Peter Lombard’s literary and intellectual legacy has been studied rather diligently since the appearance of Marcia Colish’s magisterial two-volume monograph and Philipp Rosemann’s more accessible, yet equally rigorous studies [Colish 1994; Rosemann 2004; 2007]. As a complement to the flow of new publications in the wake of the global “Lombard research”¹ and as a continuation of my earlier research [Tkachenko 2017] I would like to pay some attention to the Master of the Sentences’ theology. In particular, further studies in his theology proper are needed: a more detailed exposition of the distinctions 38 and 39 would be of some avail for the purpose of clarification of the Lombard’s doctrine of God’s knowledge and its relation to the human free will.

As I have shown elsewhere [Tkachenko 2017: 27-28, passim] Lombard tends to see God’s (fore)knowledge as either his pure awareness of everything knowable or the awareness and actual willing of some future events. At the same time, he denies that the divine knowledge per se causes anything: neither God’s knowledge causes these events to happen, nor are the actually happening events causes for God knowing them. God’s knowledge can be said to cause a thing to happen in a narrow sense only, when it is complemented by his voluntary action. God’s knowledge, in general, is not causative, but God’s knowledge of the good is causative, because he simultaneously knows and wills what is good. Hence, Lombard’s is the traditional compatibilist view of God’s foreknowledge and voluntary activity on the one side and the contingency of the created order and the rational creatures’ free will on the other side. But the details of this conception are yet to be revealed. The distinctions 38 (its last part) and 39 of the Book of Sentences (Libri quattuor sententiarum) or simply the Sentences might shed some light upon the issue and, thus, what follows will be an attempt at clarification of Peter Lombard’s position.²

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² Hereafter I will cite the Lombard’s Latin text from the classical critical edition: [Petrus Lombardus 1971] and in careful comparison to the earlier critical edition: [Petrus Lombardus 1882].
1. Distinction 38: God’s knowledge and the creatures’ free will

The distinctio 38 contains a triple discussion of (1) the allegedly causal character of the foreknowledge, (2) the mechanism and causes of the scientia divina, and (3) its supposed infallibility. Since the first two topics have been discussed elsewhere, now I will present the Sentences’ interpretation of the third question: that about the supposed infallibility of the divine scientia, granted that there exists the free will of rational creatures.

Discussing this issue, Lombard mentions the anonymous critics and poses the hypothetical syllogism with modal logical aspects:

1. God foreknew that such a person would lecture (Deus praescivit hunc lecturum);
2. but it is possible that this person will not lecture (sed potest esse ut iste non legat);
3. and so it may be otherwise than God foreknew (ergo potest aliter esse quam Deus praescivit);

And this syllogism allows continuing the logical chain further:

4. it follows then that God’s foreknowledge is fallible (ergo potest falli Dei praescientia).

The formal structure seems to be this:

(1*) $G \land K (a \land p)$
(2*) $\diamond a \land \neg p$ (which by simplification turns to: $\diamond \neg p$)
(3*) $(G \land K (a \land p)) \land (G \land K (a \land \neg p))$,

which is an apparent contradiction that necessarily questions God’s cognizing ability and its infallibility:

(4*) $\diamond G \neg K$

or

(4**) $G \land P \neg K$,

both of which are problematic.

Peter Lombard sees that this reasoning is “entirely false” (omnino falsum est) both logically and theologically. God’s knowledge must be infallible and perfect by definition (thesis 1), but even from the logical standpoint, the hypothesis trying to prove its fallibility is wrong. He agrees that it “is certainly possible for something not to happen” (Potest equidem non fieri aliquid) (thesis 2). But he denies that it would require that God would not know that. For him, “if a thing were not going to happen, it would not be foreknown by God as happening” (si illud non fieret, nec a Deo praescitum esset fieri). Then his answer is:

5. If something does not happen, then God does not foreknow it as happening or going to happen.

As for the English translation, I will primarily use Giulio Silano’s work: [Peter Lombard 2007], although at times I will refer to Alexis Bugnolo’s translation, published as [Peter Lombard 2014]. My choice of the translation will depend on its supposed closer rendering of the Latin original in my – apparently subjective but not necessarily wrong – view.


