

СЕРЕДНЬОВІЧНА ФІЛОСОФІЯ

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AN ANALYSIS OF ANSELM'S PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF MAN'S FREEDOM IN HIS *DE CONCORDIA*

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to *discover, understand, present and analyze the key ideas of St. Anselm concerning the notions of (God's) knowledge, (divine and human) will and the mode of divine-human relations in the context of this «knowledge-will» framework.* It is going to be done on the basis of a specific book written by Anselm of Canterbury and dedicated to the just-announced philosophical and theological problem. This issue – that of the relations between different subjects' «knowledges» and wills – has been regarded as both interesting and even compelling for centuries, and its various nuances have been studied by many thinkers (Augustine, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent, William Ockham and others in the Middle Ages; Calvin, Arminius, Voetius, Descartes, Molina, Suarez, Spinoza and many others in the modern times). This is why its perennial philosophical significance goes without saying.

However, the potential of medieval discussions on the discussed subject has not been fully uncovered and brought to the fore. Specifically, Anselm's work entitled «On the harmony (or agreement) of the foreknowledge, and predestination, and grace of God with the free choice» and frequently abbreviated *De Concordia* did not receive sufficient attention and analytical consideration. Some classical introductions to the history of – medieval or generally western – philosophy (e.g. by Gilson, Kenny, Copleston and some others) give only fragmentary and partial information about the whole issue, sometimes omitting or underemphasizing the Anselmian contribution. Some scholars conducting a more detailed research on the topic (e.g. Craig [Craig, 1988], Hopkins¹ and Visser and Williams²) do more justice to both the topic and its treatment by St. Anselm. Nevertheless, Craig due to some reasons omits Anselm in his exposition of medieval theories of the divine foreknowledge and its relation to the theoretically contingent future of creatures, Hopkins concentrates on other treatises by Anselm and at one point even mistranslates him (I will show and discuss it later), and Visser and Williams present a good exposition of

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¹ See chapters «Doctrine of Man, Freedom, and Evil» in [Hopkins, 1972: p. 122–186]. Cf. [Hopkins, 1967; especially P. 26–44].

² See chapters «Modality» and «Freedom» in [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 149–169, 171–191]; see also [Visser & Williams, 2004: p. 179–203].

Anselm's view, yet they do not fully unfold the conceptual contents of the *De Concordia*. This is why a systematic exposition and (re)analysis of this oeuvre, together with a reappraisal of its author's theology of the knowledge and the will, is needed.

Thus, the object of the given paper is a specific area of Anselm of Canterbury's philosophical theology: the understanding of relations between God's (fore)knowledge and will on the one side and human free will on the other. The material source for such a study is to be found in such oeuvres as his earlier *De libertate arbitrii* (DLA) [Anselmus, 1938b] and *De casu diaboli* (DCD), and later *De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae dei cum libero arbitrio* (DC) [Evans, 2002: p. 86–87]. But it is the latter work that will be examined in detail within the scope of this essay, although from time to time I will refer to or mention the former ones or even some others (e.g. *Cur Deus homo*). Hence, by and large, this essay is primarily an examination of St. Anselm's *De Concordia* and the ideas contained in it.

The Latin text is taken from the critical edition of Anselm's *Opera Omnia*, edited and published by F.S. Schmitt [Anselmus, 1940b]. The English translation is taken from the edition of Anselm's key theological and philosophical texts prepared and published by J. Hopkins and H. Richardson [Anselm, 2000d]. I will avoid referring to the specific pages of these magnificent collections of primary texts and prefer to cite them according to the internal division of the text: DC (title = *De Concordia*) II (book), 3 (paragraph).

As for the tools used for conceptual and philosophical analysis of this medieval text, I will employ insights and observations made by Jasper Hopkins [Hopkins, 1972; & 2003: p. 138–151], G.R. Evans [Evans, 2002], Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams [Visser & Williams, 2009] and some others. But primarily I will draw upon Hopkins' and Evans' work, although, as I hope, my dependence on them will not bear an uncritical and overwhelming character. My specific goal here is to see what understanding Anselm of Canterbury had of the knowledge and the will in God and in humans, and in which sense it was (not) unique, (not) innovative or possibly influential for later generations of medieval thinkers. It is crucial to know that before one starts investigating any later medieval developments (such as the thought of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas on the subject), since the medieval theology is a story of continuity and discontinuity and of preservation and constant renewal of western thinking [De Rijk, 1985: p. 68–69; Bély, 2013: p. 413]. Hence, these continuities and discontinuities need not to be overlooked and have to be carefully analyzed.

1. Terminological and conceptual introduction to St. Anselm's thinking on the «knowledge-and-will» issues

Before proceeding to the survey and analysis of the text of the *De Concordia*, I would like to shortly introduce and clarify terms and concepts which Anselm uses when writing about the «knowledge-and-will» issues. Of specific importance are such terms and concepts as (fore)knowledge (*prae*scientia), predestination (*praedestiantio*), will (*voluntas*), choice (*arbitrium*), necessity (*necessitas*), freedom (of the will) (*libertas*), and, finally, grace (*gratia*). Their meanings should be explained in the following manner on the basis of Anselm's own definitions and explications³.

³ I put this short glossary in the beginning for purely didactic reasons. In fact, this section was written only after some basic studies in the primary texts have been done. Thus, it is not to be understood as my own reading *into* Anselm's text or an unlawful imposition of my own ideas *upon* his world of thought. Rather, it is an effort to clarify the terms and concepts used as early and as clearly as possible.

Scientia always refers to the knowledge – whether divine or human – of the true fact, real person or real thing. Thus, it means the possession of the truthful information about some really existing objects or really happening events. Consequently, *praescientia* refers to the – divine only – possession of unquestionably true information about the events which are going to occur in the future. *Nam non est aliud praescire quam scire futurum, et ideo si praescit deus aliquid, necesse est illud esse futurum* (DC I, 3)⁴.

Praedestiantio, quite simply, is the same as foreordination (*praedordinatio*) and predetermination (*praestitutio*). Thus, it means the divine act of deciding on what is going to occur (*praedordinare, quod est statuere futurum esse*) before it has actually occurred (DC II, 1).

Voluntas or *velle* is to be better identified as the *voluntas rationalis* (DLA 13). It means a rational will that can be found both in God and man. «In relation to reason the will is the faculty of *consent* whereby a person chooses to act upon certain of his desires. But the will itself is also an instrument of desire (*concupiscentia et desiderium*)» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 141]. Thus, the *voluntas* is a multifunctional faculty or ability characteristic for rational beings: it can be either (i) the desire or wish for something, *quoniam et concupiscentia et desiderium voluntas est* (DCD 7)⁵, or (ii) the ability to make decisions on the basis of preceding rational deliberation, *atque voluntatis est ut ipsa quoque reprobet ac eligat, quemadmodum rationis intellectus monstrat. Ad hoc enim maxime datae sunt rationali creaturae voluntas et ratio* (DC I, 6)⁶.

In a more complex analysis, the will in Anselm's works means three different things: (a) the deliberative force or «the *instrument* of willing» (*voluntas instrumentum*), interpreted by J. Hopkins as «the faculty of will» itself, (b) the affection (*voluntas affectio*), i.e. «various dispositions, inclinations or affections» of will, and (c) the actual use of this deliberative faculty in light of its dispositions (*voluntas usus*), i.e., the very acts of willing, the volitions themselves (DC III, 11) [Hopkins, 1972: p. 142–143]. These three aspects are to be clearly differentiated – yet, without separation – from one another, since all of them elucidate on the meaning and the mode of functioning of the will as such. Yet, only the first category can serve as a definition of the will *qua* will. The second speaks more of the substructure or specific aspects of the will's activity while the third highlights the practical aspect – the «work» of the faculty.

Arbitrium for Anselm is the same as a rational creature's (free) choice of something or (free) judgment (*iudicium*) on something (DC I, 6). This is the mode of the will's proper functioning. The will is said to operate *per liberum arbitrium* or *sola arbitrii libertate*, when it is not constrained by any kind of necessity and acts *sponte*, i.e. freely, spontaneously, on its own (DC II, 3; III, 1). The archbishop of Canterbury straightforwardly states that there are two options or modes of decision-making: *aut sponte aut ex necessitate* (DLA 2). Thus, the *arbitrium* implies a rational choice or rational decision made freely. A good example of such a choice made can be found in the story of the fall – both that of angels and human beings. Anselm speaks of it, explicating the notion of (free) choice, in DLA 2:

⁴ «...[S]ince to foreknow is nothing other than to know the future; and so if God foreknows some event, it is necessary that this event be going to occur».

Unless otherwise indicated, all the English translations of Anselm's writings are taken from J. Hopkins and H. Richardson's work, already cited above:[Anselm, 2000a; specifically: 2000b; 2000e].

⁵ Unless otherwise indicated, all the Latin quotations from Anselm's writings are taken from [Anselmus, 1938a; 1940a; 1940b].

⁶ «Moreover, it is the prerogative of the will to reject, and to elect, in accordance with what rational discernment teaches. For to this end, especially, will and reason have been given to rational creatures».

*Per liberum arbitrium peccavit apostata angelus sive primus homo, quia per suum arbitrium peccavit, quod sic liberum erat, ut nulla alia re cogi posset ad peccandum. Et ideo iuste reprehenditur, quia cum hanc haberet arbitrii sui libertatem, non aliqua re cogente, non aliqua necessitate, sed sponte peccavit*⁷.

It is obvious, then, that *necessitas* is seen as an opposite of free choice. It refers to an external – in relation to a rational creature with the faculty of will – power of coercion, compulsion and restraint, which he sometimes calls the *vis necessitatis*. *Necessitas enim videtur sonare coactionem vel prohibitionem* (DC I, 1)⁸. It is easy to note that, following Augustine, Anselm «thinks of necessity as either compulsion or prevention – and therefore of freedom as the absence of both» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 156, n. 60]. Hence, the necessity for him means an impersonal power or force of «causal compulsion» which can – and sometimes does – compel or coerce a person to do something unwillingly. As S. Visser and T. Williams put it, «we can understand Anselm's notion of necessity entirely in terms of compulsion. What necessarily is, is what is compelled to be; what necessarily is not, is what is compelled not to be» [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 150].

At the same time it is extremely important to note that Anselm distinguishes between two types of necessity (which will be analyzed in more detail later): the antecedent necessity (*necessitas praecedens*) and the subsequent necessity (*necessitas sequens*). The former actually «causes the event to occur» (*facit rem esse*) while the latter «does not compel anything to occur» (*nihil cogit esse*), but still reflects the necessary truth of «a relation of causal compulsion between concepts» [Idem, p. 158]. Anselm's example of this double notion of necessity is taken from the world of nature: the sunrise can be said to be necessary in both senses (DC I, 3):

*Ortus vero solis duabus necessitatibus futurus intelligitur, scilicet et praecedenti quae facit rem esse – ideo enim erit, quia necesse est ut sit –, et sequenti quae nihil cogit esse, quoniam idcirco necessitate futurus est, quia futurus est*⁹.

Thus, it is one thing when something has to occur because of the natural law or the operation of a certain (external) power, and another – when something has to be called necessary due to a certain logical or ontological principle¹⁰. The difference will be further elucidated in the subsequent sections.

