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THE FUNDAMENTAL POWER OF THE SOUL IN KANT'S REFLECTIONS ON GENIUS: BETWEEN THE INFLUENCES OF TETENS AND SULZER¹

The problem of demarcation between faculties

We will focus on one of the points of transcendental criticism that seems to most clearly mark its distance from Leibnizian philosophy – namely, the strict demarcation between the different faculties involved in cognition, which Kant had defended since the *Dissertatio*. However, we aim not to insist on defending this distance again. Instead, we strive to show that this thinker's position vis-à-vis Leibnizianism is not exhausted in establishing this demarcation between sensibility and understanding. On the one hand, he recognises the problems and limits accompanying this demarcation. On the other hand, throughout his intellectual development, he strives to find a critical solution that would allow him to think positively about the possible reconciliation of the faculties of cognition that must generally be presupposed for knowledge. In this crucial endeavour to address the problem of the unity of the faculties of reason, it is possible to discern a connection between Kant and the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition.

In this context, we will focus on Kant's intellectual development in which this problem converges strictly epistemologically – namely, the conception of genius that emerges in his philosophy from the mid-1770s onwards. For this enquiry, we will use the Notes and Fragments on Anthropology prior to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, to determine the epistemological problem presupposed in Kant's conception of genius, as well as the historical provenance of this conception.

The demarcation between sensibility and understanding constitutes one of the foundational contributions of transcendental criticism. Hence, Kant addressed this question in clear opposition to Leibnizianism in his inaugural dissertation, through which he sought to

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distance himself from tradition and which, years later (AA 10: 208), he would come to regard as the starting point of his critical writings, i.e., *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis*. As is well known, in this work, Kant defends that understanding and sensibility are fundamentally different faculties of cognition.

Suppose the method of philosophy focuses on how the object is given to the faculties and on the sufficiency or insufficiency of the faculties for cognising it. In that case, a distinction must be made between sensibility and understanding, as the former is characterised by receptivity and the latter by thought or intellection (AA 2: 392). With this, moreover, Kant ceases to regard sensibility as merely negatively related to thought, for sensibility is not a confused form of cognition but instead acquires its status within the system of philosophy as a distinct mode of cognition, in which the distinction can be grounded according to principles specific to sensibility – namely, space and time. This autonomy of sensibility enables Kant to establish the possibility of a specifically sensible cognition independent of intellectual cognition or, following the conceptual framework of the *Dissertatio*, independent of the “real use” of the understanding.

The *Critique of Pure Reason* entails an essential qualification of this demarcation between the faculties, insofar as Kant understands that sensible objectivity is only possible if pure understanding, the former real use of the experience, can determine *a priori*, through its proper concepts, the pure form of space and time. In doing so, Kant acknowledges that the principles of sensibility are not sufficient to ground sensible objectivity, as seemed to be the view held in the *Dissertatio*. However, this does not mean that Kant abandons his thesis of the demarcation between the principles of sensibility and those of understanding, respectively. Instead, transcendental critique recognises that the experience must be able to determine in its unity, according to the intellectual synthesis presupposed in the categories – the form in general present in every sensible synthesis, which, in turn, is only possible according to specific principles of sensibility. Only this determining intervention of the intellect in the sensible domain allows the objective validity of appearances to be established, i.e., we can consider sensible representations in general as objects of experience.

However, this determination, whose origin lies in the intellectual synthesis, does not establish the *particular or material* constitution of phenomena, as this intellectual synthesis refers to the possibility of thinking a representation by its regular correspondence with an object *qua* object. Still, it leaves entirely undetermined the question of how the mind forms a particular representation through the sensible synthesis of the imagination and how this representation can be determined in its particularity by the understanding. In other words, transcendental logic seeks to show that our empirical judgements can claim objective validity. Still, the particular constitution of these judgements and the possibility of empirical truth remain questions that criticism leaves undetermined.

From the point of view of the relation between the faculties, Kant supports the possibility that sensibility – or imagination – and understanding can generally coincide in their formal character. How this coincidence between the faculties of cognition is established in the subject's mind on the occasion of a given representation is a question that criticism cannot meaningfully determine. However, only this coincidence can ensure that what is first apprehended by sensibility can give rise to an empirical judgement, which is developed and generalised logically through its relation to other cognitions, so that the possibility of a logical system of cognition can be meaningfully conceived. According to Kant, this progress of cognition, based on a coincidence or collaboration between the faculties of cognition, can only be verified *a posteriori*.