4 Sent. 1, dist. 38, cap. 2, no. 1 [Petrus Lombardus 1971: 279; Peter Lombard 2007: 216].
Quite interestingly, he does not put it positively: if a thing were not going to happen, it would be known by God as such, that is, as not happening. But Lombard constructs his argument differently. Its formal structure is this:

Instead of

\[(5*) \text{If } \neg p, \text{ then } G^K \neg p\]

he says:

\[(5) \text{If } \neg p, \text{ then } \neg(G^K \text{ that } p)\]

But this is nothing more than an escape from modal logic to more practical thinking, theorizing in terms of the actual state of affairs. It is here that Lombard easily refutes the “fallibility” argument by the modus tollens:

\[(1*) G^K \text{ that } p\]
\[(2*) \Diamond \neg p\]
\[(5*) \text{But if } \neg p, \text{ then } \neg(G^K \text{ that } p)\]

However, it is not the end, for there is an additional reasoning that the unnamed critics offer. They suggest that a “thing can either happen otherwise than God foreknew, or not otherwise” (Aut aliter potest fieri quam Deus praescivit, aut non aliter). In the first case God’s prescience seems to change or be fallible; in the second case, everything must happen by necessity. But since it is truly possible (2) that a thing can happen otherwise than it actually does, then there is also a possibility for God’s knowledge to be mistaken or changed.

Peter Lombard’s response is surprisingly grammatical and dialectical in the medieval sense. For a modern reader, it would be just to interpret it as a reference to the rules of formal logic and the philosophy of language. Here the magister sententiarum refuses to give a simple answer and points out that such a complex phrase can have a number of meanings. It can mean either “it can happen otherwise than God foreknew” (aliter potest fieri quam Deus praescivit), or “it is possible for what God foreknew not to be” (potest non esse quod Deus praescivit), or “it is impossible for what God foreknew not to be” (impossibile est non esse quod Deus praescivit), or “it is impossible for all things that happen not to be foreknown” (impossibile est non esse praescita omnia quae fiunt). And even these derived or deduced dicta can be interpreted differently.

To solve the riddle, Lombard utilizes the distinction between two approaches to modal propositions: conjunctive reading (coniunctim) and disjunctive reading (disiunctim). The former is to be identified with the Abelardian de sensu or the later medieval in sensu composito, meaning the modal or other logical operator modifies the whole phrase, and/or the phrase is taken as a whole without any additional distinctions. The latter is identical to the Abelardian de re and the later in sensu diviso, meaning either that the modal or other logical operator modifies only one part of the phrase, or that the different parts of the phrase are analyzed separately and rather diachronically. Lombard himself does not give a definition of the two senses, but at least explains that the conjunctive reading is an interpretation of the modal proposition which includes – literally, “implies” – the condition itself (Possunt enim haec coniunctim intelligi, ut conditio sit implicita). But since it is far from being a strict definition, it is right to suggest that he followed the mid-twelfth-century consensus here.

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7 Sent. 1, dist. 38, cap. 2, no. 2 [Petrus Lombardus 1971: 279; Peter Lombard 2007: 216].
That granted, he proceeds and analyzes the aforementioned phrase and similar expressions in the light of this distinction. Here are his resolutions:

- “It cannot happen otherwise than God foreknew” (*Non potest aliter fieri quam Deus praescivit*) is true conjunctively and false disjunctively, for “a thing can happen otherwise than it does, and yet God foreknew that it would happen in this way.” In other words, the conjunctive thesis “It cannot be that (something happens otherwise than God foreknew it)” is true, whereas the disjunctive thesis “A thing cannot happen otherwise than it does and otherwise” is false.

- “It is impossible for a thing not to happen which God foreknew or as God foreknew it” (*impossibile est id non evenire quod Deus praescivit vel cum Deus praescierit*) is true conjunctively and false disjunctively. In other words, the statement “It is impossible for a thing not to happen which God foreknew or as God foreknew it,” is true, whereas the statement “It is impossible for a thing to be and [it does] not happen what God foreknew or as God foreknew it” is false.