As for the Anselmian notion of *libertas*, it has to be understood also along the Augustinian lines [Hopkins, 1972: p. 157–158]. In general, he speaks of any kind of freedom as ability or power, since *omnis libertas est potestas* (DLA 3)¹¹. But, in specific, most often he prefers to think about the freedom of the will, which he defines as «the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of this uprightness itself» (DLA 3) or, in other words, «the capacity to choose the good» [Evans, 2002: p. 88]. In DC I, 6 he unambiguously says: *Libertas autem ista est : potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudi-*

⁷ «The apostate angel [Satan] and the first man [Adam] sinned by free choice, for [each] sinned by his own choice, which was so free that it could not be compelled by any other thing to sin. Therefore, [each of them] is justly blamed because in spite of having this freedom of choice, each sinned freely and out of no necessity and without being compelled by anything else».

⁸ «For *necessitas* seems to imply coercion or restraint».

⁹ «...[T]he sunrise is understood to be going to occur with two necessities: (1) with a preceding necessity, which causes the event to occur (for the event will occur because it is necessary that it occur), and (2) with a subsequent necessity, which does not compel anything to occur (for because the sunrise is going to occur, it is – necessarily – going to occur)».

¹⁰ Cf. a brief explanation in: [Knuutila, 2004: p. 122f].

¹¹ «...all freedom is ability».

*nem*¹². Thus, this freedom is not a possibility to choose between several options or specifically between the good and the evil, although it is possible that alternative possibilities can appear before the free will. Rather, it is to be identified with the freely exercised ability to choose good and, as a result, possess the uprightness (*rectitudo*) of the will and the soul, since the real uprightness is closely connected to and implies the notions of truth, rightness and justice [Hopkins, 2003: p. 148]. The key thing is that this capacity or power needs to «have its origin in the agent rather than in some external cause» [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 179].

Consequently, the freedom of the will tends to mean but an ability to make non-necessitated, and therefore free, decisions to choose the good (as it is envisaged by the good God). Thus, it is very similar to the notion of the free choice as a voluntary rational choice, although the freedom of the will additionally implies – and St. Anselm constantly highlights that (DC I, 6-7; III, 3-4) – both the rightness of *choice* and the uprightness of the *will* making this choice. Nevertheless, this difference is of relative importance, for in other aspects the concepts of the free will and the free choice seem to overlap. In DLA 13 the archbishop of Canterbury even coins a complex name for their symbiosis: *libertas arbitrii rationalis voluntatis* – «freedom of choice of a rational will» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 141]. However, the idea of alternative possibilities, laid down before this will, should not be utterly dismissed. «Alternative possibilities come into the picture as a kind of by-product. They are not constitutive of freedom; they just happen to be available, given the requirement that free action have its origin within the agent, in conjunction with the relevant circumstances of the particular case» [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 179]. And exactly this «origin within the agent» plus his will's orientation to the good constitute together the Anselmian understanding of the freedom of will.

Finally, *gratia* means but God's saving or «donating» activity whereby he absolutely freely and without any obligation or necessity imposes on or gives to man certain «gifts». By gifts St. Anselm understands either the proper rightness of the will or the justification and final salvation of the sinner. In any case, God's grace plays a crucial role both in the process of human salvation and in the act of «correction» of human will. «Et quamvis non omnibus det, quoniam “cui vult miseretur, et quem vult indurate”: nulli tamen dat pro aliquo praecedenti merito, quoniam “quis prior dedit” deo, “et retribuetur ei?” Si autem voluntas, per liberum arbitrium servando quod accepit, meretur aut augmentum acceptae iustitiae, aut etiam potestatem pro bona voluntate, aut praemium aliquod : haec omnia fructus sunt primae gratiae, et “gratia pro gratia”, et ideo totum est imputandum gratiae, “quia neque volentis est” quod vult, “neque currentis est” quod currit, “sed miserentis est dei”» (DC III, 3)¹³.

Having now shortly introduced the key terms and concepts, I would like to proceed to a presentation of the overall structure and key ideas of the *De Concordia*. The next section will serve this purpose.

¹² «And the freedom [which is under discussion] is the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for its own sake».

¹³ «Now, God does not give to everyone; for “He shows mercy to whom He wills to, and He hardens whom He wills to”. Nevertheless, He does not give to anyone on the basis of any antecedent merit; for “who has first given to God and it shall be recompensed to him?” But if by free choice the will keeps what it has received and thereby merits either an increment of received justice or, as well, the power for a good will, or some kind of reward: all of these are the fruits of the first grace and are “grace for grace”. And so, everything must be imputed to grace because “it is not of him who wills” that he wills “or of him who runs” that he runs, but, instead, “is of God, who shows mercy”».

2. Survey and analysis of the *De Concordia's* key ideas and arguments

The treatise entitled *De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio* consists of three parts which examine different topics, announced in the title. The first part treats the problem of a philosophical and theological harmonization of the divine foreknowledge and the free choice. It consists of seven paragraphs and is properly named – *Quaestio I. De praescientia et libero arbitrio* («First Controversy: Foreknowledge and Free Choice»). The second part is much shorter – it has only three paragraphs – and touches upon a related issue – that of the relation between God's predestination and human's «access» to the same free choice. It is dubbed *Quaestio II. De praedestinatione et libero arbitrio* («Second Controversy: Predestination and Free Choice»). Finally, the third section deals with a purely theological question about the activity of God's grace and the functioning of free will. Its title is *Quaestio III. De gratia et libero arbitrio* («Third Controversy: Grace and Free Choice»). This part is the biggest, consisting of 14 paragraphs. I will briefly introduce the content of each of these sections and look in detail at the arguments and ideas the author sets forth.

2.1. God's foreknowledge and free choice

He starts by formulating the problem at stake and indicating the direction, which he wants to follow in the search for its solution. The issue discussed is that of a possible harmony (*concordia*) or, in reverse, mutual exclusion of God's foreknowledge, predestination and grace on the one side and the free human will on the other. Thus, the bulk of the problem lies in a «seeming opposition between forces which make absolute demands» [Evans, 2002: p. 87; cf. Mumford & Anjum, 2014: p. 21ff] wherein the absoluteness of divine knowledge and power seems to discard or destroy the absoluteness or, at least, reality of the human freedom of choice. And Anselm's basic thesis – or, rather, aspiration – is the conviction that it is possible «simul esse et praescientiam dei, quam sequi necessitas futurarum rerum videtur, et libertatem arbitrii, per quam multa sine ulla necessitate fieri creduntur» (DC I, 1)¹⁴. He offers several arguments in support of his position.

At first (in DC I, 1) he offers a more logical argument *a contrario*:

(1) It seems that it is impossible for God's foreknowledge and human will's free choice¹⁵ to coexist (*simul esse*)¹⁶. [Basic premise]

¹⁴ «...let us posit as existing together both God's foreknowledge (from which the necessity of future things seems to follow) and freedom of choice (by which many actions are believed to be done without any necessity)».

¹⁵ Although Anselm speaks here about the *liberum arbitrium* – the free choice – it is indeed possible and totally adequate to translate it sometimes as the «freedom of will» or «will's free choice» because, (1) as I have noted above and J. Hopkins showed in his research, the two concepts are closely connected in Anselm's philosophy and he really «tends to speak of *voluntas libera* (free will) and *arbitrium liberum* (free choice) interchangeably» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 141]. Additionally, (2) in some cases the translation «free will» fits better with the context of *De Concordia* and the contemporary use these terms. But whenever possible I will try to retain Anselm's own terminology.

¹⁶ Hopkins translates *simul esse* as simply «co-exist». But it also can be translated as «be together», «act jointly», «exist simultaneously», «be at the same time» or even «stand in partnership or combination with each other». See [Glare, 2005], s.v. «simul»; [Stelten, 2004], s.v. «simul».

I will follow Hopkins' wording in most cases but sometimes I am going to disagree with him and offer my reading.

(2) But, logically speaking, impossibility entails some other impossibility: «an impossible thing is one from which, when posited, some other impossible thing follows» (*Quod si est impossibile, oritur inde aliud impossibile*). [Logical premise]

(3) Then, if the co-existence of God's foreknowledge and human free choice is indeed impossible, some kind of impossibility should arise from a postulation of its possibility. But is it impossible?

(4) The assumption that the foreknowledge and the free choice are possibly compatible entails a conclusion that «if something is going to occur without necessity, God foreknows this, since he foreknows all future events» (*si aliquid est futurum sine necessitate, hoc ipsum praescit deus, qui praescit omnia futura*).

(5) Subsequently, if God foreknows this non-necessitated event which happens by free choice, it must occur necessarily (*Quod autem praescit deus, necessitate futurum est, sicut praescitur*).

(6) But then, «it is necessary that something be going to occur without necessity» (*Necesse est igitur aliquid esse futurum sine necessitate*).

(7) As a result, it appears that the two necessities mentioned – that of God's perfect knowledge of all future events and that of God's knowledge of non-necessitated and voluntarily done future events – do not contradict each other. «For, on the one hand, it is necessary that what is foreknown by God be going to occur; and, on the other hand, God foreknows that something is going to occur without any necessity» (*quoniam et necesse est quod deus praescit futurum esse, et deus praescit aliquid esse futurum sine omni necessitate*).

(8) Hence, it becomes obvious that the postulation of a possibility of the (seemingly impossible) coexistence of God's foreknowledge and the free choice does not entail any impossibility (*nulla ex hoc nascitur impossibilitas*). Rather, it produces a thesis about (another) *possibility*: since it is possible to say that God necessarily knows about some necessarily free events in the future, it is also possible to conclude that a certain kind of harmony between the two phenomena – i.e. the necessarily perfect foreknowledge and the necessarily free (non-necessitated) choice – can exist.

This specific form of argument seems to correspond to a basic – yet, implicit – conviction of St. Anselm that «the necessity of a proposition or an inference depends on the self-contradictory character of its negation or rejection» [Weinberg, 1991: p. 62]. Thus, a thesis *A* must be necessarily true if the impossibility of non-*A* has been proven, the Anselmian «*A*» being possibility of the co-existence of God's foreknowledge and human free choice. Since its impossibility was excluded, it must be indeed possible.

Nevertheless, this argument speaks only about a *possible* coexistence and concordance between the two «opposite» things. Therefore, Anselm proceeds to some more constructive theses and hypotheses, which are to prove that this harmony *does* exist and should be rationally accepted. In order to reach this goal he examines the meaning of «necessity», the nature of futurity and eternity, and, afterwards, the mechanism of willing.

Firstly, he qualifies the notion of necessity (DC I, 2): when it is said that something is necessary, or that it is necessary for something to happen (*necesse esse*), or that something happens by necessity (*ex necessitate*) there can be several interpretations. It is not inevitable that necessity be identified with certain power (*vis*) of coercion or compulsion (*coactio*). It can mean a purely logical necessity when, for example, we say that it is necessary for God to be immortal (*necesse est deum esse immortalem*) and not to be unjust (*necesse est deum non esse iniustum*): it is simply logical for a perfect being to be immortal and just,

since the immortality is a perfection and, thus, must be ascribed to God, while injustice is a vice and, thus, must not be said of a divine being. The most perfect being, i.e. that than which nothing greater can be thought (a well-known definition found in Anselm's *Proslogion*), *must* be perfect but this is a *theo-logical* and *onto-logical* necessity¹⁷, simply *discovered* by a rational mind, and not a power of coercion which compels God to be such and such. Hence, this logical necessity, found within and applied to the realm of theology proper, does not necessitate *anything*, since it does not compel or cause *things* or *events*. Thus, it appears to be an example of specific «theo-logic» or theological logic, which avoids real necessitarianism. But Anselm continues his analysis and says even more.