Thus, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, there is an essential complementarity between the *a priori* determination of the objective validity of cognition and the indeterminacy of the singular constitution of sensible objects, as has been particularly noted by Reinhard Hiltcher [1987: 11-77]. From this, it follows that problems such as the empirical truth of our judgements (*KrV*, B 82ff.) or the activity of the natural talent of Judgment cannot be determined using criteria, rules, or precepts (A 133/B 172). This indeterminacy regarding the cognition of appearances by the pure concepts of the understanding is expressed as a *heterogeneity between the faculties of cognition*, as Kant himself acknowledges in his confrontation with Eberhard concerning the correct interpretation of Leibniz's philosophy (*ÜE*, AA 8: 250).

Transcendental philosophy does not possess a unitary principle that would allow for the *in concreto* determination of the coincidence between sensibility and understanding – that is, the possibility that what is given to sensibility, in what defines its material singularity beyond its being-an-object in general, can be subsumed under an empirical concept of the understanding. Nothing, therefore, guarantees that the heterogeneity of things given to sensibility is such that they can be thought through the empirical use of the understanding, and consequently, that the universal categories can be specified in an actual empirical experience.

This issue will become the main epistemological problem of the *Critique of Judgment* (AA 5: 179ff.). This explains why Kant's reflections on the relation between the faculties can be found within the framework of his conception of taste and genius, which develops in his thought from the late 1770s onwards, and which will constitute one of the fundamental aspects on which the new theory of the faculties presupposed in the concept of reflecting power of judgment will be based.

The concept of *Grundkraft* and the influence of Tetens

The idea that the faculties must be underlain by a unity as a prerequisite for cognition corresponds to the discussions of the Leibnizian-Wolffian school on the concept of a fundamental power (*Grundkraft*), according to which we must assume that the different faculties are underlain by an active power whose spontaneity gives unity to the various faculties of cognition and generally makes their reconciliation possible for cognition [Dessoir 1911: 124-131]. We find this idea in Leibniz's *Monadology*, where he regards the soul as a spontaneous force. Through this, Leibniz not only understands consciousness based on apperception but, to what concerns us here, he conceives of the soul as a unity that governs each of its aspects or manifestations. About this concept and his thesis of pre-established harmony, Leibniz grounds the possibility of a unitary law that regulates the necessary order in the activities of consciousness and thus enables the rational development of cognition [ibid.: 126].

Wolff adopts this conception based on the assumption of a fundamental power as the power of representation (*vis representativa*); this is the power that achieves an inner reconciliation between the faculties of the soul. For Wolff, a real diversity of faculties could contradict the necessary simplicity and unity of the soul; therefore, such diversity must be considered merely nominal. In line with Leibniz's starting point, the difference between the faculties is marked by a difference in the degree of clarity and distinctness with which they access cognition of the exact nature. The faculties would thus represent different expressions or actualisations of this fundamental power, which, as the ground of unity, provides the means through which psychology can explain why one event ra-

ther than another occurs in the mind and, consequently, in the process of cognition [Heßbrüggen-Walter 2004: 77]. For only by considering the power that constitutes the soul as such can we explain why certain perceptions appear in the soul rather than others [ibid.: 81].

A critical alternative to the Wolffian position is represented by Crusius, who acknowledges the possibility of a pluralism of real fundamental powers, particularly due to the difficulty of both determining the reality of such a single, fundamental power and explaining the various actions or faculties of the soul as such heterogeneous expressions of the same foundation [ibid.: 84f.].

