. Highlighting the informational core of his narrative, we should note that it almost completely conveys the content of “Emile, or On Education.” The only exception is the omission of two elements, that is, the extensive religious and philosophical part of the novel, and the idea of a universal religion as a way of moral improvement of humanity. However, the author’s positive attitude toward Rousseau becomes quite obvious when we look at the rhetorical layer and evaluative propositions in Selikhanovych’s narrative. On the one hand, the Kyiv professor mentions the personal flaws the Swiss thinker had (weak will, dreaminess) as well as his immoral actions, inconsistency, and illogicality of his theories. On the other hand, he justifies them with extreme emotionality and sincerity of feelings, calling Rousseau’s literary works immortal, and himself a genius, “a poet of ideas,” whose creative imagination forms a “new amazing world of art” emerging from poor reality [ibid.: 111-112]. Therefore, Selikhanovych quite predictably completes his essay with the conclusion that in Rousseau’s philosophic and pedagogical constructions, despite all their one-sidedness and exaggeration, one can always find a sound grain. In addition, there is no single idea in all modern theoretical pedagogy for which a prototype would not be found in Rousseau’s works. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to call the Swiss thinker the founder of all modern theoretical pedagogy [ibid.: 124].

However, the above-mentioned cannot be taken to be the ultimate basis for a conclusion that the hidden intention of Selikhanovych’s narrative is the idealisation of Rousseau and the formation of an uncritical attitude to his philosophy of education. Most likely, in the new historical conditions during the destruction of the old ideologically repressive order, and revolutionary events and shifts in social consciousness in 1917, the Kyiv professor tried to create an objective image of Rousseau, not distorted by the censorship, in order to reveal the innovative and humanistic potential of his philosophy of education without old ideological prejudices. Several questions to review accompanying the text material of the manual serve as indirect evidence of this [ibid.: 124-125]. These questions require the students to be aware of the biography facts and an accurate presentation of the writer’s views on the fundamental
problems of education, except the last one which foresees formulating an evaluative judgement on the significance of his pedagogical ideas.

Based on the given facts, the idea arises that Selikhanovych, unlike the professors of Kyiv Theological Academy, perceived Rousseau as the Self. His person was regarded as someone worthy of trust, admiration, and following. Vasyl Zenkovskyi, the last representative of the Kyiv academic tradition of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, seemed to treat Rousseau with the same understanding and trust. However, completely different nuances were presented in his own version of the Rousseau narrative.

**Vasyl Zenkovskyi**

First of all, Zenkovskyi [Tkachuk 2002a], despite his corporate involvement in the university, the secular branch of the Kyiv academic tradition, grounds his philosophy and activities on deeply rooted Christian beliefs. That is why, when considering the phenomenon of Rousseau in the pedagogy course [Zenkovskyi 1996], he focuses on the connection between the pedagogical doctrine of the outstanding writer with Christianity. In his judgments on Rousseau’s role in the history of philosophical and pedagogical thought, Zenkovskyi defines the essence of the new idea, which Rousseau managed to articulate clearly, loudly, and understandably. This is “pedagogical naturalism” as the statement about the radical goodness of a child’s nature which requires the recognition of his right to unconditional acceptance and love, and therefore the right to be himself and develop himself freely, according to natural laws. At the same time, Zenkovskyi notes that Rousseau stood on the shoulders of such giants as Jan Amos Komenský and John Locke. The former substantiated the principle of naturalness of upbringing, and the latter demanded attention to the individuality of the child and the creation of conditions for his natural powers’ exploration [ibid.: 15-17].

Zenkovskyi’s own attitude towards this key postulate of Rousseau’s philosophy of education is extremely contradictory. On the one hand, the Kyiv thinker must admit: Christianity was not reflected much in pedagogy before Rousseau’s time and education was mainly based on the strict exhortations of the “The Wisdom of Jesus, son of Sirach,” a deuterocanonical Old Testament book [ibid.: 16]. But “Emile, or On Education” as a pedagogical novel is permeated with “such love for the child that refers us to the way the children were regarded by the New Testament” [ibid.: 15]. Actually, Rousseau’s statement about children’s natural goodness is in line with the Christian worldview [ibid.: 17]. On the other hand, paradoxically, Rousseau separates pedagogical thought from Christianity, because he admires the child’s nature from a purely naturalistic, godless point of view and rejects the original sin and natural evil in children [ibid.: 16]. According to Zenkovskyi, Rousseau’s idea to create a healthy, normal person without God, using only the human mind, leads to pedagogical thought the wrong way, because it prevents seeing the child’s development in terms of its inconsistency and completeness. Nevertheless, the Kyiv professor emphasises that Rousseau is the main inspirer of modern pedagogy, and the most important pedagogical currents of the 19th century were formed under the influence of his ideas [ibid.: 16, 18].