Another distinction should be made between the two seemingly identical *modi loquendi*: (a) *necesse est esse* («it is necessary that [something] is») and (b) *ex necessitate est* («something is [or happens] by necessity») (DC I, 2-4). In Hopkins' wording, «“It is necessary for X to happen” does not always mean the same thing as “X happens by necessity”. For it is not redundant to say “It is necessary for X to happen by necessity” or self-contradictory to say “It is necessary for X to happen freely”» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 159]. It is exactly the point of the theologian from the town of Aosta: he frequently opposes the «by free choice» (*per liberum arbitrium*) and «as the result of freedom-of-will» (*ex libertate voluntatis*) constructs not to the «it is necessary that» (*necesse est*) formulations, but to the «by necessity» (*ex necessitate*) ones (DLA 2; DC I, 4). The latter wording implies a causal relation between the necessity and the event whereby the necessity brings the event about by making it happen (*cogit esse*) or directly «generating» it (*facit esse*) (DC I, 3). This is what I would call a *metaphysical* or *actual* necessity, which is real (it exists as a specific power in the world of *Actua*) and active (it compels, induces or produces things and events). Anselm calls it a «preceding» or antecedent necessity (*necessitas praecedens*) since it «precedes» things both casually and logically. This type of necessity emerges as a cause (*causa est*) of certain events and, in this role, may signify either *natural laws* which operate necessarily (because God created them in this way), or any other *external agency* wherein one «particular concrete object» – be it God, Satan, angel, or human being – somehow induces or forces another «particular concrete object» – be it angel, Satan, or human being – to do something [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 150–154]. Thus, it becomes obvious that the antecedent necessity refers to a physical or metaphysical power which can be identified with the world-order, established by God, or coercive actions of particular beings or entities (who have such power) whereby they directly cause some events or compel other beings to do certain things without participation of these less powerful beings' wills. (The last qualification is based on Anselm's frequent contrast between those events that take place *ex necessitate* and those happening *ex libertate voluntatis* or *per liberum arbitrium*. In the first case there is no reference to willing or voluntary participation of the compelled being in the act that occurs by necessity. But in the second one there is a clear indication that the will of a specific being actively participates in the making of an event's happening.)

However, Anselm contends, there is another kind of necessity, which «does not *affect* anything» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 159] because it has neither causal power, nor (meta)physical

¹⁷ Here, by the term «theo-logical» I mean logic functioning within the realm of theological discourse and by the term «onto-logical» I imply the same logic which has to do with ontological issues, since the question of God's being is always a question of the being per se. After all, in classic medieval thought (Anselm, Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and others) logic is always connected with ontology. «This type of Christian philosophy of language passionately focuses on actual reality» [Vos, 2006: p. 194].

reality. Rather, it is the necessity «which holds when there is a relation of causal compulsion between concepts»¹⁸ and, hence, refers to some unavoidable semantic or logical connections between the terms, concepts or, to certain extent, objects. This relation can be seen in the following examples Anselm draws (DC I, 2):

[1] *Nam cum dico : si erit, ex necessitate erit : hic sequitur necessitas rei positionem, non praecedit.*

[2] *Idem valet, si sic pronuntietur : Quod erit, ex necessitate erit. Non enim aliud significat haec necessitas, nisi quia quod erit non poterit simul non esse.*

[3] *...non idem est rem esse albam, et rem albam esse albam. Lignum enim non est semper necessitate album, quia aliquando priusquam fieret album, potuit non fieri album ; et postquam est album, potest fieri non album. Lignum vero album semper necesse est esse album, quia nec antequam sit, nec postquam est album, fieri potest, ut album simul sit non album*¹⁹.

In every case, the same formula is used [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 159]. The propositions follow either a simpler «identity» pattern:

Necessarily, if p , then p .

or a more complex way of saying the same truth:

Necessarily, if x is F , x is F .

Anyway, his examples with a white staff being necessarily white and the future event being necessarily future obviously tend to be perfect expressions of the two fundamental laws of formal logic: the law of identity ($A = A$) and the law of non-contradiction ($A \neq \text{non-}A$). Thus, a white staff is necessarily a white staff *because* it is exactly what it is, and this cannot be otherwise, *because* a white staff cannot be white and not white at the same time in the same sense. But this kind of logical identification or entailment really «follows, rather than precedes, the presumed existence of the thing». Therefore, quite logically, Anselm calls it a «subsequent necessity» (*necessitas sequens*), which has a bearing on purely logical connection between terms and concepts as well as on some ontological aspects of the reality (e.g. a thing's identity to itself, or the truth value of a statement about certain state of affairs, etc).

In CDH II, 17 Anselm skillfully and clearly contrasts the two *necessitates* with each other (italics are mine):

For there is a necessity which precedes and is the cause of a thing's being the case (*causa est ut sit res*); and there is a necessity which succeeds and is caused by the thing's being the case (*quam res facit*). When the heavens are said to revolve because it is necessary for them to revolve, then this is a necessity which precedes and efficiently causes. But when I say that *because you are speaking, you are – necessarily – speaking*, this is a

¹⁸ [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 158]. Cf. [Hopkins, 1972: p. 79, 159–160]. Hopkins states (p.79) that this is «a kind of necessity which can be ascribed to propositions rather than to events». It can even be called «propositional» whereas the antecedent necessity can be called «natural».

¹⁹ [1] For when I say «If it will occur, of necessity it will occur», here the necessity follows, rather than precedes, the presumed existence of the thing.

[2] The sense is the same if we say «What will be, of necessity will be». For this necessity signifies nothing other than that what will occur will not be able not to occur at the same time.

[3] By comparison, for a thing to be white is not the same as for a white thing to be white. For example, a staff is not always necessarily white, because at some time before it became white it was able not to become white; and after it has become white, it is able to become not-white. But it is necessary that a white staff always be white. For neither before a white thing was white nor after it has become white can it happen that a white thing is not-white at the same time».

necessity which is subsequent and does not efficiently cause anything but, instead, *is caused* (*sequens vero et quae nihil efficit sed fit, est cum dico te ex necessitate loqui, quia loqueris*). For when I make this statement, I signify that nothing can cause it to be the case that while you are speaking you are not speaking; I do not signify that anything is compelling you to speak. For although the force of their natural state compels the heavens to revolve, *no necessity causes you to speak* (*te vero nulla necessitas facit loqui*). Now, wherever there is antecedent necessity there is also subsequent necessity; but it is not the case that where there is subsequent necessity there must be antecedent necessity.

Here we see that the key difference between the two types of necessity is that the antecedent necessity *causes* things and events, and the subsequent necessity *is caused* by things or events²⁰. It is exactly the latter «format» that corresponds to God's mode of foreknowing future events without necessitating them. But it is also evident that there are two types of events – those happening by necessity and those happening by free choice. These two types of necessities and two types of events can form several combinations:

- (i) It is necessary for those events, which happen by necessity to happen.
- (ii) It is necessary for those events, which happen by free choice to happen.
- (iii) It is not necessary for those events, which happen by necessity to happen
- (iv) It is not necessary for those events, which happen by free choice to happen.

Anselm does not discuss the thesis (iii) in DC, but, as was seen in the quotation from CDH, he obviously dismisses this kind of statements, because the antecedent necessity entails the subsequent one and, thus, the proposition (iii) is a contradiction. Proposition (iv) could have served as the model for a «total contingency» – a reality where nothing is necessary and everything depends on free choice's decisions only – but Anselm does not discuss such a possibility. He prefers to concentrate his own and the reader's attention on theses (i) and (ii) instead. He comments on them, gives some examples and applies them to the issue discussed (DC I, 3-4).

Proposition (i) is logically correct and incorporates both types of necessity without any free choice included. It perfectly exemplifies a natural order with its chains of causes and effects as well as any other instances of compulsion or direct causality. The sunrise that has to necessarily occur (by the natural law efficiently causing it, according to God's decision) will necessarily occur (subsequent necessity). Hence, God necessarily knows the future events, which have to happen by necessity.

Proposition (ii) is also logically correct and includes a rationally acceptable combination of the free choice and the necessity of God's (fore)knowledge. The latter operates in the «subsequent necessity mode» whereby the knowledge logically follows and is neces-

²⁰ This is why I find it quite problematic that S. Visser and T. Williams straightforwardly and without any qualification state right away: «Anselm's core notion of necessity is that of causal compulsion: "All necessity is either compulsion or constraint. These two necessities are related to each other as contraries, just like necessary and impossible. For whatever is compelled to be is constrained from not being, and what is compelled not to be is constrained from being, just as what is necessary to be is impossible not to be, and what is necessary not to be is impossible to be, and vice versa". Since compulsion and constraint are interdefinable in this way, we can understand Anselm's notion of necessity entirely in terms of compulsion. What necessarily is, is what is compelled to be; what necessarily is not, is what is compelled not to be» [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 150ff].

This is a very one-sided statement that does not reflect the full picture of Anselm's modal theory. Although these authors later discuss the subsequent necessity as well (starting from p. 158), their initial position dominates their overall presentation of the issue.

sarily entailed by the happening event. The former serves as a so-to-say «substitute» to efficient causality of the antecedent necessity, since the act is produced by a rational agent (not God) who possess the ability for free voluntary decisions. Yet, Anselm does not say that God's knowledge of a future event, which happens by the free choice is really – i.e. actually, *realiter* in the world of *Actua* – caused by, and thus is dependent on, a creature's free decision. Rather, he says, that (a) God's knowledge of the future is perfect and, in a sense, necessary (i.e. required by his divine ontology); but (b) this knowledge accords with the «mode» of event or object known – if the event itself is necessary (i.e. happening by necessity), then God knows it *as necessary*, and if the event itself occurs by free choice, God knows it *as occurring by free choice*. Thus, *quoniam quamvis omnia futura praesciat, non tamen praescit cuncta futura necessitate, sed quaedam praescit futura ex libera rationalis creaturae voluntate* (DC I, 3)²¹. Moreover, there is relation of mutual logical reciprocity, reflecting the laws of identity and non-contradiction, between the divine (fore)knowledge and the event's «mode» of occurrence – *Haec omnia deus, qui scit omnem veritatem et non nisi veritatem : sicut sunt spontanea vel necessaria videt ; et sicut videt, ita sunt* (Ibid)²². Therefore, the necessity of God's perfect foreknowledge neither transforms the ontic constitution of subjects possessing the free will – they remain free agents – nor alters the free nature of events occurring by the free choice.

Hence, in the last analysis, it is really possible to conclude (together with G.R. Evans) that, God's «necessary futurity may be seen as in some sense containing contingent futurity» [Evans, 2002: p. 90], since *God's necessarily perfect necessary knowledge embraces both necessarily happening events and freely (or voluntarily) done actions*²³. But it is also possible (together with J. Hopkins) to rename the two types of necessity and conclude that Anselm actually distinguished – implicitly though – between the *necessity per se*, i.e. the necessity *qua* compulsive causality (*necessitas praecedens*), and the *certainly* as a statement of necessary logical truthfulness (*necessitas sequens*). Then, the logically correct rendering of the latter principle would perhaps look like this:

«The proposition “If X is foreknown to happen in way Y, then X happens in way Y” is necessarily true» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 160].

I will not discuss the validity of this formula, but I will agree with Hopkins that epistemological certainty is a good way of interpreting Anselm's subsequent necessity principle. Yet, I do not think that it is *the only* interpretation²⁴. Nevertheless, the theological value of

²¹ «For although God foreknows all future events, He does not foreknow that all of them are going to occur by necessity. Rather, He foreknows that some of them will occur as the result of the free will of a rational creature».