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we will ascertain that Kant takes a complex stance in this debate, as it is not easy to identify him with any of the previously outlined positions. Heßbrüggen-Walter has rightly observed that, in some passages, Kant reproduces Tetens's position [Heßbrüggen-Walter 2001; 2004: 161-164]. However, in our view, based on the study of the relevant passages found in the first *Critique*, it is not easy to provide a comprehensive account of Kant's position on the problem of the relation between the faculties. Likewise, it is insufficient to study only the antecedents of these discussions found in the *Notes from the Lectures on Metaphysics*. Without denying their relevance, it must be taken into account that, according to Kant himself, his theory of the *reflecting power of judgment* ultimately determines the relation between the faculties. We believe that considering Kant's reflections on the relation between the faculties, and, in this context, on a fundamental power of the mind, can shed light on how transcendental philosophy addresses this issue. We presuppose here that the theory of reflecting power of judgment is not only of interest within the realm of aesthetics, but rather that, through the critique of the judgment of taste, Kant expounds the subjective principles presupposed in general by the reflecting faculty of judgment. These principles have a *heuristic* validity – that is, they are concerned with how the subject must reflect on the use and organisation of their faculties in the investigation of nature.²

The influence of Tetens in the *Critique of Pure Reason* seems evident. The recourse to an active power of the soul as a basis for conceiving the activity presupposed in the use of the faculties of cognition is also found in Tetens [1979: II, 21]. This thinker begins with the recognition of a multiplicity of cognitive powers and defines the necessity of admitting “a certain high degree of inner spontaneity” involved in sensation, representation, and thought, from which he argues that the cognitive powers are but “different expressions of the same power, which may be called [...] their fundamental power.” [ibid.: I, 669]

It should be noted that Tetens' specific approach cannot simply be subsumed under the metaphysical development of the school's philosophy. Despite the Leibnizian provenance of his theory of the fundamental power, the empiricist influence stemming from Locke leads him to reject the possibility of a positive knowledge of this original power. He argues, however, that we are entitled to interpret the feeling that accompanies each of the faculties of cognition as an expression of this inner activity or spontaneity:

We do not know the fundamental power of the soul, because we cannot understand the first original effects of its natural power. Feeling is only the first expression. We can say that the fundamental power of the soul is the same absolute reality which, to a certain extent, develops, feels, and thinks [...].

[ibid.: I, 737]

² On this issue, see [Sánchez-Rodríguez 2010a: 192-242].

Both in the transcendental deduction and the Paralogisms, Kant rejects the metaphysical aspects of the definition of consciousness found in Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolffianism. In the *Pölitiz Metaphysics*, a text close to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant confronts the Wolffian conception and poses the following question: “Whether all the faculties of the soul can be united and derived from a single fundamental faculty or whether different fundamental faculties must be adopted to explain all the actions of the soul from them.” (AA 27: 261).

Kant rejects the first option because the soul cannot be properly known as a single substance, nor can the different faculties be determined as accidents derived from this unity (AA 27: 262). Within the framework of the Transcendental Dialectic, the imposition of limits on metaphysical knowledge and the strict demarcation between the sensible and the rational would have rendered this cognitive determination impossible.

However, although philosophy cannot positively know the ultimate foundation of unity that underlies the faculties, the Transcendental Dialectic is nonetheless compelled to presuppose this hidden unity. In his exposition of the significance of a fundamental power in nature, Kant employs precisely the example of the hidden unity between the faculties of cognition:

Initially, a logical maxim bids us to reduce this apparent variety as far as possible by discovering hidden identity through comparison, and seeing if imagination combined with consciousness may not be memory, wit, the power to distinguish, or perhaps even understanding and reason. The idea of a *fundamental power* – though logic does not ascertain whether there is such a thing – is at least the problem set by a systematic representation of the manifold of powers.

(A 649/B 677)

Through his critique of this idea, Kant recovers its transcendental significance as a regulative principle of subjective validity to orient our empirical cognition. Moreover, this internal relation between the faculties also seeks to conceive as *unified* what the Transcendental Analytic had to *separate* in its grounding of the possibility of cognition – namely, the sensible and the rational.

Kant thus continues to engage with this concept from the Leibnizian tradition. However, he maintains that the unity of the mind, as the fundamental force underlying the faculties of cognition, cannot be positively determined but must be presupposed to conceive the order and organisation of these faculties for cognition. According to Kant, this presupposition of the unity of reason, exemplified by the concept of fundamental power, holds the status of a *transcendental idea* (A 560f./B 678f.).