As you can see, Zenkovskyi’s essay does not include a description of Rousseau’s biography and his educational theory. This is due to the concept of the pedagogy course, in which the Kyiv philosopher aimed to outline with wide strokes the movement of, and historical perspectives on, pedagogical thought. Given this, it is clear why so thin an informational layer of the narrative has been presented. However, the rhetoric and tone of the value judgments leave no doubt: Zenkovskyi treats Rousseau as the Self. Sincerely admiring his innovations and similarly sincerely not understanding his inability to see the roots of his own
beliefs in Christianity, the Kyiv professor can only bitterly admit Rousseau’s guilt in the tragic aberration of the development of pedagogical thinking on a civilizational scale – the separation of pedagogical thought and educational practices from the Christian Church.

As we can see, representatives of the younger generation of the Kyiv academic philosophy change their assessment of Rousseau’s significance in the history of philosophical and pedagogical thought to the opposite one, when compared with the older generation’s views. Explaining this, we think it is worth paying attention to the radical changes in the political context within which they created their narratives. “The History of Pedagogy in the West and Russia,” a manual by Selikhanovych, was published in 1917, during the February Revolution while the liberalisation process was well underway in all spheres of Russian life, and Zenkovskyi, being in emigration, prepared and published his pedagogy course in the 1930s for students of the Saint Sergius Eastern Orthodox Institute in Paris.

**Conclusions**

Thus, comprehending in one glance the historical narrative on Rousseau in the Kyiv academic philosophy of the late 19th and early 20th century, we can observe the following. First of all, Kyiv professors were the first in the Russian Empire to include information on Rousseau’s biography, his works, and philosophical and pedagogical ideas in the curricula and educational literature on pedagogy in higher education (higher educational establishments), which proves that they understood the significance of this figure in the history of philosophy of education. At the same time, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, significant changes in the representation and assessment of the influence of the Swiss thinker on the development of philosophic and pedagogical thought were taking place in the Kyiv academic tradition. While in the 1860s-1870s in the narratives of Kyiv academicians Rousseau was presented rather as a negative character whose ideas had to be known to understand their danger and harmfulness and in the 1880s-1910s he was simply a vivid representative of one of the powerful currents of scientific pedagogy, then, starting from the late 1910s, the Swiss writer appeared to be the progenitor of all modern theoretical pedagogy and, consequently, definitely a positive figure. However, along with this, attention should also be paid to another trend in the presentation of Rousseau’s philosophy of education in the historical excursions of Kyiv professors. Namely, in contrast to the representatives of the older generation, that is, Yurkevych and Gogotskyi, who provided extensive philosophical criticism of the basic postulates of Rousseauism, the representatives of the younger generation, namely, Selikhanovych and Zenkovskyi, limited themselves to only general remarks on their controversial nature.

What caused the appearance of Rousseau in the historical and philosophic narratives of Kyiv professors? Undoubtedly, it was the popularity of his “Emile, or On Education” both in Europe in general and in the Russian Empire in particular. However, there was also another significant factor, the growing attention to the creative heritage of the Swiss thinker paid by recognized leaders of pedagogical science at that time – first of all, by some professors at German universities and teacher-training institutes.