²² «Now, God (who knows all truth and only truth) sees all these things as they are – whether they be free or necessary; and as He sees them, so they are».

²³ In Anselm's own words (DC I, 3): *Quoniam enim quod deus vult non potest non esse : cum vult hominis voluntatem nulla cogi vel prohiberi necessitate ad volendum vel non volendum, et vult effectum sequi voluntatem : tunc necesse est voluntatem esse liberam et esse quod vult. In huiusmodi ergo verum est quia necessitate fit opus peccati quod vult homo facere, quamvis non necessitate velit.* («For since what God wills is not able not to occur: when He wills for no necessity either to compel the human will to will or to prevent it from willing, and when He wills that the effect follow from the act of human willing, it is necessary that the human will be free and that there occur what it wills. In this respect, then, it is true that the sinful deed which a man wills to do occurs by necessity, even though the man does not will it by necessity».)

²⁴ E.g. for some alternative ways of looking at the issue see [Knuutila, 2004: p. 111–131] and [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 149–169].

Hopkins' discovery helps better translate the Anselmian argumentation into contemporary ordinary speech:

Assume that a free choice is foreknown to occur. (Anselm has previously established to his own satisfaction that there are free choices.) Then Anselm's argument runs: if it is foreknown, then it is certain; if it is certain, then (in a sense) it is necessary; and if it is necessary, then it cannot fail to occur as it is foreknown, viz. freely. Hence, far from interfering with freedom, foreknowledge guarantees it [Hopkins, 1972: p. 159].

Anyway, by his argumentation Anselm formulates a very peculiar paradox: God ontologically necessarily and epistemologically necessarily knows all future events which are going to occur by free choice and *ex libera rationalis creaturae voluntate*. It follows, then, that some kinds of necessity (as understood by Anselm) really coexist with and even support the freedom of choice which can be found in the world of rational creatures endowed with the free will. *Sed si aliquid est futurum sine necessitate, hoc ipsum praescit deus, qui praescit omnia futura. Quod autem praescit deus, necessitate futurum est, sicut praescitur. Necessesse est igitur aliquid esse futurum sine necessitate. Nequaquam ergo recte intelligenti hic repugnare videntur praescientia quam sequitur necessitas, et libertas arbitrii a qua removetur necessitas, quoniam et necesse est quod deus praescit futurum esse, et deus praescit aliquid esse futurum sine omni necessitate* (DC I, 1)²⁵.

But in the argumentation of the thinker's from Aosta (then Bec, and afterwards Canterbury) there is another interesting twist, which has to deal with the nature of futurity, the nature of (God's) eternity, and a little word *simul*.

In second turn, Anselm approaches the same problem of the hypothetic (dis)harmony between there existing God's impeccable foreknowledge and the creaturely freedom of choice from different perspective. He notes that, diachronically thinking, for an agent with the free will there is always a possibility to take an unconstrained and non-necessitated decision. Only when the decision has been *already* made, then it becomes necessary (the *necessitas sequens*). Thus, he definitely believes in what can be called a «diachronic contingency» principle: «it is the concept of temporal or *diachronic possibility* [whose formula looks like this:] p is contingent_{t₁} = *def* p is true at the very present time t_k and not- p will be true at a future time t_p » [Vos, 2006: p. 269]. But he puts it into a different formula:

P is not necessary or p is diachronically contingent = it is t₁ now and it is not the case that p is at t₁ and it is possible that p is at t₂ or that not-p is at t₂.

But then, *if it is t₂ now and it is the case that p is at t₂, then it is not possible that not-p is at t₂.*

Now, after the choice has been freely made and p happens, is happening or has happened, it is necessary for p to be at t_2 because «when we say of what is going to happen that it is going to happen, this statement must be true, because it is never the case that what

²⁵ «Now, if something is going to occur without necessity, God foreknows this, since he foreknows all future events. And that which is foreknown by God is, necessarily, going to occur, as is foreknown. Therefore, it is necessary that something be going to occur without necessity. Hence, the foreknowledge from which necessity follows and the freedom of choice from which necessity is absent are here seen (for one who rightly understands it) to be not at all incompatible. For, on the one hand, it is necessary that what is foreknown by God be going to occur; and, on the other hand, God foreknows that something is going to occur without any necessity».

is going to happen is not going to happen» (DC I, 2)²⁶. The Anselmian expression of this principle of the diachronical non-necessity of events reads like this (Ibid):

Similiter res non necessitate est praesens, quoniam antequam esset praesens, potuit fieri ut praesens non esset; et postquam est praesens, potest fieri non praesens. Rem autem praesentem necesse est esse praesentem semper, quia nec priusquam sit nec postquam est praesens, potest praesens simul esse non praesens. Eodem modo res aliqua – ut quaedam actio – non necessitate futura est, quia priusquam sit, fieri potest ut non sit futura; rem vero futuram necesse est esse futuram, quoniam futurum nequit esse simul non futurum²⁷.

However, this is only a part of his argument. If we think about the freedom of choice and its relation to the foreknowledge of God, we should take heed to their different ontological modes – or, better, different «time factors». The former is diachronically possible along the time-span and within the temporal framework of *this* created world. But the latter functions within – quite mysterious – parameters of the divine eternity. The last mentioned concept (along the Boethian lines) signifies for Anselm «an eternal present in which the whole of time is contained» (*praesens... aeternum, in quo tempora cuncta continentur*) which can also be called «the nature of eternity, which encompasses the whole of time and whatever occurs at any time» (*vis aeternitatis, quae claudit omne tempus et quae sunt in quolibet tempore*) (DC I, 5; cf. DCD 21). This eternal – and actually divine, since this is how *he* experiences reality – present has neither temporal succession, nor temporal categories of past, present and future. Hence, God does not really *foreknow* the future events – he knows them as «presently present», i.e. immediately present to him within his immutable eternal present. But he does not see those events as «future», «present» or «past» in temporal sense [Hopkins, 1972: p. 160–161].

This doctrine allows Anselm to (quite paradoxically) conclude the following (DC I, 4–5; Roman type is mine):

...[C]um vult aut facit deus aliquid, sive secundum aeternitatis dicatur immutabilem praesentiam, in qua nihil est praeteritum aut futurum, sed omnia simul sunt sine omni motu... sive secundum tempus... negari nequit scire quae vult et facit, et praescire quae volet atque faciet. ...

Cum autem res tam aliter esse cognoscatur in tempore quam in aeternitate, ut aliquando verum sit quoniam aliquid non est in tempore quod est in aeternitate, et quia fuit in tempore quod ibi non fuit, et erit temporaliter quod non ibi erit: nulla ratione negari videtur posse similiter aliquid esse in tempore mutabile, quod ibi est immutabile. Quippe

²⁶ As rightly suggests S. Knuutila, this whole idea can be read as a traditional doctrine of the necessity of the present which is based on the famous Aristotle's dictum that whatever is, when it is, necessarily is. And it is indeed probable that Anselm fully embraced the idea, which he could find in his sources (directly Boethius, indirectly Aristotle, and additionally some contemporaneous logicians and theologians such as Peter Damian and the «dialecticians» of that time). Nevertheless, the same Knuutila notes, that there are no clear definitions or distinctions in Anselm, as regards these temporal and modal aspects of the theo-logic. The theologian from Aosta «does not systematically discuss modal consequences or modal syllogisms» [Knuutila, 2004: p. 124, cf. 111–115, 122–123].

²⁷ «Similarly, it is not by necessity that a thing is temporally present. For before the thing was present, it was able to happen that it would not be present; and after it has become present, it can happen that it not remain present. But it is necessary that a present thing always be present, because neither before it is present nor after it has become present is a present thing able to be not-present at the same time. In the same way, some event – e.g., an action – is going to occur without necessity, because before the action occurs, it can happen that it not be going to occur. On the other hand, it is necessary that a future event be future, because what is future is not able at the same time to be not-future».

*non magis opposita sunt mutabile in tempore et immutabile in aeternitate, quam non esse in aliquo tempore, et esse semper in aeternitate ; et fuisse vel futurum esse secundum tempus, atque non fuisse aut non futurum esse in aeternitate*²⁸.

It means that every (freely taken) decision and every event (occurred by the free choice) exists in two modes of reality: in the created world of *Actua* – and we know it *only* as such – and in the uncreated reality of God's eternity – and *God* knows it *only* as such. But these two modes cannot be thought to oppose each other, since logically it does not follow from the definitions and characterizations of the temporal and eternal world-orders. Hence, Anselm contends, «free choice and God's foreknowledge are not at all inconsistent with each other» (*praescientia dei et liberum arbitrium nequaquam invicem repugnant*) (DC I, 5). Vice versa, it follows out of this understanding of the eternity and the temporality that God's foreknowledge and creatures' free choices can coexist. Yet, this idea is even deeper than that.

At the very beginning of his oeuvre St. Anselm has clearly set forth his goal: to prove that it is possible to *simul esse et praescientiam dei et libertatem arbitrii* (DC I, 1). And he constantly repeats this formulation – «*simul esse*» (Idem, I, 2ff). Hopkins regularly translates it as a simple «co-exist». But in my estimation, this is a mistranslation on the side of this authoritative interpreter of the Anselmian texts, and, hence, another translation should be preferred here. Since (a) Anselm almost exclusively uses the *simul* to mean specifically «at the same time» or «simultaneously»²⁹, and (b) his argument «from eternity» implies

²⁸ «...When God wills or causes something, He cannot be denied to know what He wills and causes and to foreknow what He shall will and shall cause. ([It makes no difference here] whether we speak *in accordance with eternity's immutable present*, in which there is nothing past or future, but in which all things exist at once without any change (e.g., if we say only that He wills and causes something, and deny that He has willed or has caused and shall will or shall cause something), or whether we speak *in accordance with temporality* (as when we state that He shall will or shall cause that which we know has not yet occurred). ...

A thing is known to exist in time so differently from the way it exists in eternity that at some point the following statements are true: (1) in time something is not present which is present in eternity; (2) in time something is past which is not past in eternity; (3) in time something is future which is not future in eternity. Similarly, then, it is seen to be impossible to be denied, in any respect, that *in the temporal order something is mutable which is immutable in eternity*. Indeed, being mutable in time and being immutable in eternity are no more opposed than are not existing at some time and always existing in eternity – or than are existing in the past or future according to the temporal order and not existing in the past or future in eternity». (Italics are mine.)

²⁹ See and compare the following formulations:

1) *Non enim aliud significat haec necessitas, nisi quia quod erit non poterit simul non esse*. – «For this necessity signifies nothing other than that what will occur will not be able not to occur at the same time». (DC I, 2)

2) *...puto quia et praescientiam dei et libertatem arbitrii simul esse nulla prohibet inconvenientia*. – «I think that no inconsistency prevents freedom of choice and God's foreknowledge from co-existing» (Idem).

3) *Lignum vero album semper necesse est esse album, quia nec antequam sit, nec postquam est album, fieri potest, ut album simul sit non album*. – «For neither before a white thing was white nor after it has become white can it happen that a white thing is not-white at the same time» (Ibid).

4) *...non potest aliquid simul esse et non esse*. – «[S]omething cannot both be and not be the case at the same time» (Idem).