Already in the Transcendental Analytic, he had admitted that sensibility and understanding are to be regarded as two trunks sharing a common root, even if critique can only focus on the analysis of the faculties at the point where the two trunks bifurcate and present themselves as specifically distinct.³ The foundation of an *a priori* cognition of the real

³ “All that seems necessary for an introduction or a preliminary is that there are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought” (*KrV*, A 15/B 29); “[we] begin only at the point where the general root of our cognitive power divides and branches out into two stems, one of which is reason. By “reason” I here understand, however, the entire higher faculty of cognition, and I therefore contrast the rational to the empirical” (A 835/B 864). On the problem of an unknown common root among the faculties, see [Heidegger 1929: 34; Martínez Marzoa 1987; Henrich 1955].

through the pure concepts of the understanding, which possess objective validity, requires a clear demarcation between sensibility and understanding as heterogeneous faculties, insofar as they are based on different principles. However, the possibility of an empirical use of the understanding and, consequently, of a system of empirical cognitions, also demands the consideration of the reconciliation or collaboration between the multiple cognitive faculties of reason. From the *Critique of Pure Reason* onwards, Kant describes this reason as an organized body (B XXIII).

Kant develops this theme primarily through the theory of the reflecting power of judgment. In this article, we will focus on how the concept of *Grundkraft* does not designate an actual and substantial reality that can be objectively known, but rather a transcendental and regulative idea of subjective validity. Kant will draw on his developments aimed at articulating his theory of genius to formulate this requirement of presupposing a unity of the faculties.

Genius as *Geist*⁴ or that which vivifies among the faculties

In the materials of the *Posthumous Legacy* and the *Notes to the Lectures on Anthropology*, Kant characterises genius as an active, creative power and therefore as opposed to imitation (*R 921a*, AA 15: 407). Genius is a natural disposition that creates new products without relying on rules given by experience (*Anthropologie-Mongrovius*, AA 25: 1310f.). It acts independently of regulations and produces the very law that it employs in creating new images (*R 812*, AA 15: 361; see also *R 922*; AA 15: 410).

Kant recurrently refers to the various components of this particular disposition, which is genius, which results from the interaction of different faculties at different levels of the mind. The first level is sensibility, which includes sensation, imagination, and wit. The second level is given by the power of judgment, which enables the free productions of the imagination to be brought into harmony with the understanding; it thus entails a limitation of the scope and productivity of the imagination. Thirdly, Kant mentions *spirit* (*Geist*). The final level is occupied by taste, which expresses the reference to sociability and the feeling of others.⁵

This definition of genius as a certain proportion between the faculties of cognition enables Kant to relate this conception to the problem of the unity between sensibility (or imagination) and understanding. He considers *Geist*, which allows for the reconciliation of the initially diverse faculties, serving as their common substratum and the principle of their activity. According to him, genius is the correct proportion between sensibility or imagination, judgment or understanding, and taste. *Geist* designates the principle that governs the enlivening of the faculties to bring them into harmony with an inevitable end or idea.

Geist is not a particular faculty but rather one that gives unity to all the faculties.

Understanding and sensibility – or, in this case, imagination – are the faculties of the human being; *Geist* is the unity of these faculties. It is, therefore, the general unity of the human mind or the harmony between these faculties. *Geist* is also the enlivening of the

⁴ The German term “*Geist*” will not be translated here; its meaning can be related to the English terms “soul”, “spirit”, “wit” or “anthropological idiosyncrasy of an epoch or a nation”, [Tonelli 1966a; 1966b]. The most complete and up-to-date study on the concept of genius in the 18th century is [Martinez, Ponce 2022].

⁵ Cf. *Anthropologie-Menschenkunde*, AA 25: 1060; *Anthropologie-Mongrovius*, AA 25: 1313; *R 812*, AA 15: 361f., *Ref. 916*, AA 15: 400; *R 922*, AA 15: 411; *R 1509*, AA 15: 824f.

imagination through an *idée*. The *idée* is, properly speaking, an occupation of the intellect, though not through abstraction, for in that case, it would concern concepts. It is the *principium* of the rules [...]. The *idée* always corresponds only to the unity of the manifold within the whole; it therefore contains the *principium* of the manifold within the entire.⁶

Geist is not a particular faculty, but one that gives unity to all the faculties. Understanding and sensibility, or in this case, imagination, are the faculties of the human being; the *Geist* is the unity of these faculties. It is thus the general unity of the human mind or, again, the harmony between these faculties. *Geist* is also the vivification of the imagination through an *idée*. The *idée* is properly speaking an occupation of the intellect, but not through abstraction, for it is a matter of *concepts*. It is the *principium* of the rules [...]. The *idée* always corresponds only to the unity of the various in the whole; it therefore contains the *principium* of the different in the whole.

