NATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AS A SUBJECT OF COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

This article has two main objectives. The first one is to continue the discussion started in Issue 30 of the Journal Sententiae [Khoma 2014], on the subject whether the national philosophy can be a clearly defined research object. Like the previous reply by one of the authors of this article [Yosypenko 2014], our consideration of this issue shall not be relevant to any cases and versions of national philosophies. It shall be focused on the Ukrainian national philosophical tradition if compared with the Polish one. To outline the context for such a comparison, we shall review the above work of the modern Polish historian of philosophy Tomasz Mróz, which shall be the second objective of our article.

The book by Tomasz Mróz, the Professor at Zielona Góra University of Poland, is an interesting example of international university cooperation. It is very symbolic that the lectures on the history of Polish philosophy were delivered and then published in the University of Vilnius: Vilnius is a historic center of spiritual and intellectual life of Lithuanians, Poles, Belarusians and Ukrainians. However, for the historians of the Ukrainian philosophy the book is interesting not only because of its close historical or geographical problems: as considered by the authors of this review, the work by Professor Mróz can be a good incentive for further development of research in the field of historiography of national philosophies in the Eastern Europe. It outlines the conditions of possible definition of the Polish philosophy as a research object, thus suggesting a prospect of comparative research in this field.

The idea of comparative philosophy arose in the 20th century, with the advent, in the intellectual space of Western philosophy, of a fair amount of scientific knowledge on Eastern philosophy. This idea is in comparative studying of theories, systems, and categories within various philosophical traditions. In our viewpoint, such a comparison became possible only when the above theories, systems or categories became a subject of description and analysis in historiography of related traditions. In other words, it became possible when the history of eastern philosophies was started to be written in accordance with principles traditionally used for the history of western philosophy. As far as the authors are concerned, the comparative approach has not yet been used in solving the problem of defining the Ukrainian philosophical tradition as a research object, though the idea of comparative research of national philosophical traditions was introduced by the Ukrainian philosopher Vasyl Lisovyi (1937-2012). Notwithstanding the fact that even the first works on historiography of national philosophies in the Eastern Europe compare “their” philosophy with already set philosophical

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national traditions, these comparisons did not develop into comparative research. This is due mostly to the reasons stated by V. Lisovyi. In his point of view, “ordinary counting of convergent and divergent features in traditions can be disorienting, since each of the principal philosophical concepts in each tradition is connected with other concepts and has its own history. For a comparison (establishing convergent and divergent features) to be justified, first it is necessary to understand the meaning of each term in the context of a certain tradition” [Lisovyi 2008: 18]. In our opinion, this is possible if only the traditions which are the subject of comparison have previously become a subject of description and analysis of the fully-developed historiography. Fully-developed is a historiography which has passed the stage of primary accumulation of knowledge and is developing properly philosophical methods of research and (re)construction of philosophical tradition. In Ukraine, the notion of philosophical historiography in this meaning and the first investigations in this field were initiated in the 1980s by Yuriy Kushakov (1946-2016), and in the field of historiography of national philosophies by Vilen Horsky (1931-2007). The authors of this review have also joined this work recently. And only now, when in Ukraine we can hear regular discussions on methodology of research and (re)construction of the Ukrainian philosophical tradition, the latter can become a full-value subject of comparative research.

Another condition mentioned by V. Lisovyi, is necessary avoidance, within the comparative approach, of two extreme points – consideration of philosophical theories, systems and categories “as general and universal, since their sense can be understood only in the context of certain original cultures” on the one hand, and on the other hand – “the holistic approach urges radical versions of relativism, one of which is a conception of linguistic relativity in its radical forms. According to it, any comparison of intellectual traditions by certain features is impossible, since any concepts in any tradition are interrelated and are an element of the whole: distinguishing of this element from the whole distorts its meaning” [Lisovyi 2008: 18]. In the field of national philosophy research, such approaches, on the one hand, turn to deny the existence of national philosophical traditions and to attempt seeing only the development of elements of “universal” philosophy “in Ukraine”. On the other hand, such approaches are striving to turn the national philosophical tradition into a closed system, with a number of exclusively original and thus incomparable features. It is often intensified by understanding a tradition as something all-embracing and invariable, something which has been once and forever formed in the past and which can be only be followed. And V. Lisovyi points out that a tradition is “a combination of processes of inheriting certain cultural achievements with a renewal, including creation of the radical new” [Lisovyi 2008: 17].