- “It is impossible for all that happens not to be foreknown” (*impossibile est non esse praescitum omne quod fit*) is also true conjunctively and false disjunctively. In other words, the statement “It is impossible that (all that happens not be foreknown)” is true, whereas the statement “It is impossible and all that happens not be foreknown” is false.

Hence, it becomes clear that Peter’s answer to these “modal objections” is quite sophisticated and well-defined. He establishes the exhaustive knowledge and infallible foreknowledge of God and also guards the possibility for created things and events to be otherwise than they are, yet without giving any detail about the nature of this possibility: what does the possibility mean? It can mean the things’ potency or power to act or happen otherwise, or a simple logical – in other words, hypothetical – option that it could possibly have been different, or the diachronic contingency, which implies that something might happen otherwise at another time. However, although Lombard does not present such a deep analysis of the problem, he leaves a very rich material for his successors. It will be elaborated on later by his commentators.

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8 In Latin: *Non potest (alter fieri quam Deus praescivit)*. It is my variation of the phrase. Original Lombard’s sloppy formulation is this: *Non potest... quod Deus praesciverit ita fieri et aliter fiat*. Sent. 1, dist. 38, cap. 2, no. 2 [Petrus Lombardus 1971: 279].

9 In Latin: *Non potest aliter fieri / quam Deus praescivit*. This is again my variant. Lombard’s wording is this: *non posse evenire quam eventit, quo modo futurum Deus praescivit* [Petrus Lombardus 1971: 279].

10 In the case of this thesis, Lombard does not formulate the true conjunctive and the false disjunctive proposition. He is content to say: *si coniunctim intelligas, verum dicas; si disiunctim, falsum*. In what follows I present my own reconstructions.

11 In Latin: *impossibile est (id non evenire quod Deus praescivit vel cum Deus praescierit)*.

12 In Latin: *impossibile est / id non evenire quod Deus praescivit vel cum Deus praescierit, or impossibile est id / non evenire quod Deus praescivit vel cum Deus praescierit*.

13 In Latin: *impossibile est (non esse praescitum omne quod fit)*. This is my formulation based on Lombard’s phrasing: *non potest esse utrumque simul, scilicet ut fiat et non sit praescitum*. Sent. 1, dist. 38, cap. 2, no. 2 [Petrus Lombardus 1971: 279].

14 In Latin: *impossibile est / non esse praescitum omne quod fit*. Original wording: *Deum non potuisse non praescire omne quod fit* [Petrus Lombardus 1971: 279].

15 See [Vos 2006: 225-226]. For a detailed and rather exhaustive treatment of the medieval – and, in particular, the twelfth-century – perception of modalities and possibility, see [Knuuttila 1981, 1993: 45-98].
2. Distinction 39: analyzing the power of God’s knowledge

In the next chapter the Master of Sentences asks the question about the capacity of God’s knowledge: can it increase (augeri) or decrease (minui), or maybe change in some other way (mutari)? And he offers two theological paradoxes, which form the background – and, later, the “application” – of his discussion.\(^{17}\)

The first paradox seems to justify the statement that “God can know what He never knows.” (potest Deus scire quod nunquam scit). It can be encapsulated in the following chain of reasoning:

(6) there is someone, who is not going to read today (Est enim aliquis, qui non est lecturus hodie);
(7) yet it can be, that he reads today; for he can read today (et tamen potest esse, ut legat hodie; potest enim hodie legere);
(8) but nothing can come to be, which cannot be known by God (Nihil autem potest fieri, quod non possit a Deo sciri);
(9) Therefore, God can know, that this one (is) going to read today (Potest ergo Deus scire, hunc lecturum hodie),
(10) therefore, He can know something, which He does not know (potest igitur aliquid scire, quod non scit).