(*Anthropologie-Pillau*, AA 15: 782)⁷

This enlivening of the faculties and their concordance is understood as the purposiveness of the imagination: “*Geist* is the principium of the enlivening (of the talents, faculties of the soul) through ideas (hence, it is the principle of an imagination enlivened according to purpose). An idea enlivens when it sets the imagination into diverse activity” (*Refl. 942*, AA 15: 418).

Geist is that which enlivens the relation between the faculties. However, this principle of the organisation of the mind cannot be determined in a speculative sense (*Refl. 932*, AA 15: 414). Kant acknowledges the necessity of presupposing a fundamental power as a substratum that serves as the foundation for the unity of the faculties. Yet, he insists on the impossibility of discerning its nature through cognitive means. This harmony between the faculties, grounded in a standard foundation, can only be presupposed *a posteriori* from the products of genius but cannot be intelligible *a priori* (*Anthropologie-Menschenkunde*, AA 25: 1060).

To sum up, it can be said that, based on the concept of *Geist*, Kant understands genius as an active and productive power that serves as the basis for the enlivening of the faculties of cognition, infuses them with activity, and makes their organisation and ordering possible.⁸

From this, we must ask about the historical origin of this understanding of genius in the context of the relationship between the faculties.

The historical origin of the Kantian conception of genius

The problematic question of the historical origin of the Kantian conception of genius has become a classic research subject on Kant. Most scholars agree that this conception enables Kant to systematise the research on aesthetics that he had been developing since the early 1770s. However, they differ regarding the historical origin of this conception. In an early seminal work, Schlapp argued that it is the category of genius, as adopted by Kant

⁶ *Anthropologie-Pillau*, AA 15: 782; see also AA 15: 772; *Anthropologie-Mongrovius*, AA 15: 1313; *Anthropologie-Friedländer*, AA 15: 418.

⁷ See also *Anthropologie-Pillau*, AA 25: 772; *Anthropologie-Mrongovius*, AA 25: 1313; *Anthropologie-Friedländer*, AA 25: 418.

⁸ It should be noted that Kant will define this relation between the faculties according to the concept of *Geist* on the model of the living being; see in this respect *R 945*, AA 15: 419; *R 950*, AA 15: 421.

from the Anglo-Saxon tradition, that allows for the emergence of the Critique of Judgment [Schlapp 1901: 387f.].

In contrast, Baeumler later contended that the systematic significance of the third *Critique* can only be understood within the historical framework of German scholastic philosophy [Baeumler 1923: 161-165, 300-302]. More recently, the thesis that Kant adopted his conception of genius – and consequently his definition of the imagination as productive – under the influence of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, particularly from Gerard's *An Essay on Genius*, has regained traction. This thesis, defended by Piero Giordanetti, is based on the texts in which this connection with Gerard is most explicitly evidenced – namely, the *Notes from the Lectures on Anthropology*, where Kant acknowledges the wisdom of this thinker in defining the imagination as productive and in explaining the origin of this productivity through the category of genius [Giordanetti 1984].⁹

However, these materials, which consist of the notes taken by students who attended Kant's lectures on Anthropology, cannot be treated by the interpreter as if they were published works. Consequently, any interpretation of Kant's intellectual development based on them must be grounded in a comparative analysis of these texts concerning his published works and the so-called *Reflections* of the *Posthumous Legacy*. Such an analysis should lead us to relativise the significance of Gerard's influence.¹⁰

Indeed, Kant will define productivity as the defining feature of genius, and he will acknowledge the value of Gerard's contribution precisely because he characterises imagination and genius in these terms. However, a comparison between the ideas presented in the *Notes from the Lectures on Anthropology* and the *Reflections* reveals that Kant stands in direct opposition to the theory of the faculties presupposed in Gerard's approach, insofar as this theory would fail to account for the very productivity of genius that Gerard himself defends.