The final reason, in our viewpoint, is a disproportion of the traditional comparative context of the Ukrainian philosophical tradition. Starting from the works by Dmytro Chyzhovskyi (1894–1977), “exemplary” for the Ukrainian philosophical tradition are German, French and British traditions. Referring to them is usually a model of possible national philosophy, important for philosophical traditions being at the stage of formation and self-knowledge. The analyses made by Prof. Mróz prove that the founding fathers of historiography of the Polish philosophy thought in a similar way (p. 22-24). Since, on the one hand, the Ukrainian philosophical tradition is not equal in scale to the above philosophical traditions, and, on the other hand, it is not exotic enough to radically differ from them, direct

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1 He initiated this work as early as in the 1960-70s, in terms of Soviet Marxism, though his most well-known are works on historiography of the Ukrainian philosophy of the 1990-2000s.

2 See, in particular: [Rudenko 2012], [Yosypenko 2013].
comparisons are not very productive. Another philosophical tradition which is in recent decades tended to be included in the list by the Ukrainian philosophical historians – the Russian tradition, suggests considerably more reasons for comparison. These can be common outstanding figures or research fields, for example, the corner concepts for both historiographies are topoi as philosophical ideas in Kyiv Rus or Hryhoriy Skovoroda’s philosophy. However, considering the common base of these topoi, the Ukrainian philosophical historians are inclined to take pains either to prove their belonging to the Ukrainian philosophical tradition only, or, on the contrary, to prove the indissolubility of the two philosophical traditions and the need for uniting them under the name of “domestic” philosophy. At the same time, in our opinion, the historiography of Polish philosophy is a very good “mirror” where one can study the Ukrainian philosophy with the help of comparative research.

As stated by the Author himself, Selected Issues in the History of Polish Philosophy is neither a collection of general lectures nor an introduction to the history of Polish philosophy. In this book Tomasz Mróz first of all aims at summarizing and setting forth, in a stylistically available way, the results of his own original research in the field of history of Polish philosophy. And actually the texts collected under one cover reflect the main directions of Professor Mróz’s work – studies on historiography of Polish philosophy, a research on Platonism reception in Poland and a study of an outstanding figure of one of his predecessors in the field of Polish Platonism and historiography of Polish philosophy – Wincenty Lutosławski. So, being combined, these three case studies form a totally representative image of modern approaches to studying the history of Polish philosophy. What especially stimulates our interest to the work by Tomasz Mróz is that solving the problem of status for the Polish philosophy as a research object is also viewed by him in applying the comparative studies, in particular “studies on the inter-cultural, inter-national reception of philosophical ideas” (p. 17).

The first chapter of the Book entitled “Polish Philosophy” or “Philosophy in Poland”? is dedicated to the analysis of key ideas that occurred in the discussion between Polish philosophers and historians of philosophy on self-determination and character of the Polish philosophy. The Author explains the importance of analyzing this discussion by its impact on the development of approaches to studying the history of Polish philosophy which could be of interest today for investigators of both history of Polish philosophy and other philosophical traditions. The goal and objectives of this review considered, we would like to analyze Tomasz Mróz’s methodological ideas presented in this chapter of the Book, as well as to open out the Author’s point of view on possibility of national philosophy as a clearly defined research object.

The problem of character of Polish philosophy as a research object, including the issue of “national adjectives attributed to philosophical traditions”, is revealed by Tomasz Mróz by means of contrasting two terms which acquired special importance in the discussions of Polish philosophical historians of early 20th century: “philosophy in Poland” and “Polish philosophy” (p. 14-15). In Tomasz Mróz’s viewpoint, the both terms are valid and are used in relation to Polish and any other national philosophy, though they refer to different historical and subject fields of historical and philosophical studies.

It is the Author’s opinion that, the term “history of philosophy in Poland” embraces all philosophical phenomena that appeared in Poland, all philosophical problems disturbing the Poles, all discussions in the Polish philosophical environment: “… the history of philosophy

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3 Detailed bibliography of Polish- and English-language works summarized by the related sections in the Book, is given by Tomasz Mróz in notes 1-3 of the Introduction (p. 9-10).
in Poland” encompasses all the philosophical phenomena that emerged in Poland, all the philosophical problems with which Poles were beset, and all the discussions in the Polish philosophical milieu, on condition that some material trace of these phenomena, problems and discussions has been preserved” (p. 15). Thus the researcher concludes that “… the subject of research of the historian of philosophy in Poland concerns everything on the subject of philosophy that has been written, published, and preserved until contemporary times” (p. 15).