5) *...nihil horum prius aut posterius apud deum est, sed omnia simul aeterno praesanti sunt intelligenda. Habet enim aeternitas suum simul, in quo sunt omnia quae simul sunt loco vel tempore, et quae sunt diversis in locis vel temporibus*. – «...none of these actions is earlier or later for God; rather everything must be understood to exist *at once* in an eternal present. For eternity has its own

some kind of simultaneity, it is most logical to translate his key thesis of the first section of the *De Concordia* in the following manner: «We have shown that God's foreknowledge and the free choice exist and act simultaneously, that is, at the same time» (*monstravimus quod praescientiam dei et liberum arbitrium simul esse*) (DC I, 7). This is how his presentation of the differences between the eternal and the temporal modes of reality and separate treatments of the two naturally receive a bridge, which joins the two different sides. The human reality operates in the temporal mode; the divine reality enjoys the eternal present. But how do they coexist? Anselm's answer is clear: they do so harmoniously – *at the same time, all at once, in a flash*, without «before» or «after». Hence, in my estimation, the *simultaneity* of God's foreknowledge and the rational creatures' free choices is the key to the metaphysical part of Anselm's argument *pro horum concordia*.

Lastly, in DC I, 6-7, the archbishop of Canterbury explains some crucial nuances of the rational beings' ability for willing which are expected to further elucidate on the subject discussed. Already earlier (DC I, 3) he established that *by definition* free will must act freely: *Opus vero voluntatis... voluntarium sive spontaneum est, quoniam spontanea voluntate fit, et bifariam est necessarium, quia et voluntate cogitur fieri, et quod fit non potest simul non fieri. Sed has necessitates facit voluntatis libertas, quae priusquam sint eas cavere potest*³⁰. And the will itself, as was said above, is an ability to make decisions on the basis of preceding rational deliberation. But the key thing is that this deliberative power must be free and unconstrained.

Even if the will should follow some *ratio* of the mind or some «advice» of the soul's desires, it is the *will* itself that takes a decision. Neither fleshly desires, nor emotional inclinations, nor even rational knowledge determine *what* the will will finally choose. When there is any freedom of choice, *sola voluntas determinat ibi quid teneat, nec aliquid facit vis necessitatis, ubi operatur electio sola voluntatis* (DC I, 6)³¹. When in DCD 27 Anselm has to discuss the reason of a good angel's fall, he unambiguously explicates this thesis [Pranger, 1975: p. 81–82] (Roman type is mine):

D. *Cur ergo recessit ab angelo iusto iustitia?*

M. *Si proprie vis loqui, non recessit ab eo, sed ipse deseruit eam volendo quod non debuit.*

D. *Cur deseruit eam?*

M. *Cum dico quia volendo quod non debuit illam deseruit, aperte ostendo cur et quomodo illam deseruit. Nam ideo illam deseruit, quia voluit quod velle non debuit; et hoc modo, id est volendo quod non debuit illam deseruit.*

D. *Cur voluit quod non debuit?*

M. *Nulla causa praecessit hanc voluntatem, nisi quia velle potuit.*

D. *An ideo voluit quia potuit?*

«simultaneity» wherein exist all things that occur at the same time and place and that occur at different times and places» (DC I, 5).

³⁰ «Now... the will's deeds are voluntary and free because they are done by a free will. But these deeds are necessary in two respects: (1) because the will compels them to be done, and (2) because what is being done cannot at the same time not be done. But these two necessities are produced by freedom-of-will; and the free will is able to avoid them before they occur».

³¹ «[T]he will alone here determines what he keeps; and where only the will's choosing is operative, there the force of necessity accomplishes nothing».

M. Non, quia similiter potuit velle bonus angelus, nec tamen voluit. Nam nullus vult quod velle potest ideo quia potest, sine alia causa, quamvis numquam velit si non potest.

D. Cur ergo voluit?

M. Non nisi quia voluit. Nam haec voluntas nullam aliam habuit causam qua impellere-tur aliquatenus aut attraheretur, sed ipsa sibi efficiens causa fuit, si dici potest, et effectum³².

It is a very powerful statement – «willing has no other cause; rather, it is an efficient cause of itself – if this can be said – and its own effect». For Anselm it entails several things:

1) There are things which the will should choose and which, if it has a chance, it wills – something beneficial (*commodum*), the good (*bonum*), justice (*iustitia*), and so on. The most noble orientation and, at the same time, prerogative or even freedom of the will is to will uprightness of the will for its own sake. Yet, the mankind as well as some portion of angels failed to keep this uprightness and therefore are no more able to always will good (DC I, 6).

2) There are things which the will should not choose – the evil (*malum*), what is detriment (*incommodum*), injustice (*iniustitia*), and so on. However, because of the very nature of the will (to will freely) and a possibility to choose not-good (simply because even the good needed to be chosen freely and, consequently, there must have been a possibility of not-choosing it; but this possibility should not have been actualized), the first man made the fatal choice in favor of the evil. As a result, the original rightness and the healthy ability not to sin were lost [Evans, 2002: p. 87–89]. Now, the man still possesses some freedom of will and choice, but it is incomplete (Idem).

3) As the last example shows, although the will is an ability with strong *rational* element imbedded in it, it still can, and often does, will *irrationally* [Hopkins, 1972: p. 150]. This is not good, but required by the very constitution of will (*libertas*) and, additionally, its current state (*culpa, rectitudo deserata*) (DC I, 6-7). In fact, the ability to choose without possibility to choose freely would lead to pure necessity. M.B. Pranger, rightly encapsulates this Anselmian thought in a phrase: «*Potestas* without *voluntas* is *necessitas*»³³.

³² «S. So why did justice depart from the just angel?

T. If you wish to speak properly, justice did not depart from him, but he deserted justice by willing what he ought not to have [willed].

S. Why did he desert it?

T. When I say that he deserted it by willing what he ought not to have [willed], I indicate clearly *why* and *how* he deserted it. For he deserted it *because* he willed what he ought not to have willed; and he deserted it *in this manner*, viz., by willing what he ought not to have [willed].

S. Why did he will what he ought not to have [willed]?

T. There was no cause which preceded this willing – except that he was able to will.

S. Did he will because he was able?

T. No, for the good angel was likewise able to will [what he ought not to have willed]; nevertheless he did not will [it]. For although no one would ever will if he were not able [to will], nonetheless it is not the case that what someone is able to will he wills *because* he is able, and for no other reason (*causa*).

S. Then, why did he will [what he ought not to have willed]?

T. Only because he willed [it]. For this willing had no other cause (*causa*) by which in any respect to be driven or drawn; rather, it was an efficient cause of itself – if this can be said – and its own effect».

³³ [Pranger, 1975: p. 85]. «*Potestas* zonder *voluntas* is *necessitas*».

4) At the same time, due to the very same reason (the ontic constitution of the will), it should be held that the will cannot be compelled or caused to do anything, unless it wills so. The story of the fall and a creative example of a man who is «threatened with death unless he tells a lie» demonstrate that. If a man is threatened in this manner, it can be said that he is compelled to make a choice. But, in fact, such a conclusion is «misleading: against his will the man is confronted by an unfortunate option, but he does not actually opt *against his will*» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 151]. The range of possibilities is determined, but the choice itself is not. It is impossible to will unwillingly. Any decision of the will is an act of *willing* which is in itself by definition *voluntary* and not necessary (DC I, 6)³⁴.

5) Finally, in the case of God's (fore)knowledge and will and its relation to the free choice and the creaturely free will, the following theses hold. (i) God's will must be absolutely free because (a) any will must by definition be free, but (b) he is the most perfect being and cannot have *any* necessity «hanging» over himself (although there is some necessity *in* God [Pranger, 1975: p. 143]). (ii) God's will cannot be *determined* by his perfect knowledge, since then, again, a sort of necessity is imposed on his will, which is impossible, for the divine *voluntas* must be divinely – i.e. absolutely – free. (iii) God's will cannot be really or temporally *preceded* by his perfect knowledge, because God lives in the permanent present of the eternity, where everything occurs *simul*. The objects of his knowledge as well as the objects of his will are present to him at one and the same moment. The conclusion (iii) is derived from DC I, 5 and 6, while (i) and (ii) are inferred directly from the following passage in DC I, 4: *Quare si scire et praescire dei necessitatem ingerit omnibus quae scit aut praescit, nihil secundum aeternitatem aut secundum ullum tempus vult aut facit ipse ex libertate, sed omnia ex necessitate. Quod... absurdum est vel opinari...*³⁵

Hence, in the last analysis, it becomes clear that Anselm has coined several very interesting arguments in support of his «concordatic» position. Some of these are definitely taken from Augustine, Boethius and Aristotle, but their creative reworking and some emendations – together with many original ideas – belong to St. Anselm of Canterbury. Yet, even though the harmony of God's foreknowledge and the free choice has been demonstrated and proved (in his opinion), the problem of predestination and «irresistible» grace remains. It will be treated in the next section.

2.2. God's predestination, grace and free choice

The problem here is well formulated by Anselm:

Prædestinatio videtur idem esse quod praeordinatio sive praestitutio ; et ideo quod deus prædestinare dicitur, intelligitur praeordinare, quod est statuere futurum esse. Quod autem deus statuit futurum esse, necessitate videtur esse futurum. Quare quidquid deus prædestinat, necesse est futurum esse. Si ergo deus prædestinat bona et mala quae fiunt, nihil fit per liberum arbitrium, sed omnia ex necessitate. ... Si ergo deus omnia prædestinat, et prædestinata sunt ex necessitate : cum nihil per liberum arbitrium necessitate fiat,

³⁴ Hopkins provides a very good analysis of Anselm's notions of the will's ability/inability and comments on its positive contributions as well as its flaws. See [Ibid, p. 145–151].

³⁵ «Therefore, if God's knowledge or foreknowledge imposes necessity on everything He knows or foreknows, then He does not freely will or cause anything (either in accordance with eternity or in accordance with a temporal mode); rather, He wills and causes everything by necessity. Now... this conclusion is absurd even to suppose...»

sequi videtur nihil esse liberum arbitrium manente praedestinatione ; aut si statuimus in aliquibus liberum arbitrium, perire in illis praedestinationem (DC II, 1)³⁶.

The logical chain is simple: the divine predestination determines all future events before they occur (*praeparare, statuere futurum esse*) → then all future events – whether those happening by necessity or by free choice – are determined by God's will, i.e. they must occur → then there is no room for the free decision of the will(s). Hence, even if God's (fore)knowledge does not necessitate the events of our world, God's omnipotent will does. Consequently, there should be only one explanation of how the so-called voluntary decisions are taken: they are either the outcomes of God's will (*praedestinatio*) or his free creatures' wills (*liberum arbitrium*). It seems an «either – or» situation or, speaking logically, a strict disjunction.

However, Anselm dismisses this option altogether. He restates and somewhat adjusts his arguments from DC I and offers a way of explaining the harmonious coexistence of the divine and the creaturely rational free wills.

In the first place (DC I, 7; II, 1), he notes that it is important to differentiate between two «types» of actions God commits: (i) he is said to foreordain (*praedestinare*) all evil deeds of the free agents and (ii) he is said to cause (*facere*) good deeds of the free agents. But concerning the former it should be said that God *directly causes* only the essential goodness of these agents and their deeds (for since God has created them, and everything God creates is good, they are good in this sense), but as for the free decisions of their wills – God only *permits* (*permittit*) and *does not correct* (*non corrigit*) them. As for the latter, it is indeed more appropriate (*specialius*) to say that God predestines the good decisions of the free agents, because «He causes both what they are [essentially] and the fact that they are good» (*in illis facit quod sunt et quod bona sunt*). Thus, along the Augustinian lines, the predestination is taken to mean either direct causation (in the case of good deeds), or indirect causation (in the case of evil deeds), i.e. «permission» [Evans, 2002: p. 91].