Genius is not, as Gerard suggests, a particular power of the soul (otherwise, it would have a specific object), but rather a principium of the enlivening of the other faculties through ideas of the desired objects. Invention presupposes an enlivening of the faculties of cognition, not merely the sharpness of the faculties of learning. However, this enlivening must be directed towards an end – namely, the production of an idea – otherwise, it cannot be considered invention but merely a chance discovery. (Refl. 949, AA 15: 420f.)

As already indicated, Kant explains the origin of the productivity of the faculties through the concept of the idea, which, in turn, derives from the concept of *Geist*. *Geist*, however, is not regarded by Kant as a particular faculty of the mind but rather as the fundamental power that serves as the organising and enlivening principle for the rest of the faculties. This definition of genius and its productivity as a certain proportion between the faculties provides the constitutive basis for the approach that will reappear in the *Critique of Judgment* (KU, 5: 413-18).

Without providing any textual argumentation, Schlapp argues that this conception of the proportion between the faculties is also present in Gerard's theory of genius [Schlapp 1901: 118f. n. 2f.]. However, *Refl. 949*, cited above, clearly shows that if Gerard conceived of genius in this way, Kant was entirely unaware of it. Consequently, his conception of genius within the framework of the relation between the faculties cannot be at-

⁹ See in this respect *Anthropologie-Menschenkunde*, AA 25: 945, 1055; *Anthropologie-Mongrovius*, AA 25: 1314.

¹⁰ On this issue, see [Sánchez-Rodríguez 2010b: 546-552; Clewis 2023: 117-125].

tributed to Gerard's influence. Instead, Kant presents this definition of genius as a correction of Gerard's theory: invention, productivity, and the enlivening of the imagination, as well as its concordance with the understanding through judgment, can only be grounded in the concept of *Geist* – that is, in a characterisation of genius as a proportion or organisation between the faculties of cognition (see also *Refl. 1509*, AA 15: 826; *Refl. 921a*, AA 15: 408).

And this theory can only be understood if one attends to Kant's relation to the *debates in Leibnizian aesthetics on the concept of genius*.

Sometimes, Kant explains the meaning of the concept *Geist* based on the French concept *esprit*.¹¹ In fact, in the seventeenth century, "genius" was used in France as *esprit*, a term that, in the French intellectual milieu, designated the totality of the capacities of the mind as a natural disposition [Warning 1974].

This influence of French poetics must have been familiar to Kant due to his direct engagement with the work of Meier, Baumgarten's foremost disciple, and heterodox Wolffians precisely because of the Leibnizian imprint in their philosophy. In Meier's logic manuals, which Kant used for his lectures, we find: *natural wit (Mutterwitz)* "is what the French called the genius of a scholar. By natural genius, we mean that proportion of the powers of cognition through which one acquires the capacity to become a scholar." [Meier 1997: § 588, 766]. Baumgarten had already defined genius as the correct proportion between the faculties of cognition, precisely in the work that Kant used as a manual for his lectures on *Metaphysics and Anthropology* [1739: § 648]. This conception of genius is also found in the famous *Berliner Akademie* prize-winning essay. Eberhard likewise defines genius as the original disposition that enables a proper relationship between the faculties of cognition [Eberhard 1968: 208-252]. Similarly, this general conception appears in Sulzer's *Analyse du génie*, included in the *Mémoires de la Berliner Akademie* (1757), which was published in German in 1773 under the title *Entwicklung des Begriffs vom Genie* [Sulzer 1974]. This case is particularly relevant to the question at hand, for in this work, we not only find a clear connection between the concepts of fundamental power and genius, but also see that this theory is grounded in a rational psychology with an apparent Leibnizian influence. The parallels between this position and the theory Kant expounded in his lectures from the mid-1770s are manifest.

Sulzer understands that "genius is not a particular property of the soul, different from the rest, but rather the faculty that dominates over the rest," [ibid.: 308] as well as that "genius is not a particular capacity of the soul, but a general nature of all the capacities of the soul." [ibid.: 308f.] This is a characterisation with which Kant agreed, and precisely the point of divergence between him and Gerard. This conception of genius, as that which infuses activity and organisation into the rest of the faculties, is defined by Sulzer in terms of fundamental power, establishing a connection with Leibniz's philosophy.