The Author sees the efficiency of such definition of research object of the history of national philosophy first of all in its being available for use in studying the historical and philosophical phenomena of the Renaissance. He also gives examples of thinkers of the past of Polish origin, who kept their Polish identity and were integrated into the common European philosophical context: they did not solve nation’s specific problems and/or did not use the Polish language for their writings. As an example, Tomasz Mróz names Vitello (ca. 1230–after 1280), Copernicus (1473–1543), as well as the Italian philosopher Faustus Socinus (Sozzini, 1539–1604) who spent the last part of his life in Poland. However, in the researcher’s viewpoint, “history of philosophy in Poland” as a methodological approach can be used for classification of more modern philosophers as well, for instance Henryk Struve (1840–1912) and Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938). They had Polish identity but, as in case with Henryk Struve, they were not of Polish origin, or as in case with Kazimierz Twardowski, who founded the Lviv-Warsaw school, they represented traditions with intellectual roots being traced back to Austrian and German philosophies (р. 16).

Despite the conclusive definition of the research object of the national philosophy as “history of philosophy in Poland”, Tomasz Mróz does not as well consider artificial and senseless the subject field of “history of Polish philosophy”: “If the philosophy were considered to be a creation unrelated to the national element, a universal philosophy with no frills like Anglo-Saxon, German, Russian, French or Polish, then the philosophical content would be abstracted from its context, whether geographical, linguistic or cultural. And if philosophy were considered as isolated form any changing circumstances, then philosophy, its questions and answers, would have to be abstracted from the philosophers who asked themselves these questions and answered them” (p. 17).

Tomasz Mróz starts grounding the subject field of “history of Polish philosophy” with a statement on an indissoluble connection of philosophy and national culture: “I think that philosophy, by its very nature, is one of the components of culture, namely intellectual culture. It is also the most synthetic of all cultural components, because the subject of philosophical reflection is culture itself. Since one may indicate cultural differences between peoples and nations in different areas of culture, then one can also observe them in philosophy” (p. 17). And these distinctions, according to the researcher, can be revealed not so much by investigating certain peculiarities and searching for an invariable set of features of a national philosophy (English, German, French or other), as by means of studying communication and a dialogue of various “philosophical worlds”. The Author names this methodological position “studies on the inter-cultural, inter-national reception of philosophical ideas” (p. 17): “Examples of one-way impact or mutual exchange of ideas constitute – at least in my opinion – one of the most interesting historical and philosophical facts. Therefore, in the studies on the history of any “local” philosophy, attention should also be drawn to the history of international reception of the various philosophical currents. The specific and unique character of philosophy in Poland, France, or Germany, is also reflected in the character of the reception of new philosophical ideas. The reception may be selective or incomplete, and sometimes even grotesque, but still, reception often reflects the true colours of the recipient” (p. 17-18).
Having described the discussion on the research subject of history of Polish philosophy in the first half of the 20th century (Henryk Struve, Stanisław Garfein-Garski, Adam Zielenczyk, Roman Ingarden, Bolesław Gawecki), as well as later debates (Wiktor Wąsik, Józef Bańka, Andrzej Walicki, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Stefan Świężawski, Barbara Skarga, Zbigniew Kuderowicz), Tomasz Mróz suggested his own understanding of national philosophy as a research object and methodological principles of its studying.

According to Tomasz Mróz, the basic conclusion of the discussion on the subject of Polish philosophy is a thesis on “the interdisciplinary nature of the history of Polish philosophy”, whose research object is within the subject directions of history of philosophy and history of Polish culture (p. 37). Only together these fields constitute the subject of history of Polish philosophy. As mentioned by Tomasz Mróz, the precise definition of history of Polish philosophy as a research object can be insured in terms of the following methodological principles.

1. The history of Polish philosophy is not to be viewed as a direction which does not deserve a researcher’s attention, being much poorer in its content if compared with the world philosophical accomplishments.

2. One should avoid investigating only the immanent development of history of Polish philosophy.

3. The centre of research should be less influential (minor) authors, though they are to be potentially interesting for the international philosophical community.

4. The subject of research of history of Polish philosophy can be texts that are traditionally not viewed as philosophical.