Of course, the authority of German scholars also influenced the assessment of Rousseau’s educational philosophy by Kyiv’s orthodox academicians. However, in creating Rousseau’s image in their educational courses, they did not show their complete dependence on their Western colleagues. Criticism of Rousseau’s educational theory by academicians from Christian easter-orthodox positions was caused by both internal and external factors. The
majority of Kyiv scholars originated from priests’ families, were educated, excluding Zenkovskyi, in church educational institutions (theological schools, seminaries, Kyiv Theological Academy), and belonged to the spiritual order and corporation of theological academic teachers. The latter meant that they were members of a special intellectual community whose research and teaching activities were regulated by the Statutes of Russian theological academies and the rules of theological censorship [Tkachuk 2002b]. But this does not mean that Kyiv’s theological and academic professors were insincere and not independent in their critique of Rousseauism. On the contrary, their attitude to Rousseau's philosophy of education was based on deep personal beliefs, and a holistic philosophical worldview, resulting from rigorous intellectual education, through diligent study of the works of Church Fathers and philosophical classics, primarily the Platonic tradition and German idealism, as required by the spiritual and academic programme of that time. This is also true for university professors, although the conditions at Saint Volodymyr University were somewhat more liberal [Tkachuk 2004]. However, as we saw from their example, the influence that powerful political factors exerted upon the content and rhetoric of the historical and philosophic narrative of such a controversial personality as Jean-Jacques Rousseau should not be underestimated either.

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**Svitlana Kuzmina, Liudmyla Bachurina**

**Rousseau in narratives of Kyiv academic philosophers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries**

This article aims to reveal the semantic dynamics of narratives on Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the heritage of Kyiv academic philosophers of the 19th and early 20th centuries: Pamfil Yurkevych, Sylvester Gogotskyi, Markellin Olesnitskyi, Mykola Makkaveiskyi, Oleksandr Selikhanovych, and Vasyl Zenkovskyi. As a result of analysis of their manuscripts and printed editions (mostly bibliographic rarities) such as lecture courses, overviews, manuals, lexicons, and critique informational and rhetorical layers of the narratives were separated. Keeping almost the same informational core, Kyiv academicians’ stories on Rousseau differ significantly in terms of rhetoric. While the “older generation” goes into philosophical criticism of the pedagogical ideas of the Swiss thinker as the Stranger, the “younger ones”, limiting themselves to remarks about their controversial nature, represent him as the Self. This difference is due to both personal factors and institutional conditions for the development of Kyiv academic philosophy, as well as changes in the general political situation in the period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

**Світлана Кузьміна, Любмила Бачуріна**

**Руссо у наративах київської академічної філософії другої половини ХІХ - початку ХХ ст.**

Мета статті – виявити смислову динаміку наративів про Жан-Жака Руссо у спадщині київських академічних філософій XIX – початку ХХ ст.: Памфіла Юркевича, Сильвестра Гогоцького, Маркеліна Олесницького, Миколи Маккавеїського, Олександра Селіхановича, Василя Зеньковського. В результаті аналізу їхніх рукописів і друкованих праць (здебільшого бібліографічних раритетів), як от конспектів і програм курсів лекцій, підручників, словників, рецензій було відокремлено інформаційний і риторичний шари цих наративів. Зберігаючи майже однакове інформаційне ядро, оповіді київських академістів про Руссо суттєво відрізняються в риторичному плані. Якщо “старше покоління” вдається до
Rousseau in narratives of Kyiv academic philosophers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries

філософської критики педагогічних ідей швейцарського мислителя як Чужого, то “моло-
дші”, обмежуючись зауваженнями щодо їхньої контроверсійності, репрезентують його як
Свого. Ця різниця зумовлюється як особистими чинниками, так і інституційними умо-
вами розвитку київської академічної філософії, а також змінами в загальній політичній
ситуації періоду другої половини XIX – початку XX ст.

Svitlana Kuzmina, Doctor of philosophical sciences, associate professor, Dean of Faculty of Humanity and Social Sciences, Volodymyr Dahl East Ukrainian National University.

Світлана Кузьміна, доктор філософських наук, доцент, декан факультету гуманітарних і соціальних наук, Східноукраїнський національний університет імені Володимира Даля.

e-mail: dr.svitlana.kuzmina@gmail.com

Liudmyla Bachurina, S senior lecturer of the department of foreign philology of V.I.Vernadsky Taurida National University.

Людмила Бачуріна, старший викладач кафедри зарубіжної філології Таврійського націона-
льного університету імені В.І. Вернадського.

e-mail: bachurina2707@gmail.com