It can be formalized:

\[(6^* ) \text{ } b \land \neg p \]
\[(7^* ) \Diamond \text{ } b \land p, \text{ because } b \text{ } p \]
\[(8^* ) \neg ((\Diamond b_1(b_2, b_3 \ldots )) \land (\neg (G^K b_1(b_2, b_3 \ldots )))) \]
\[(9^* ) \text{ therefore } G^K (b \land p) \]
\[(10^* ) \text{ therefore } (G^K p) \land (G^K p) \]

or, alternatively,

\[(8^{**} ) \neg ((\Diamond b_1(b_2, b_3 \ldots )) \land (\neg \Diamond (G^K b_1(b_2, b_3 \ldots )))) \]
\[(9^{**} ) \text{ therefore } \Diamond G^K (b \land p) \]
\[(10^{**} ) (\Diamond G^K p) \land (G^K p) \]

It is a very interesting paradox, whose details – especially with regards to the theses (9) and (10) – remain somewhat unclear, since Lombard does not utilize technical language, nor gives any detailed explications. But he immediately adds another one:

(11) there is someone going to read today, whom God knows (is) going to read (Est enim aliquis hodie lecturus, quem Deus scit lecturum);
(12) but it can be, that he does not read (At potest esse, ut non legat);
(13) therefore, God is able not to know, that he (is) going to read (ergo potest Deus non scire, hunc lecturum);

\(^{17}\) The text of the both paradoxes’ theses is taken directly from Sent. 1, dist. 39, cap. 1, no. 1 [Petrus Lombardus 1971: 280; Peter Lombard 2014: 682].
(14) therefore, He is able not to know something which He does know (potest igitur non scire aliquid quod scit).

It also can be formalized:

\[
(11^*) (c \land p) \land G^K (c \land p)
\]

\[
(12^*) \Diamond (c \land \neg p)
\]

\[
(13^*) \Diamond G^K \neg p
\]

\[
(14^*) (\Diamond G^K \neg p) \land (G^K p)
\]

or, perhaps,

\[
(13^{**}) \Diamond \neg (G^K p)
\]

\[
(14^{**}) (\Diamond G^K \neg p) \land (G^K p)
\]

The same type of unclarity is to be found in the formulation of the second paradox, as well. The formal validity and power of the arguments are not really analyzed here. The dividing line between two different meanings of posse is not drawn either: it can be seen as one’s ability, or as an abstract possibility for something’s (not) happening. And unfortunately, Master Peter is not very rigorous on this.

Yet, what is surely clear is that he agrees that both paradoxes are valid and applicable to theology proper, but denies that they support the idea of changeability of the divine wisdom. It cannot change because it is identical with the essentia Dei, which is perfect and immutable. But the two paradoxical conclusions that (a) God can know something, which he does not know (posse scire quod non scit), and (b) God is able not to know something which He does know (posse non scire quod scit), are true. The former is correct because it is possible that something non-existing in reality is subject to his knowledge (potest aliquid esse subjectum eius scientiae quod non est). The latter is true because it is possible that something that does exist in reality is not subject to his knowledge without any change within or of his knowledge (posset non esse subjectum aliquid quod est sine permutatione ipsius scientiae). The first conclusion seems to imply God’s knowledge of not (yet) realized possibilities, while the second is more mysterious as it speaks of God’s potency not to know what he knows. The nature of such a hypothetical opportunity is uncertain but both cases show that it is logically possible that God’s potency includes a wide range of additional opportunities.

Thus, once again Lombard does not fully unpack an extremely promising theme, but still, he makes his point and does not shy away from more speculative questions. Of course, he refuses to go deeper in his philosophizing and “dialecticizing” but he shows his good acumen in this realm. Moreover, from the theological point of view, he defends the thesis about the permanent and unchanging nature of scientia divina by means of returning to his perfect essence theology. Additionally, he adds two more insights.