All the soul's capacities arise from that fundamental power which, as the great Leibniz observes, constitutes the essence of all substances, particularly the nature of the soul [...]. In this power, we must also inquire into the leading cause of genius.

[ibid.: 307]

Like Tetens and Kant, Sulzer holds that this "active power" cannot be explained but is perceived and felt in the mind [ibid.: 309, 319]. Similarly, the thesis that ideas origi-

¹¹ Cf. *Anthropologie-Pillau*, AA 25: 772; *Anthropologie-Friedländer*, AA 25: 554f.; *Refl. 841*, AA 15: 374; *Refl. 1510*, AA 15: 828; *Refl. 1485*, AA 15: 701.

nate from this inner power that underlies the faculties parallels Kant's theory of genius [ibid.: 310].

Moreover, Sulzer also understands genius as the intervention of different faculties in proportion to each other. First, there is sensibility, which includes the senses, imagination, and wit. The defining feature of imagination is described as enlivening [ibid.: 313]. Secondly, like Kant, he mentions *judgment*, which limits wit and the products of imagination [ibid.: 314]. Thirdly, genius requires the intervention of *Geist*, whose restraint accounts for the ability to produce things skilfully [ibid.: 317]. Fourthly, he refers to the strength of both soul and body.

By way of conclusion, it becomes evident that in the developments and treatments of the problem that lead to his theory of genius, Kant presupposes and explores a conception of the human spirit as a fundamental power underlying all its manifestations, imparting life to them and enabling their harmony. His writings on metaphysics and the *first Critique* reveal Kant's engagement with the concept of a fundamental power of the soul, a treatment closely aligned with that found in Tetens's work, which Kant knew well. However, we believe it is necessary to go beyond these texts to understand Kant's approach to this problem entirely. First, it is not so much in the *first Critique* but rather in the *third Critique* that Kant deepens his theory of the faculties – not merely by undertaking philosophical inquiry where the two trunks of a common root have already bifurcated, as he puts it in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but rather by addressing the problem of how the subject must conceive the relationship and complementarity between the faculties if empirical cognition is to be possible. In the *first critique*, the requirement to think of a fundamental power is a transcendental principle, which is necessary if the investigation of the multiplicity of faculties is to be possible. This is a subjective necessity, concerning how the subject conceives of their cognition and faculties – akin to what will later be designated by the concept of *heautonomy* in the *third Critique*. The strictly metaphysical problem regarding the existence of a fundamental power of the soul and the possibility of knowing it is transformed in Kant into a subjective demand of reason, justified by its own epistemological needs, yet without representing any form of knowledge about reality or the human mind.

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The Fundamental Power of the Soul in Kant's Reflections on Genius: Between the Influences of Tetens and Sulzer

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant addresses the problem of reason's supposition of a fundamental power underlying the faculties of cognition. This concept had been debated in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy. Kant's position in this work is not entirely clear, although a distinct dependence on Tetens's prior treatment of the issue can be detected. The requirement to assume a unitary foundation underlying the diversity of the mind's operations or faculties was a common theme in Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy. In this article, we will argue that Kant developed the concept of a fundamental power primarily through his theoretical elaborations on the nature of genius. In this way, he integrates this concern of the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition into his aesthetic project.

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Фундаментальна сила душі в Кантових рефлексіях про генія: між впливами Тетенса і Зульцера

У «Критиці чистого розуму» Кант розглядає проблему припущення розуму про засадничу силу, що лежить в основі пізнавальних здібностей. Ця концепція обговорювалась у філософії XVII і XVIII століть. Позиція Канта в зазначеній праці не зовсім зрозуміла, хоча можна виявити чітку залежність від попереднього розгляду цього питання Тетенсом. Вимога припустити єдину основу, що лежить в основі різноманітності операцій або здібностей розуму, була поширеною темою в ляйбніцівсько-вольфгангівській філософії. У цій статті ми стверджуватимемо, що Кант розробив концепцію засадничої сили переважно через свої теоретичні розробки щодо природи генія. Таким чином, він інтегрує цю проблему ляйбніцівсько-вольфгангівської традиції у свій естетичний проєкт.

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