In the second place, he reiterates the argument *de aeternitate*: as there is no foreknowledge, i.e. the actual knowledge of the fact *before* it has taken place, in God, there is also no predestination or foreordination, i.e. God's willing of the fact *before* it has happened. God dwells in the eternal present, where all the objects of his knowledge and all the decisions of his will are present to him *at one and the same «moment» of eternity*. It means that for him to *know* a «future» (or «past») event and to *will* the same «future» (or «past») event is to commit a double action – since knowing and willing are different from each other – at the same time, *simul*. Anselm expresses this principle quite briefly: *Sciendum quoque est quia sicut praescientia non in deo dicitur proprie, ita nec praedestinatio ; quia illi nec ante nec post aliquid est, sed omnia sunt illi simul praesentia*³⁷ (DC II, 2). Thus, he

³⁶ «Predestination is seen to be the same thing as foreordination or predetermination. And so, that which God is said to predestine, He is recognized to foreordain – i.e., to determine to be going to occur. But what God determines to be going to occur must, it seems, be going to occur. Therefore, it is necessary that whatever-God-predestines be going to occur. Hence, if God predestines the good and the evil actions which are done, nothing is done by free choice but everything occurs of necessity. ... Hence, if God predestines all things, and if things predestined occur of necessity: since nothing done by free choice is done by necessity, it seems to follow that as long as there is predestination there is no free choice, or – if we establish that in some cases there is free choice – that in these cases there is no predestination».

³⁷ «We must also realize that just as foreknowledge is not properly said to be found in God, so predestination is not either. For nothing is present to God either earlier or later, but all things are present to Him at once».

goes here along the Boethian lines of theological thinking [Hopkins, 1972: p. 29], but definitely broadens and deepens them.

In the third place (DC II, 3), he repeats his theory of the two *necessitates* and adjusts it to the new context of the *necessitas – voluntas* span [Pranger, 1975: p. 85], instead of the *necessitas – scientia* combination, which was analyzed in DC I. Now he states that as it was logically correct to say, that God foreknew both the necessarily-happening and the freely-done actions of his creatures, so it is impeccable to say that «without any inconsistency, some actions that are going to occur by means of free choice are... predestined» (*praedestinari similiter per liberum arbitrium quaedam futura absque omni inconvenientia*). This is necessarily true, because, given God's perfect knowledge and omnipotent will, it is indeed *necessary* for him to know and will all the events that are to occur in the world, including those being brought about by the creature's free will. But this is a sample of the subsequent necessity, claims Anselm, and not that of the antecedent (or real causal) one. *Pariter igitur, quamvis necesse sit fieri quae praesciuntur et quae praedestinantur, quaedam tamen praescita et praedestinata non eveniunt ea necessitate quae praecedit rem et facit, sed ea quae rem sequitur, sicut supra diximus*³⁸. Yet, after this unambiguous phrase he adds several comments which could either hide, or further elucidate his idea.

On the one hand, he says that «although God predestines these things, He causes them not by constraining or restraining the will but by leaving the will to its own power» (*Non enim ea deus – quamvis praedestinet – facit voluntatem cogendo aut voluntati resistendo, sed in sua illam potestate dimittendo*). Hence, it seems that God's will is thought to logically and metaphysically *follow* decisions of the free will. But then, is not it the case that the divine act of will is somehow dependent on the creature's act of will that has to happen first?

Yet, on the other hand, it is immediately clarified that «although the will uses its own power, it does nothing which God does not cause – in good works by His grace, in evil works not through any fault of His but through the will's fault» (*Quamvis tamen sua voluntas utatur potestate, nihil tamen facit, quod deus non faciat in bonis sua gratia, in malis non sua sed eiusdem voluntatis culpa*). Here it seems that the situation is the other way around: God's will somehow *causes* (*faciat*) absolutely everything, since it is said to equally efficiently act both by means of God's own grace (*sua gratia*) and by means of the creature's (evil) will (*non sua sed eiusdem voluntatis culpa*).

Moreover, after this Anselm adds another interesting phrase: «And just as foreknowledge, which is not mistaken, foreknows only the real thing as it will occur – either necessarily or freely – so predestination, which is not altered, predestines only as the thing exists in foreknowledge» (*Et sicut praescientia, quae non fallitur, non praescit nisi verum sicut erit, aut necessarium aut spontaneum : ita praedestinatio, quae non mutatur, non praedestinat, nisi sicut est in praescientia*). What does this *praedestinatio praedestinat sicut est in praescientia* mean? It can mean two things: either (a) the predestination follows the foreknowledge and acts in accordance with the information provided by it, or (b) the mode of predestination's «functioning» is similar to that of the divine foreknowledge. The first seems fallacious, because God's will must be absolutely free and cannot be constrained even by God's own knowledge. But then the second interpretation must be correct: God

³⁸ «Therefore, although things foreknown and predestined must occur, it is nonetheless equally true that some things foreknown and predestined occur not by the necessity which precedes a thing, and causes it, but by the necessity which succeeds a thing – as I have said above».

predestines (even freely done) events in exactly the same manner in which he foreknows them. And if we collect the sayings I have just quoted – about the predestination's subsequent necessity, the power of the creature's will, the causing activity of God's will and its mode of functioning – and analyze them together, a clearer picture of Anselm's argumentation will arise.

I think that in DC II, 3 he wants to say that God's knowledge and God's will function in the similar way: they both are simultaneous with each other (since they «happen» in the eternal present) and with the creaturely free will (since, it is said, they «are simultaneous» (*simul esse*) with each other as well). Consequently, in every single act of the creature's free will there are two agents, who are both active at the same moment (*simul*) and whose actions can be said to be either «parallel» or even «glued together». From God's perspective the logical order of this simultaneity or synchronicity would be this: (i) I, God, will – either causally (*facere*) or permissively (*permittit*) – and (ii) the free will of the creature wills. From the creature's viewpoint the situation looks differently: (i) I, creature, will, and (ii) God wills. But the problem is that these two types of a logical order are somewhat fallacious, because Anselm's key point does not speak of the logical *ordo*, although every event can and should be ascribed to God's activity *par excellence*, since everything that happens, does so in accordance with God's will. Yet, the point is that, in the last analysis, the logical order (in any of the two versions) is not to be identified with the chronological or «real» order: in reality, the decision of God's will and the decision of human will are *absolutely simultaneous*. There is no even «and» between the two: God wills – rational creature wills; rational creature wills – God wills. The metaphysical or «realistic» synchronicity is the key to the understanding of Anselm's idea in DC. *The divine foreknowledge and the divine preordination and the human free choice exist and act simultaneously, that is, at the same time.*

Besides, it should be noted that in the last part of his opus St. Anselm of Canterbury comments on the nature of God's grace and its role in salvation, deepens his understanding of the will and explains in detail what it is and how it works. This explanation is very important, because it elucidates on his thesis that the will is *by definition* free and cannot be constrained. He unfolds his overall analysis in the following way.

Since the Holy Scripture speaks of both God's gracious gift of mercy (*gratia*) and human active participation (*per liberum arbitrium*) in the drama of salvation, it is important to keep balance between the two sides (DC III, 1). Anselm even directly states that *nec sola gratia nec solum liberum arbitrium salutem hominis operetur*³⁹ and then adds: *gratia et liberum arbitrium non discordant, sed conveniunt ad iustificandum et salvandum hominem*⁴⁰ (DC III, 5). Specifically, it is said that the grace is nothing else than God's saving power, i.e. «that without which no one (after he has reached the age of understanding) merits salvation» (*de illo, sine quo nemo salutem meretur, postquam intelligibilem habet aetatem*); and the free choice here is nothing else than human responsible actions which are meritorious for salvation, i.e. «that without which no man is saved» (*de illa, sine qua nullus salvator homo*). Grace should touch the man's heart first, enabling him to believe, but it is (also) true that ever after the man's responsibility is to rightly believe (*recte credit*), rightly understand (*recte intelligit*) and rightly will (*recte vult*). These three constitute a *sine qua non* of human salvation, because only a combination of these three

³⁹ «...[N]either grace alone nor free choice alone accomplishes man's salvation».

⁴⁰ «...[G]race and free choice are not incompatible but cooperate in order to justify and to save a man»

actions counts as the uprightness of heart required for being justified by God, as written in Ps. 94:14-15⁴¹. But for Anselm the *rectitudo voluntatis* is the most crucial element of the uprightness, because it is to this end – *ad recte volendum* – that the Christian faith (*fides*) and the right understanding (*intellectus*) are given to men (DC III, 2).

Thus, it is needed that the will act rightly. Yet, «the will wills rightly only because it is upright. For just as sight is not acute because it sees acutely but sees acutely because it is acute, so the will is not upright because it wills rightly but wills rightly because it is upright» (*voluntas non vult recte, nisi quia recta est. Sicut namque visus non est acutus, quia videt acute, sed idcirco videt acute, quia est acutus : ita voluntas non est recta, quia vult recte, sed recte vult, quoniam recta est*). Thus, possession of the uprightness logically precedes volition of the uprightness. *Idem autem est voluntati rectam esse et rectitudinem habere*⁴². But now, after the Fall⁴³, man cannot have (*habere*) this uprightness, unless God's grace (*nisi per Dei gratiam*) gives it to him and he accepts (*accepit*) it. Only after this the man can have the uprightness of the will and is able to keep it by his free will (*hanc autem rectitudinem per liberum arbitrium servari posse*). Anyway, the process of «uprightnessification» of the will is initiated by grace alone, after the original Adam's innocence has been lost, but still, the will should actively participate in the process (DC III, 3). The archbishop of Canterbury summarizes it in the following paragraph (DC III, 4):

*Quibus autem modis post rectitudinem eandem acceptam gratia liberum arbitrium adiuvet ut servet quod accepit... Nemo certe servat rectitudinem hanc acceptam, nisi volendo. Velle autem illam aliquis nequit, nisi habendo. Habere vero illam nullatenus valet, nisi per gratiam. Sicut ergo illam nullus accipit nisi gratia praeveniente, ita nullus eam servat nisi eadem gratia subsequente. Nempe quamvis illa servetur per liberum arbitrium, non tamen est tantum imputandum libero arbitrio quantum gratiae, cum haec rectitudo servatur ; quoniam illam liberum arbitrium non nisi per gratiam praevenientem et subsequentem habet et servat*⁴⁴.

Thus, it seems that everything is done by, or with assistance of, the grace. Although the uprightness is kept by the free will, everything is to be imputed to God's mercy [Evans, 2002: p. 92]. But why, then, and how this will is said to be permanently free and extremely important for human life and salvation?

In DC III, 11-12 Anselm explains what some scholars labeled a «revolution in the theory of will» [Vos, 2006: p. 423]. He refuses to hold exclusively to the classical Latin meanings of the term *velle*, which then meant «to be inclined», «to want», or «to wish», and offers a much deeper reading of the word. He puts an emphasis on the will as «active and resolute

⁴¹ Latin text (Psalmus 93) reads: *...Non enim derelinquet Dominus populum suum et hereditatem suam non deseret, quoniam ad iustitiam revertetur iudicium et sequentur illud omnes recti corde*. Modern English (NIV, Psalm 94) sounds: «For the LORD will not reject his people; he will never forsake his inheritance. Judgment will again be founded on righteousness, and all the upright in heart will follow it».