He includes a Trinitarian perspective to the discussion and also tells something about the “divine cognizing mechanism.” With the help of Augustine, he establishes that when we

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18 See Silano’s translation with his preference for “to be capable of” or “to be able to” as English renderings of posse in [Peter Lombard 2007: 217].
19 See Bugnolo’s translation used above with his opting for neutral phrases like “it can be that” or more ability-oriented but still broad “can” in [Peter Lombard 2014: 682].
22 Augustine, De Trinitate, book 15, cap. 14, no. 23; cap. 13, no. 22.
speak of the divine knowledge we mean the one knowledge of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, so that the knowledge of God is always the triune knowledge. It means that all three persons “know and see all things simultaneously,” fully and unchangeably (simul omnia scient et vident). Consequently, the divine knowledge is always instantaneous and simultaneous, functioning sub specie aeternitatis.

Consequently, God cannot know things newly or with a connection to the time of Actua (noviter vel ex tempore). He knows everything that happens in time from his eternity (ab aeterno). We may not know how exactly it works, but there is no reason to suppose his dependence on the flow of time. Therefore, he cannot “begin to know or foreknow anything” (non tamen potest incipere scire vel praescire), nor can he “have known” or “be about to know” with similar references to time. Any such category has a meaning only inside the time frame, which does not exist in the eternity. This is why it is impossible to impose this time-bound type of sayings on God. Nevertheless, God’s eternal knowledge captures whatever can be captured epistemically.

Moreover, God can know not only what happens – or happened, or will happen – in the created universe. He also can know what he can do (quod potest facere), including possibilities, which will never be realized (quod nunquam fiet), and things or events with no actuality at all (quod nunquam fiet, nec est, nec fuit). It is right even to say that he “can now know or foreknow what he did not know or foreknow from eternity” (posse scire vel praescire quod ab aeterno non scivit vel praescivit). This phrase is true when we mean by it that God has the potency or “the power of knowing and foreknowing something from eternity and now, and yet the thing foreknown neither is, nor will be” (habere potentiam sciendi et praesciendi ab aeterno et modo aliquid, nec illud tamen praescitum est vel futurum).

What is interesting in this discourse on the possibilities of God’s knowledge is that Peter Lombard constantly uses the potest verb without actually saying that God does know this or that set of possibilities. He feels comfortable with highlighting God’s power but does not want to make some sorts of theological declarations. The last phrase is the epitome of this humble and accurate approach: God is able to know a thing, which he did not know yet. In other words, God’s knowledge can potentially include more information than he knows now (scire plura quam scit) but still, it cannot and will not change. Such a paradoxical conclusion – once again – is easily explicated in this way: quantitatively his knowledge could have been – and as Lombard argues here, potentially can be – different, qualitatively it is always the same – full, exhausting, and comprehensive. What changes is the number or the quality of the things that are subject to the divine wisdom, not the character of the wisdom itself.

Having said that, Peter Lombard closes the distinction 39 with some final – but not unimportant – theological remarks. He notes that providence (providentia) as “knowing care” that God takes for his creation does not have to be interpreted as the knowledge of particulars, individuals and their specific situations at this or that given moment of time. For example, God cares “universally for all the things which he made, so that each of them should have what is owed to, and suitable for, it” (Providentiam ergo et curam universaliter de cunctis quae condidit habet, ut habeat unumquodque quod sibi debetur et convenit). In the same way, he has the full statistical information about the population or the life-and-death events in the life of

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23 Sent. 1, dist. 39, cap. 1, no. 3 [Petrus Lombardus 1971: 281; Peter Lombard 2007: 218].
lice, flies, or fishes. But God does not know this “at each single moment” (per momenta singula). Yet, his knowledge of these nuances is permanently full, for he sees all these and similar “things simultaneously and always” (simul et semper omnia). It sounds confusing.