5. The history of Polish philosophy is to be the subject of research for not only Poles (p. 37).

In our opinion, the above principles set forth by Professor Mróz have great research potential: “rediscovering” of minor authors and/or combination of registers of immanent (“internal”, according to Hegel) and “external” history of philosophy can noticeably change the retrospective of the philosophical thought of the past and correct the “historical memory” of philosophy, what is done successfully by historians of philosophy in relation to most various subjects of research. Moreover, the experience of the 20th century historiography demonstrates that applying any definitions in a history and philosophy research, related to not only history of national philosophy, has clear terms and conditions. At the same time, methodological principles – as Professor Mróz’s principles cited above, are more efficient than definitions: unlike definitions, principles are rather inclusive than exclusive.

The Author’s analysis of the discussions in historiography of Polish philosophy during the 20th century, clarifies for historians of the Ukrainian philosophy the conditions forming the historiography of each of philosophical traditions. In this way it outlines the problems of historiography of the Ukrainian philosophy that are yet to be solved. However, despite the differences, we have much in common, therefore such a comparison also stimulates more general conclusions. Historiographical discussions, similar to those described by Professor Mróz, are often viewed as a purely positivist project, only as discussions on methodology of reception of an always self-identical and clearly defined subject, in this case – history of philosophy which needs most detailed description. At the same time, T. Mróz’s analysis of these discussions, which looks like a reconstruction in “Futures Past” of Polish philosophy, that is drawing a conclusion on research programs of the past generations of Polish philosophers, confirms once again our conviction that in case of a reconstruction of any historical and philosophical phenomenon, such “methodological” discussions actually construct the contours and specific features of this phenomenon. And thus, historiography of national philosophy is not only called for itemizing, in maximum full, investigating and popularizing the
accomplishments of previous generations of any national philosophical tradition. It is also
called for being, according to Evert van der Zweerde’s definition, “the recurrent retrospective
reflection of philosophical culture, in its present-day state, upon its own past. It is, so to speak,
its historical self-awareness. Philosophy always has its own past as part of its present. However,
the representation of that past, made possible by the professional discipline of history of phi-
losophy – where would we be without reliable editions and minute analyses? – is always and
by definition incomplete and selective” [Zweerde 2009: 170].

Such understanding of the role of historiography of philosophy for a certain philosophi-
cal tradition acquires special significance in traditions where the history of national philo-
sophy takes a noticeable place in a philosophical landscape – this is a quote by a researcher in
the history of Russian philosophy. That is why, basing on our own experience in investigat-
ing the historiography of Ukrainian philosophy, it would be very interesting to know about
T. Mróz’s experience in studying the history of Polish philosophy.

First, here are a few remarks on the role of historiography of national philosophy of to-
day. Should it focus on the past philosophy only, or should it be also aimed at searching in
the past of problems important for the present-day science? In particular, should it be aimed
at diagnosing the state of certain national philosophical traditions and outline the ways of
their further development? The answer to this question is in our opinion very important if
considering a tendency clearly illustrated in the first section of the discussions reconstructed
by Professor T. Mróz: during the 20th century, the issue of (self)determination of national
philosophy (Polish in this case) is more and more turning from a problem of all Polish phi-
losophers into a problem of Polish philosophical historians only. Certainly, at the beginning
of the 20th century, Polish philosophers were divided between three empires and, thus three
cultural worlds and education systems, what motivated them to search for a “Polish philos-
ophy” to counterbalance the “philosophy in Poland”. This motif stopped being valid when,
during the 20th century, a Polish system of education and scientific research was created,
where philosophers taught, wrote and largely read in the Polish language. Instead, a long-
lasting Polish philosophical tradition was institutionalized. This leads to another question:
whether the institutionalization of the national philosophical tradition provides for parallel
existence in its terms of, for example, such phenomena as “Polish philosophy”, appealing to
the national cultural experience, and “Philosophy in Poland” aimed at the world philosophy?
Such parallel existence seems most obvious with the philosophical historians where the na-
tional philosophy historians cross little in their interests and research with the historians of
western philosophies, despite the obvious fact that it is impossible to investigate histories of
national philosophies in the Central and Eastern Europe without studying their relations with
western philosophical traditions.