⁴² «But for the will to be upright is the same as for it to have uprightness».

⁴³ See DC III, 7-9 for a more detailed treatment of the Fall, which Anselm offers.

⁴⁴ «Since grace assists in many ways, I cannot list all the ways in which grace aids free choice (after free choice has received this uprightness) to keep what it has received. ... Assuredly, no one keeps this received uprightness except by willing it. But no one can will it unless he possesses it. And he cannot at all possess it except by means of grace. Therefore, just as no one receives uprightness except by means of grace preceding, so no one keeps uprightness except by means of this same grace following. Assuredly, even though uprightness is kept by free choice, still its being kept must be imputed not so much to free choice as to grace; for free choice possesses and keeps uprightness only by means of preventent and of subsequent grace»

willing» or decision-making activity [Ibid, p. 423–424; cf. Glare, 2005: s.v. uolo]. But he does conjoin this idea with the older meanings, skillfully combining and distinguishing between the various aspects of both the word and the phenomenon it stands for.

As I have said in Section 1 («Terminological and conceptual introduction to St. Anselm's thinking on the «knowledge-and-will» issues»), the will has a threefold structure: the faculty of willing (*voluntas instrumentum*), some dispositions or inclinations of the will (*voluntas affectio*), and actual thoughtful use of the will (*voluntas usus*). The nature of the will is analyzed in DC III, 11, where Anselm first states that it is important to «distinguish in the will – in regard to which we are discussing these matters – the instrument, its aptitudes, and its uses» (*discernamus in voluntate propter quam ista dicimus instrumentum, et aptitudines eius, et usus eius*) and then concludes: «Assuredly, the will is seen to be spoken of equivocally – in three senses. For (a) the instrument-for-willing, (b) the inclination of this instrument, and (c) the use of this instrument, are distinguishable» (*Voluntas utique dici videtur aequivoce tripliciter. Aliud est enim instrumentum volendi, aliud affectio instrumenti, aliud usus eiusdem instrumenti*).

Having said that, he continues by (i) clarifying the meaning of each of the structural elements of the will and (ii) explaining how the three work together and have their share in the «vocation» of the will. Let us consider both steps of Anselmian thinking each in its turn.

He defines the «will-as-instrument» (or «instrument-for-willing» in Hopkins' translation) as a «power-of-the-soul, which we use for willing (*vis illa animae qua utimur ad volendum*) – just as the reason is the instrument-for-reasoning, which we use when we reason, and just as the sight is the instrument-for-seeing, which we use when we see». The inclination(s) of the will is (are) «that by which the instrument is so inclined to will some given thing (even when a man is not thinking of that which he wills) that if this thing comes to mind, then the will wills [to have] it either immediately or at the appropriate» (*qua sic afficitur ipsum instrumentum ad volendum aliquid... ut si venit in memoriam, aut statim aut suo tempore illud velit*). Thus, it refers to an internal reason of our choices and illuminates the fact that our «choices are motivated» [Hopkins, 2003: p. 149]. Actually, the will-as-affectio could be connected to the concept of «motivation» in contemporary psychological terms, but I will not defend, reject or investigate deeper this thesis, since it falls out of the scope of my research. Finally, the «use» of the will is «something which we have only when we are thinking of the thing which we will» (*quem non habemus, nisi cum cogitamus rem quam volumus*). It means that using implies a double action: willing itself (*volumus*) and reflective thinking (*cogitamus*). Hence, the *usus voluntatis* is a rational, i.e. conscious and thoughtful, act of willing.

Being able to exercise the freedom of choice means having the instrument for willing; being inclined, i.e. wanting, feeling desire for or having need in something is the same as the *affectio*; and rationally deciding to choose something – e.g. «I will to read now» – is actually the same as using the will. A man who is able to see could serve as a parallel example of this tripartite scheme, given that his ability to see, i.e. the faculty of seeing, would be considered similar to the faculty of will which we discuss now. In this case, his ability to see is an instrument he has; his (natural) inclination or desire to look around, see the world and «visually contemplate» something or someone is the disposition or affectio; and his actual sight, i.e. act of seeing, is the use of the faculty.

The will-as-instrument is single and monolith: there cannot be less or more of it. Moreover, everybody – at least, every human being, every rational creature – has this ability. *Hoc instrumentum semper habet homo, quamvis illo non semper utatur ; sicut*

*habet visum qui est instrumentum videndi, etiam quando illo non utitur, ut cum dormit*⁴⁵. And the act of willing (*voluntas usus*) is but a regular or periodic exercise of this ability, that is a number of instances when «we direct the will toward various things» (*convertere voluntatem ad diversa*). However, the situation is more complex with the *voluntas affectio*. The inclinations are of two kinds: «the affection for what is to our advantage (*affectio commodi*) [and] a second and more noble tendency, an inclination or affection for justice (*affectio iustitiae*). ... To will, in the sense of *to wish* or *to want*, is much more akin to *velle* in classical Latin which is connected with what suits and is convenient for me and is convenient to me (*bonum commodi*), while the new Christian sense of *willing* is especially a matter of what we *ought to do*» [Vos, 2006: p. 423–424]; cf. [Hopkins, 1972: p. 142–143]. The wish for what is *good to me* is good, but the wish for *the good itself* is better. The beneficial, which attracts a man, can be relatively good or can seem good, but it is not necessarily good in itself. Vice versa, what seems to humans pleasant and beneficial after some time frequently appears to be not good at all. However, God *qua* the good, the justice and the uprightness is necessarily, unchangingly and unquestionably good. Therefore any *commodum* cannot be compared to the *bonum* itself or, in DC's wording, *rectitudo* itself and *iustitia* itself. Justice and rightness are the best things for the will to will. Thus, in Anselm's own words, *una est ad volendum commoditatem [affectio vel aptitudo], altera ad volendum rectitudinem*⁴⁶ – the two are really different. Therefore, now, that this distinction has been drawn, there is no surprise that for Anselm the true – and the very best conceivable – freedom of the will is «the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for its own sake» (*potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem*). It is so because he really «places “justice” at the heart of things» [Evans, 2002: p. 92].

In general, on the basis of what has just been said, the threefold understanding of the will according to St. Anselm must be clear now. But it is also important to see how these parts work together. And here the scheme is easily reconstructed (DC III, 11-12):

- 1) the will-as-instrument is a fundamental faculty of rational creature which «contains» two aptitudes and «implies» a possibility of its own active usage. But both the former and the latter are essential elements of the will's nature, its ontic constitution, and, thus, the will is indeed «an instrument that moves itself» (*instrumentum se ipsum movens*)⁴⁷ without any external compulsion;

⁴⁵ «A man always possesses this instrument even though he does not always use it. The case is similar to his having sight, in the sense of the instrument-for-seeing, even when he does not use it (e.g., when he is asleep)».

⁴⁶ «One of these is the inclination to will what is beneficial; the other is the inclination to will what is right».

⁴⁷ The full quotation and translation of this passage:

Voluntas quidem instrumentum movet omnia alia instrumenta quibus sponte utimur, et quae sunt in nobis – ut manus, lingua, visus –, et quae sunt extra nos – ut stilus et securis –, et facit omnes voluntarios motus; ipsa vero se suis affectionibus movet.

Unde dici potest instrumentum se ipsum movens.

«Indeed, the will-as-instrument moves all the other instruments which we freely use – both those instruments which are a part of us (such as our hands, our tongue, our sight) and those that are independent of us (such as a pen and an ax). Furthermore, it causes all of our voluntary movements; but it moves itself by means of its inclinations. Hence, it can be called an instrument that moves itself».

- 2) now, the two aptitudes or inclinations «effect» the will-as-instrument (*afficitur instrumentum*) by «pushing» it to a decision which favors one of them – either a decision for the sake of justice and uprightness, or a decision for the sake of well-being;
- 3) then, the instrument – rationally or irrationally – decides what to choose and «switches on» the use-function whereby it commits the act of willing itself and, at the same time, thinks about this act, being aware of what it does.

The first step is an ontological statement and a possibility-statement: there *is* ability with certain «sub-abilities», and there is *no* other forces or factors, which determine its actions; consequently, this ability can do something or function in some way quite independently. The second step is a motivation statement: the inclinations motivate the agent to make a specific choice which, in general, corresponds to one of the two purposes – happiness and well-being or justice and uprightness. The third step is the very act of willing: the instrument of will deliberately acts by making a certain choice. But since (a) no external forces participate in the process and (b) only internal inclinations⁴⁸ and own power of the will are involved, whenever and however the free will makes its choice, it wills freely. S. Visser and T. Williams summarize this Anselmian point well:

[T]he person... is free because he knows what goal he ought to aim at and has the power to choose accordingly, and no external force is operating so as to necessitate his choice. ... What is central to Anselm's definition is that the action be self-initiated and consciously chosen, not that it be one of at least two possibilities. This aspect of Anselm's theory partially satisfies the intuition that as long as a person knows what he is doing and why he is doing it, his action is free, regardless of whether the agent had some other option available to him. ...

What is relevant to freedom is not the source of the motivations, but whether, when there is a decision to be made among competing goals, it is the agent himself who is doing the deciding. If the agent initiates the choice and is not determined by circumstances outside his control, then his choice is free and it is permissible to hold him responsible for his action. In the unfortunate, and indeed unlikely, instance in which a person has absolutely no good motives from which to choose, he is still responsible for the action that results from the motive he chose to follow [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 187, 188–189].

This is a good capture of some of Anselm's key points of the *De Concordia*. If the will is an ability to make deliberative decisions and if it functions exactly as he described it, then it is indeed possible to speak of the ever-present and never-absent freedom of the will. Hence, Anselm of Canterbury understanding of the will is a real achievement of the medieval theological thought. At that moment it was a very powerful theory, which perhaps deserved to be called a «revolution». But it both employed some already-existing and well-known ideas and, on the other hand, created a fresh and original synthesis of those old and some newer conceptions. We have discussed that already and now I would like to summarize my points and formulate some conclusive remarks concerning Anselm, his theological thought, and the *De Concordia*.

⁴⁸ See DC III, 12-13 for a more detailed treatment of the issues – e.g. human inclinations before and after the Fall, the nature of the *commodum* and the *rectitudo*, etc – involved.

3. Analytical summary and integrative conclusion to the study of the *De Concordia*'s key ideas and arguments

In brief, the *De Concordia*, written by Anselm, then already the archbishop of Canterbury, in 1107-1108 AD [Hopkins, 2003: p. 11–12; Aird, 2014: p. 90], is a treatise on the relation of God's (fore)knowledge and gracious (pre)destination with his creatures' free will operating in the «free choice» mode which shows some distinctive features of the western medieval thinking in general and the Anselmian way of theologizing in particular. It collects some ideas of St. Augustine and Boethius, integrates, updates and synthesizes them (together with some original Anselm's theories) in creative manner and, as a result, becomes a work containing some peculiar ideas and challenging hypotheses.

In my estimation, the key ideas and arguments of the DC are those concerning (a) the two types of necessity, (b) a definition of the freedom of choice and of will, (c) the nature of the will and, finally, (d) the relation of simultaneity that exists between God's knowledge, God's will and the creature's will. Summing them up and critically assessing them, I would like to share the following theses.