The main point here is about the universal divine providence which cares for each creature, although in different ways because the rational ones have a special provision (specialem providentiam) while irrational do not. But the words about God’s knowledge of the quantity of lice, flies and other small creature is rather peculiar. Such a knowledge simul et semper is affirmed while such a knowledge per momenta singula is denied. This can mean two things. Either (a) God cannot know things as if by contemplating them from within the time and observing them through each single moment that passes for them (note the Latin preposition “per” here) because he knows everything at once from eternity, or (b) God cannot have a knowledge of time-indexed propositions about the irrational creatures and their life spans because in his knowledge all propositions of this kind have no time indexes — there are but sets of eternally true and eternally false statements. In my view, the latter sounds very unconvincing while the former must be acknowledged as the correct interpretation because of the obvious textual support. The very expression “non scit [Deus] hoc per momenta singula, immo simul et semper omnia” points in that direction. God does not have a knowledge that sees the succession of events in the strict sense and, thus, goes through a succession of moments itself (per momenta) for that would imply change; he rather contemplates all moments and events at once in his eternity. Also, the phrases “per momenta singula” and “simul et semper” modify the verb “scit” and not the object “omnia” so that the time-index applies to the mode of knowing and not to the nature of known propositions or, rather, things and living creatures. Such interpretation does justice to the Lombard’s text and fits in his argument in the distinction 39: God’s knowledge is exhaustive, eternal, and unchanging. And, additionally, once again the extra-temporal and eternal perspective on God’s knowledge is established and promulgated.

Besides, Lombard makes an observation about predestination as another side of the foreknowledge. After quoting Augustine, who says: “predestination is the preparation of grace,

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28 Ibid.
29 As Knuuttila has convincingly shown, after Boethius many eleventh- and twelfth-century theologians and philosophers tended to interpret “statement-making utterances as temporally indeterminate sentences having an implicit or explicit reference to the moment of utterance (now) as a part of their meaning,” but upon this reading the truth value of such statement must change depending on the time of utterance of this statement and then Peter Lombard must have added some rather sophisticated explanations of his position. He speaks here about the divine knowledge which is not connected to the time span, therefore if he means that God knows only the temporally indefinite propositions, it entails the conclusion about the necessary truthfulness or falsity of these propositions. If the proposition is temporally indeterminate and has no connection to the time index of the utterance because it is uttered in the divine eternal now, then it must be either eternally — and, hence, necessarily — true or eternally — and, hence, necessarily — false. See Knuuttila’s explanation: “If it [the Boethian model of modality] is applied… to type sentences at the moment of their utterance, those sentences will be necessarily true if true and necessarily false if false.” [Knuuttila 1993: 53, 2017: section 2]. It is possible but unlikely that Peter Lombard speaks about modal logical concepts here. (1) The topic of the paragraphs concerns universal providence and not truth or falsity of contingent propositions known by God; (2) the discussion lacks specificity and use of the appropriate terminology, for there is no indication of modal concepts; and (3) it would be too pretentious to reconstruct Lombard’s thought about such a complex theme (if it is really discussed here) on the basis of one sentence. His thought moves in a different direction (see above).

30 Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, cap. 10, no. 19.
which cannot be without foreknowledge; but there can be foreknowledge without predestination” (praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio, quae sine praescientia esse non potest; potest autem sine praedestinatione esse praescientia), Master Peter adds a short qualification. Reprobation has to do with the latter and, thus, it is a sphere of foreknowledge’s jurisdiction alone. But predestination is the same as God’s election of, and preparation of the goods for, the elect that happens with his foreknowledge involved.\(^{31}\) The Lombard’s statement about it is very concise and not well-argued. It follows the Augustinian citation and reads: “He predestined those whom he elected but he reprobated the rest, that is, he foreknew that they would sin to eternal death” (Praedestinavit eos quos elegit, reliquis vero reprobavit, id est ad mortem aeternam praescivit peccatos).\(^{32}\) Thus, it seems that God’s reprobation includes only one element – that of knowledge without any activity of his will, whereas God’s predestination consists of two components as it is a simultaneous eternal action of knowledge and will, with no priority or logical order indicated in this distinction.