Two other chapters of the Book add and specify the theses set forth in the first chapter.
In the second chapter “Plato’s Reception in Polish Philosophy (1800-1950)” Tomasz Mróz
presents basic results of his own long-continued research of Plato’s reception in Polish phi-
losophy. In particular, Tomasz Mróz applies here the above mentioned methodological po-
osition: “Reception studies in the history of philosophy raise doubts regarding the particular
area of historical studies in philosophy to which they should be affiliated. The research on
the reception of ancient philosophy in modern thought does not belong to the field of history
of ancient philosophy, though the names of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and other ancient
schools and philosophers appear frequently” (p. 45). A variety of approaches to interpreting
Plato’s philosophy by Polish philosophers can be divided, according to the Author, into three
main types differing from each other in the ways of treating Plato’s intellectual heritage and
in its impact (or lack of this impact) on formation of original philosophical ideas in terms of Polish philosophy (p. 10). Apart from purely subjective historical and philosophical importance of studying the “age-long relevance” of Plato’s intellectual heritage, they are for Tomasz Mróz a chance to formulate and consider “The problem of reception in the studies on the history of philosophy” (p. 46-50).

In the view of the first chapter analyses and the above raised issues, this problem can be spread on the history of national philosophies. In the course of the 20th century discussions, the receptions of “alien” philosophies (first of all, modern ones) were often taken by the national philosophy historians only as “impacts” making it impossible for “their” original philosophy to develop. This inherited a lot from the spirit of modern philosophy itself which positioned itself as an innovation in relation to the ancient philosophy. At the same time today, when we have all the grounds to state that any of the western philosophical traditions is based on a combination of rather restricted number of ideas, theories, categories, isn’t it necessary to search for originality of the national philosophy not in its invented ideas, theories and categories, but in national peculiarities of reception and development of their common combination? Yet, if not to hold a position that any national culture independently originates its own philosophy, it should be acknowledged that a national philosophy is, first of all, a national reception of the world philosophical heritage, and only such reception can give birth to something original.

However, if not to identify the reception with an “impact”, where an “alien” philosophy is an active part, and one’s “own” philosophy is a passive recipient, there arises a question of terms and nature of this reception. If reception is always active, selective, motivated, if it means adopting the ideas or theories of a foreign philosophy for its own needs or interpretation of its own problems, then, no doubt, we do not deal with an “impact” of an “alien” philosophy on philosophy “in Poland” or “in Ukraine”, but we deal with reception of a particular idea, figure or trend by the Polish or Ukrainian philosophy. At the same time, with such an outstanding figure as Plato, whose history of reception can be equal to, as in A. Whitehead’s well-known phrase, to the history of the whole western philosophy, it is necessary to differentiate Wirkungsgeschichte, which is rather a history of development of ideas by an author perceived as a carrier of “life-long important ideas”, and Interpretationsgeschichte of his texts in the modern period which can be viewed large-wide – from Historico-philosophical Commentation and to Postmodern Interpretation. Here in this case we deal with interpretation of one’s own problems with Plato’s help: in Wirkungsgeschichte, which perceived Plato as its own author, or in Historico-philosophical Commentation, where texts by Plato (like any other author) are detached from the commentator with an insuperable historical and philosophical distance which does not allow to believe he belongs here and demands from the commentator to delete from the commentary his self (including the national one)? In simple words, Plato’s Reception in Polish Philosophy is rather a page in the history of Polish philosophy or a page of world spread of Plato’s philosophy? Or is it possible to view the works of modern Polish researchers of Plato as a continuation of the long-lasting history of his reception in Poland started by their predecessors?

The third part of the book “Wincenty Lutosławski’s Vilnius Period (1919-1931)”, according to the Author, is purely historical and biographical. It is dedicated to studying the

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4 See: [Yosypenko 2016: 111].

5 It should be noted that it is this part of Tomasz Mróz’s creative work which is best presented by the English-language publications in western editions.
common page of history of philosophy in Poland and Lithuania: Wincenty Lutosławski’s teaching (1863–1954) in Stefan Batory University. We are of the opinion that Tomasz Mróz’s numerous investigations of this out of the common figure are an excellent opportunity of practical evaluation of the theses set forth in the first two chapters of the Book. How to define the historical boundaries of Poland in case of writing the history of philosophy “in Poland”: by its modern or “historical” boundaries? And what is, in this case, the relation to the history of philosophy “in Poland” of Wincenty Lutosławski, a Professor of Vilnius University and a private docent of Kazan University? And if defining the “Polish nature” of the Polish philosophy only by its relation to the Polish culture, what is the place of the works by W. Lutosławski (holding “a separate and unique position in the history of Polish reception of Plato”, p. 55) that are valuable for philosophers from other countries regardless of their relation to the Polish culture?