(A) St. Anselm's treatment of the necessity with its two types follows in the footsteps of Boethius who distinguished between natural and propositional kinds of necessity [Hopkins, 1972: p. 79, n 20] (which can be also called simple and conditional kinds [Marenbon, 2007: p. 45]). But the archbishop of Canterbury somewhat modifies and deepens this distinction. In particular, he «rebrands», renames the both necessities, thus *highlighting* (i) their fundamental difference and (ii) their connection to the physical and metaphysical realities, including God's relation to the world. In his view there is the antecedent necessity (*necessitas praecedens*), which both really – i.e. physically, metaphysically, naturally, etc. – and logically precedes and causes things or events, and the subsequent necessity (*necessitas sequens*), which both really and logically follows from things or events, being in a sense caused by them [cf. McCall, 2011: p. 502, 503]. Hence, the former is to be identified with the necessity as necessitating *power* of coercion and compulsion, and the latter – with the necessity as non-necessitating *relation* of identification – i.e. semantic, logical or metaphysical identity or correspondence between the terms or particular individual objects. This important philosophical distinction helps clarify the relation between God's foreknowledge and the free choice available to his creatures: God necessarily knows all objects and events in the world in the «subsequent necessity mode», which means that, then, the divine foreknowledge by no means causes or necessitates anything. Rather, it is necessarily *bound* or immediately *connected* to the object or event known logically and metaphysically. As several centuries before him Boethius, Anselm thought that «since God knows all things as if they were present, future events are necessary, in relation to their being known by God, in just the way that anything which is presently the case is necessary. And this necessity of the present is an unconstraining necessity – ...in themselves the future events remain completely free» [Marenbon, 2007: p.46; McCall, 2011: p. 504]. In this aspect, the thinker from Aosta offers an adequate interpretation and a slight modification of an old theory.

(B) With respect to the definition of the freedom of choice and of will, his contribution is also significant not as much as its original but as much as it remains faithful to and continues the tradition of the earlier centuries and restates it afresh for a new century. Here he, basically, repeats the ideas of the *doctor gratiae* – St. Augustine – and argues for them. For this great thinker the true freedom of choice (once-really and now only hypothetically

available to men) is the freedom to choose, will and do what is good and upright. In *Enchiridion* 30 (9) he states [Augustine, 2014; Augustinus, 2014a]:

For he is freely in bondage (*liberaliter enim servit*) who does with pleasure the will of his master. Accordingly, he who is the servant of sin is free to sin. And hence he will not be free to do right (*ad iuste faciendum liber*), until, being freed from sin, he shall begin to be the servant of righteousness. And this is true liberty (*vera libertas*), for he has pleasure in the righteous deed (*propter recte facti laetitiam*); and it is at the same time a holy bondage (*pia servitus*), for he is obedient to the will of God.

At the same time, the human freedom of choice can be also identified with a «neutral power (*media vis*) for performing good or for performing evil» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 157]. This second definition appears in *De Spiritu et littera* (*The Spirit and the Letter*) 33 (58) [Augustinus, 2014b]. Thus, Augustine offers two possible definitions of the freedom of the (human) will but definitely favors the first one.

His 11th-century follower slightly modifies this definition by adding «references to the object of choice, viz., uprightness, within the definition of “free choice”» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 157]. For Anselm, the *libertas voluntatis* is «the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for its own sake». Perhaps, we could even say that the freedom of choice is but an ability to choose good, but the freedom of the will is an ability to choose what is right *because* it is right. This slight modification of Augustine's definition does not change its core or ethos, but does highlight some of its aspects. Specifically, St. Anselm emphasizes the (more-or-less) rational nature of the will – it chooses something because it has reasons for that – and maximizes the importance of its (natural) orientation to the good itself. To be able to will some upright deeds does not mean to be free; to will those deeds because (a) you rationally deliberated on their nature and came to the conclusion that they are good and (b) you want to choose the best option available, i.e. only what is really and mostly right – this is what makes one really free. This definition and its explanation show Anselm's great dependence on and clear faithfulness to St. Augustine's legacy. But, again, they reveal his desire to deepen and expand those ancient doctrines.

(C) However, when it comes to the theorizing about the nature of the will, an innovative character of Anselm's contribution becomes more obvious. He suggests a very interesting differentiation between (i) the will as the instrument for deliberative decisions, (ii) the will as disposition(s) or inclination(s) of the will, and (iii) the will as the «use» of the will, i.e. act of willing *per se*. It helps him explain the mechanism of willing and its tiny nuances. The notion of a disposition shows the importance of motivation and leads to another distinction – that between the desires for what is advantageous or beneficial and what is upright and just. But the notions of the will-as-instrument and the will-as-act-of-willing and the fact that there are at least *two* types of inclinations clearly show that neither rational deliberation, nor internal disposition can «automatize» and *determine* what the will finally chooses. Vice versa, these conceptual «manipulations» demonstrate the logical and psychological reality of the freedom⁴⁹ of the will. The faculty makes decisions on the basis of some rational thinking, but still, it is the *will alone* that takes the decision. It has two inclinations, which push it in one or another direction, but again, it is the *will alone* that defines the course of actions. Hence, for Anselm, neither knowledge, nor emotional

⁴⁹ Here freedom means «independence», «self-determination» or «unrestrained ability to choose its course», rather than «the ability to choose good». But the reason for such ambiguity or equivocation is that Anselm himself allows for it, ambiguously speaking of freedom in both senses. See, for example, DC I, 2-3, 5 and 6, etc.

affection, nor anything else – whether we speak of God or men – can determine the will's decisions. The will *must* be free to be a will. And if its decisions are (a) not constrained or determined by any external power à la the (antecedent) necessity, (b) not determined but only informed or influenced by some internal forces à la the intellect and the will's affections, and (c) self-initiated and determined by the «undeterminable» will alone, then the will must be free by definition and because of its constitution. This line of Anselm's thinking is indeed peculiar, since here he goes beyond Augustine or Boethius. Even more, such a theory of will opened door to some more revolutionizing «theologies of will» in the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries and, thus, solidified Anselm's crucial role of the «père de la scolastique» [Gilson, 1925, p. 55].

(D) But his most important idea, expressed in the *De Concordia*, is that of the simultaneity of God's knowledge, God's will and the creature's free choices. The simple phrase *simul esse et praescientiam dei [et ejus praedestinationem] et libertatem arbitrii*, when analyzed within the scope of Anselmian and Boethian doctrine of the nature of the divine eternity⁵⁰ and exclusively Anselmian theory of the will, reveals a really great idea. The human reality operates in the temporal mode where there is the past, the present and the future. The divine reality enjoys the eternal present, the permanent now. The point of their connection is the double action of God himself, who *decides* what should happen and *knows* what actually happens in the world. But – and this is the key statement – the decision of God's will or God's knowing of his own and his creatures' voluntary activity are absolutely temporally⁵¹ synchronic with the human free will's decisions. In my view, this notion of the real synchronicity of God's and human actions is crucial to the understanding of Anselm's theses in the DC. And this discovery – perhaps, not fully realized even by Anselm himself, let alone his interpreters – can still be used, and definitely should be discussed, in the realms of Christian systematic/dogmatic theology and philosophical theology, since it is neither outdated, nor shallow. Its insights were, and still are, intellectually promising [cf. Wawer, 2014: p. 367ff, 399].

But, of course, some aspects of Anselmian inquiry into the nature of willing seem to be not well-grounded or controversial. Visser and Williams speak of some ambiguities in Anselm's account of freedom of the will [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 171–172ff, 185–186, 188–190], and Hopkins notes several very peculiar paradoxes about «Anselm's conception of human free will» [Hopkins, 2003: p. 149]. But I omit the discussion of these issues due to the lack of space and the different angle I take. Both Hopkins and the duet of Visser and Williams concentrate on Anselm's understanding of the will *qua* human will while I am more interested in a study of the will *qua* will *per se*, including *both* the divine and the human will. Of course, the theory, which Anselm offers, should be applied to the notion of human will *par excellence*, since it corresponds to his intentions. But still, his account of the nature of the will is – at least, to certain extent – applicable to theology proper (the doctrine of God) or «theology of the will» proper. For example, his belief in the centrality of the will in one's actions as well as the emphasis on maximally possible freedom of the will is applicable to both God-talk and «man-talk». In similar way, the mechanism of the will's «work» – i.e. a combination of ability, inclination(s) and use of

⁵⁰ See for a deeper treatment of these ideas in Boethius' *opera* in [Marenbon, 2007: p. 42–46, 53–55].

⁵¹ Here «temporally» does not mean «happening along the time span» or «bearing a temporal nature». Rather, it means «happening in reality (which from human point of view necessarily has a temporal aspect)» or «standing in a relation to the space-time continuum».

the faculty – can prove almost equally helpful for theology proper as for theological or philosophical anthropology.

In any case, St. Anselm's *De Concordia* and its crucial ideas have played their role in the medieval theology, being influential in 11-13th centuries, and can be interesting and challenging nowadays. At least, these ideas can – and no doubt should – become or issues in or topics for contemporary debates and research [Bély, 2013: p. 408, 409; Sumner, 2013: p. 25–35; Wawer, 2014: p. 366]. As for the development of the medieval theology after Anselm, it will not be an extravagant exaggeration to state together with early E. Gilson.

The philosophy of St. Anselm does not compose a complete system, but it is possible to say that the spirit of St. Anselm contained in a nutshell almost all the philosophical speculation which had to find its full blooming in the thomism. ... If we consider a definition of scholasticism, that identifies it with certain bodies of common doctrines, sufficient, we will also agree with the title of «the father of scholasticism» (which is quite honorary) reserved for St. Anselm. In any case, he remains the father of the line of philosophers, the greatest of who are St. Thomas [Aquinas] and St. Bonaventure, but the most vigorous is indisputably St. Anselm⁵².

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⁵² «La philosophie de saint Anselme ne constitue donc pas un système complet, mais on peut dire que l'esprit de saint Anselme contenait virtuellement toute la spéculation philosophique dont le thomisme devait marquer l'épanouissement complet. ... Si nous estimions satisfaisante la définition de la scolastique par un certain corps de doctrines communes, nous accepterions aussi pour saint Anselme le titre de "père de la scolastique" dont on l'a souvent honoré. Il demeure, en tout cas, le père de cette lignée de philosophes dont saint Thomas et saint Bonaventure sont les plus grands, mais dont saint Anselme est incontestablement le plus vigoureux». [Gilson, 1925, p. 54–55] (translation mine).

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An Analysis of Anselm's Philosophical Theology and the Problem of Man's Freedom in His *De Concordia*

The purpose of this study is to discover, present and analyze the key ideas of Anselm of Canterbury concerning the notions of knowledge, will and mode of divine-human relations in the context of this "knowledge-will" framework which is important due to (a) somewhat insufficient attention to the medieval insights on the issue and (b) the peculiarity that Anselm's intuitions have. More specifically, the object of the given paper is Anselmian understanding of relations between God's foreknowledge and will, on the one side, and human free will, on the other side, as it is presented in the work entitled *De Concordia*. In this treatise Anselm of Canterbury partially uses and further elaborates some ideas of Augustine and Boethius, while integrating, updating and synthesizing them in a creative manner, and partially develops a number of thoughts of his own. As a result, there is a set of the well-formulated and comprehensive theses concerning (i) different types of (metaphysical) necessity, (ii) a proper definition of freedom of choice and will, (iii) the nature of will per se, and, finally, (iv) unique relation of "simultaneity" that exists between God's knowledge, God's will and the creature's rational will. These ideas are presented and explicated in the article along with detailed exposition and analytical examination of the main line of argumentation found in the *De Concordia*.

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