3. Summarizing remarks: towards the Lombardian understanding of God’s knowledge and its relation to the human free will

For Lombard God’s knowledge (scientia Dei, cognitio Dei) is God’s awareness of and acquaintance with everything knowable. It can be a purely cognitive act as awareness alone (notitia tantum, notitia sola) or a double cognitive and voluntary act as awareness and simultaneous volition in the form of approbation or good pleasure (notitia simul et beneplacito; nomine scientiae includitur etiam beneplacitum atque dispositio). It has been established in the distinctions 35-36 and has not changed in the distinctions 38-39. What has changed is that now Peter Lombard looks at the divine knowledge from a modalized perspective: he asks whether it can (potest) fail, change, or be paradoxical. Thus, God’s cognition is tested against the background of such modal notion as possibility coupled with various specifications: the possibility of failure, the possibility of knowing what is non-existent, the possibility of growing or diminishing, etc.

Quite expectedly, Lombard adheres to a conservative theological viewpoint and states that God’s knowledge is exhaustive, infallible, and unchanging. Whatever happens in the actual world must be recognized as (fore)known by God; whatever does not happen in the actual world must be thought of as something that God did not foreknow and does not know. There is nothing special in this stance — here the Master of the Sentences simply translates and transmits further the traditional Christian doctrine of divine omniscience and perfection.

What is special or, at least, peculiar, however, is the way Lombard uses to express these ideas. For instance, he submits to the principle that “if something does not happen, then God does not foreknow it as happening or going to happen,” but does not put it positively: if a thing were not going to happen, it would be known by God as such, that is, as not happening. Thus, here we can see the reluctance to state too much or to make definite conclusions on difficult matters which is rather typical for Master Peter.

At the same time, the distinctions 38-39 reveal his familiarity with and willingness to use the dialectics in theological discussions. Analyzing the proposition “a thing can either happen otherwise than God foreknew, or not otherwise,” Lombard prefers to avoid a simple answer and employs the logical distinction between the conjunctive and disjunctive readings of complex – both categorical and modal – propositions. Thanks to this dialectical tool which


\(^{32}\) Sent. 1, dist. 39, cap. 4, no. 4 [Petrus Lombardus 1971: 284; Peter Lombard 2007: 220].
was commonplace in the twelfth century he is able to defend the validity and truthfulness of the following statements: “It cannot be that something happens otherwise than God foreknew it;” “It is impossible (for a thing not to happen which God foreknew or as God foreknew it);” and “It is impossible that (all that happens not be foreknown).” But the very fact that Peter Lombard applies some contemporary logical tools to his exposition of traditional Christian teaching, suggested by the very title, logic, and nature of his collection of the authoritative sentences is worth noting.

Yet, the treatment of modalities with regard to God’s knowledge that we find in Lombard’s opus is rather ambiguous and not fully explicated. He says that, for example, God can know something, which he does not know because it is possible that something non-existing in reality is subject to his knowledge, and agrees that God is able not to know something which He does know because it is possible that something that does exist in reality is not subject to his knowledge. But if the former seems to simply imply God’s knowledge of his own not yet realized possibilities, the latter is unclear.

Moreover, the very meaning of the verb posse in Lombard’s text remains ambiguous: sometimes it can be seen as one’s ability or capacity, and sometimes it sounds like a reference to an abstract possibility of something’s (not) happening. The phrases like “potest Deus scire quod nunquam scit” are to be easily interpreted as indicating one’s ability or capacity whereas a sentence of the kind “et tamen potest esse, ut…” is easily read as an impersonal neutral statement: “nevertheless it is possible that…” But the phrases like “nihil autem potest fieri, quod non possit a Deo sciri” or “potest igitur [Deus] aliquid scire, quod non scit” are open to alternative interpretations. Whether we speak of nothing that “can come to be, which cannot be known by God” or of God who “can know something, which He does not know,” it is permissible to switch between two alternates and go into two different interpretive directions. One can think that there is nothing which is capable of coming to be and capable of being (not) known by God, which leads to further paradoxes and questions, and, conversely, one might think of a logical or real possibility of there being nothing that is going to happen which could be unknown to God. In the same vain, the phrase about God’s “posse scire” can read as saying something about God’s ability to know or a possibility that God knows something. In brief, Lombard does not articulate his implied meaning of posse nor gives he any specific definition, whereas his text suggests the alteration of two senses – posse as ability and posse as possibility – without any clear mechanisms of conversion and use.