Such questions arise when studying the numerous outstanding figures of Polish and Ukrainian philosophies, urging to revaluate the methodological principles of the research. In the light of Tomasz Mróz’s principles stated above, his investigation of W. Lutosławski’s figure gives rise to two questions. Is not W. Lutosławski’s figure a good example of the above mentioned “minor author who could be potentially interesting for the international philosophical milieu”? And not only international, if to consider a Tomasz Mróz’s statement that, at the turn of the 20th century, Wincenty Lutosławski’s name was “a synonym of Polish philosophy in the world, especially in the Anglo-Saxon community”6. Is not the investigation of such minor authors able to change the customary vision of the Polish philosophy and its presence in the international philosophical community during the 19th-20th centuries? There is another question – what is the way such a research is to be carried out? What is the importance of rejection of the “only immanent research” in Polish philosophy and reconstruction (with archive sources, as in this section) of all that “constitutes the institutional basis of the national Polish tradition: educational and scientific institutions that determine methods of teaching, qualifying and classifying and provide for ways of setting philosophical problems and solving them… learned communities with their intellectual practices” [Yosypenko 2014: 57]? We are of the opinion that a comparison of options of these two approaches, as well as the correlation of various case studies in the Tomasz Mróz’s book – the analysis of rather vast historiographical discussions and the investigation of a philosopher’s reception and biography, conclusively proves that in the field of national philosophy, a philosophical historian deals with not only original theories having a unique set of features, but with a number of various phenomena, each requiring a different research method. Moreover, a combination of these phenomena by one of the features only is usually impossible. Supporting the Tomasz Mróz’s idea that the history of national philosophy as a subject is on the verge of history of philosophy and history of national culture, we would like to note that the national philosophy phenomena are differently related to national culture. The national culture itself is not something fixed, with an invariable set of features: it is a combination of most various factors – language, educational institutions, memory places, and historical narratives. And philosophical activity is based on the “crosstalk” of all these factors being of a philosopher’s immediate interest. Through this, no national philosophy can have a full and/or exemplary set of features, and defining an invariant of national philosophy due to the minimal number of features would narrow in advance the field of research. Therefore, we find very promising

6 See: [Mróz 2008: 577]; it is very interesting that this assessment is given in comparison with K. Twardowski, whose name will become a “synonym of Polish philosophy in the world” in the 20th century.
the comparative studies in the field of history of national philosophies which enable to evaluate convergences and divergences in their specific cases.

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National Philosophy as a Subject of Comparative Research

The article continues the discussion “Can "national philosophy" be understood as a strictly defined object of research?” initiated in volume XXX of Sententiae. Analyzing Tomasz Mróz’ book “Selected Issues in the History of Polish Philosophy” (2016), the authors compare the problems of historiography of Polish and Ukrainian philosophy. The authors believe that Mróz’ book offers an interesting perspective of comparative study of national philosophical traditions, the idea of which was suggested earlier by Vasyl Lisovy. The authors focus on the heuristic potential of the Mróz’ analysis of discussions concerning possible distinction between the terms “Polish philosophy” and “philosophy in Poland” and his studies of Plato’s reception in Poland. Such analysis allows us to raise several questions: (1) are the studies of “Polish philosophy” and “philosophy in Poland” not mutually exclusive, but, on the contrary, complementary genres of historiography of national philosophy? (2) how to distinguish in the analysis of the reception of a certain philosophical doctrine in national philosophy things pertaining to the history of development of the doctrine itself?
Національна філософія як предмет порівняльного дослідження

Стаття продовжує дискусію «Чи може національна філософія бути точно визначенням дослідницьким об’єктом?», розпочату в XXX числі журналу Sententiae. Відштовхуючись від аналізу книги Томаша Мруза «Selected Issues in the History of Polish Philosophy» (2016), автори здійснюють порівняльний аналіз проблем історіографії польської та української філософії. На думку авторів, книга Мруза пропонує цікаву перспективу компаративного дослідження національних філософських традицій, ідею якої запропонував свого часу Василь Лісовий. Автори зосереджуються на евристичному потенціалі досліджень Т. Мруза (а) дискусій щодо «польської філософії» чи «філософії в Польщі» та (б) рецепції Платона в Польщі. Цей аналіз дає підстави порушити низку питань. Зокрема (1) чи не є дослідження «польської філософії» та «філософії в Польщі» взаємовиключними, а взаємодоповнювальними жанрами історіографії національної філософії? (2) яким чином, аналізуючи рецепцію окремого філософського вчення в національній філософії, ми маємо розрізняти те, що належить історії цієї філософії, і те, що належить історії розвитку саме цього вчення?

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