In any case, in his discourse on the possibilities of God’s knowledge Master Peter systematically uses posse or potest without actually saying that God does know this given set of possibilities. He highlights God’s power but does not make theological declarations about what God actually knows when it comes to some paradoxical states of affairs. God’s knowledge can potentially be different or include alternative state of affairs but it cannot and will not change. This is the line of thought that Lombard defends, but he is not willing to go further.
REFERENCES


Peter Lombard on God’s Knowledge and Its Capacities: *Sententiae*, Book I, Distinctions 38-39


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**Peter Lombard on God’s Knowledge and Its Capacities: *Sententiae*, Book I, Distinctions 38-39**

The global Peter Lombard research reinaugurated in 1990s has resulted in a number of recent publications, but the Master of the Sentences’ theology proper is partially underresearched. In particular, a more detailed exposition of the distinctions 35-41 of his *Book of Sentences* is needed in order to clarify his doctrine of God’s knowledge and its relation to the human free will.

Aiming at this purpose, the article builds on the earlier established evidence that, for Peter Lombard in distinctions 35-38, God’s knowledge, in general, is not causative, although some causative power has to be ascribed to God’s knowledge of the good. The last part of distinction 38 and the content of distinction 39 further analyze the capacities and functionalities of the divine omniscience and explain how it interacts with acts of human will. The key question here deals with the problem of alternative states of affairs: whether something may be otherwise than God foreknew. As it is shown, Master Peter agrees that it is possible for created things and events to be otherwise than they are, but insists that God’s knowledge must be in any case exhaustive and infallible. He uses a number of logical tools to defend the thesis about God’s perfect knowledge and the possibility of things happening otherwise, but lacks strict definition of the notion of “possibility” used here. The study concludes that in few cases Lombard’s *possse* could mean a potency or a simple logical possibility, or the diachronic contingency, but the overall theological statement is clear: potentially, God’s knowledge can be different or include alternative state of affairs but it cannot change. This is the teaching Lombard passed on to his readers and later commentators.
Петро Ломбардський про Боже знання та його здатності: Сентенції, Книга перша, Дистинкції 38-39

Світові дослідження спадщини Петра Ломбардського, знову розпочаті в 1990-х, привели до появи низки публікацій в недавні часи, проте власне теологія цього «магістра септентцій» залишається частиною недоослідженою. Зокрема, існує необхідність в більш детальному вивченні дистинкцій 35-41 його Книги септентцій з метою прояснити його доктрину Божого знання і його взаємодії з людською свободною волею. Орієнтуючись на цю мету, дана стаття відштовхується від вже встановленого факту, що згідно з твердженнями Петра Ломбардського в дистинкціях 35-38 Боже знання в принципі не є каузативним, проте якусь каузальну силу треба приписувати Божому знанню блага. Остання частина дистинкції 38 і зміст дистинкції 39 продовжують аналізувати здатності і функції божественного всезнання і пояснювати, як воно взаємодіє з актами людської волі. Ключове питання дискусії пов’язане з проблемою альтернативних положень справ: чи може що-небудь статися не так, як Бог те передбачив. Як показано в статті, магістр Петро згоден з тим, що створені речі і події можуть відбуватися не так, як вони відбувалися, але наполягає, що в будь-якому випадку Боже знання повинно бути вичерпним і безпомилковим. Він використовує ряд логічних інструментів, щоб захистити тезу про досконалість Божого знання і можливість того, що події могли б відбуватися інакше, однак йому бракує чіткого визначення використовуваного ним поняття «можливість». Дослідження веде до висновку, що в ряді випадків Ломбардово «posse» може означати якесь потенцію або просто логічну можливість, або диахронічну контингентність, проте основна богословська заява зрозуміла: потенційно Боже знання може бути іншим або включає альтернативні положення справ, однак воно не може змінюватися. Таким є вчення, передане Ломбардцем своїм читачам і пізнішим коментаторам.


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