

IIAHOPAMA

Pablo Quintanilla

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF PERUVIAN PHILOSOPHY

It is a matter of debate on whether there has been philosophy in Peru, and more generally in the Americas, previous to the arrival of the first Europeans. I believe the question is a matter of stipulation. If you understand philosophy in a narrow sense, as the kind of argumentation on most general questions and with a metadiscursive methodology that appeared in Greece around 6th century B.C., we have no evidence of it in Peru, given that ancient Peruvians didn't have written language and that the closest mechanism of transmission of ideas were the *quipus*, a complex system of strings of different colors and with different kinds of knots.

These *quipus* were used to register numerical information and, most likely, also about some concepts related to their historical past. However, at present, nobody has found a way to decypher those concepts. So, if there was philosophy in such a narrow sense, we have no evidence of it. If we understand, in a broader sense, philosophy as an analysis of questions that address human's most general interrogations about their existence and life, we can find text written either in Spanish by the first Spaniards that arrived in Peru, in the 16th century, or in Quechua, using Latin alphabet in the 17th century.

This paper will address only Peruvian philosophy in the most narrow Western sense. Quintanilla [2004a; 2004b; 2016; 2018; 2024] provides some broader pictures and a more detailed analysis of the ideas I present in this paper. First, I will classify some general periods of Philosophy in Peru and then focus on the late 19th and early 20th century, when philosophy became a more professional activity in this country.

1. The 16th and 17th centuries

The most important influence in the intellectual discussion of these centuries comes from Spanish and Italian scholasticism, where the main references are Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. In fact, scholasticism was already being revised in France, England, and Germany, giving rise to early modernity, but in Spain and Italy, this was happening only very timidly. The consequence of this was that the conquest of Spanish America in the early and mid 16th century was carried out under the scholastic thought, fundamentally of Francisco de Suárez and Francisco de Vitoria. Mejía Valera [1963] maintains that the philosophy of

the colony was a repetition of Spanish scholasticism. However, scholasticism, already being questioned in Europe, found a new refuge in Spain's American colonies.

In addition, of course, to the texts themselves [Ballón 2011], the best source of information we have on the colonial period is the two books by Felipe Barreda Laos [1909; 1937]. In Peru, the main representative of scholasticism was Juan de Espinosa Medrano, nicknamed Lunarejo, who explicitly set out to defend the classics from the onslaught of the moderns. Espinosa Medrano not only taught and defended the Thomistic interpretation of Aristotle during the 17th Century, but also fiercely opposed the winds of renewal that were already coming from France and England, bringing the new forms of rationalism [Espinosa Medrano 1688; 1938; 2005; 2010; 2011].

2. The 18th century until the middle of the 19th century

The move away from scholasticism. This period is characterized by the distancing from scholasticism through the reception of the influence of the European philosophers of modernity, especially Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, and Kant. Intellectuals appeared whose liberal republican ideology, influenced by the political events in France and the United States, generated the encyclopedic and enlightened movements leading to independence from the Spanish crown during the second decade of the 19th century. In the philosophical field, perhaps the most interesting aspect was the appearance and development of probabilism, as a juncture between both periods.

But it could be said that the real beginning of modernity in Peru took place with the group of intellectuals called "Society of lovers of the country" (*Sociedad de amantes del país*), who edited the magazine *El Mercurio Peruano*. They were familiar with authors such as Descartes, Rousseau, Voltaire, and Spinoza, whose thoughts they taught at the Universidad Mayor de San Marcos, generating the distrust of two important powers: the Spanish Crown and the Church. The former viewed with suspicion the defense that the lovers of the country made of libertarian, democratic, and, in a hidden way, also republican values. For its part, the Church was suspicious of the rationalist turn taken by European philosophy, which in turn was appreciated and continued by Latin American philosophers, determined to use pure reason as the sole criterion for the foundation of our beliefs. Thus, once the independence of most Latin American nations took place in the first decades of the 19th century, positivism took over the intellectual scene.

3. From the middle of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century

In this period the most marked influence is positivism, to some extent that of Auguste Comte, but above all the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer and the naturalism of Charles Darwin. What European positivism brought to Latin America was mainly the demand for progress, development, and industrialization, as well as the awareness of the need to overcome the old uncritical atavisms of, at least so considered, the dogmatism of metaphysics and modern scholastic theology.

4. From the beginning to the middle of the 20th century,

the most important influence of this period was the spiritualism of Henri Bergson and Émile Boutroux. In Peru, its most outstanding representatives were Alejandro Deustua and Mariano Iberico. Marxism was also a strong influence.

5. From the mid-20th century to the present

What characterizes this period is precisely the diversity of influences and positions, the absence of a dominant philosophy, the intellectual crossbreeding, and the greater creativity, product precisely of the mixture between the diverse philosophical positions as, for example, marxism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, the analytical tradition, pragmatism and post-Kuhnian philosophy of science.

But let us now return to the flourishing period of positivism, whose influence marked the 19th century in Latin America and Peru. Confidence in science and reason tried to replace everything that sounded like religion, metaphysics or myth. It was at the University of San Marcos where this doctrine was established in Peru, fundamentally from the theses of Comte and Spencer. In Peru, the most important representatives of academic positivism were Javier Prado Ugarteche, Jorge Polar Vargas, Mariano H. Cornejo and Manuel Vicente Villarán, among other authors. And outside the university, the most important positivist was the essayist and poet Manuel González Prada.

I will try to show that this foundational generation of professional philosophy in Peru supported positivism in the latter part of the nineteenth century and then turned to spiritualism in the early twentieth century. More specifically, positivists believed that there is only one concept of knowledge, which coincides with scientific knowledge. This kind of epistemological monism tended to be abandoned by the same positivist generation that moved to spiritualism, accepting the possibility that there are different concepts of knowledge and, therefore, that there are more forms of knowledge besides scientific knowledge. But such a shift was not radical enough. Thus, many positivist assumptions remained in the spiritualist period, which explains why this type of spiritualism did not last long nor was philosophically fruitful.

In Peru, positivism is already mentioned as early as 1854, in a *Course of Elementary Philosophy* published by Sebastián Lorente [1853-1854a; 1853-1854b] in Ayacucho. However, Augusto Salazar Bondy [1965] considers that positivism appeared with force in Peru only in 1885, with Carlos Lisson. The same author establishes its demise in 1915, precisely with the arrival in Peru of Bergson's spiritualism. In any case, the appearance of positivism in Peru practically coincides with the end of the War of the Pacific, one of the most serious identity traumas that Peru had to face in its beginnings as a nation. It is an idea shared by Salazar Bondy [1965], David Sobrevilla [1978; 1980; 1988-1989; 1996], María Teresa Rivara de Tuesta [2000a; 2000b], and Augusto Castro [2009] that Peruvian philosophy appeared after the War of the Pacific, with the first generation of intellectuals influenced by positivism.

Indeed, it would be possible to imagine that the postulates of order and progress, as well as industrialization and development brought by positivism, were received in the chaotic Peruvian society, which was emerging from several civil wars and a tragic war with Chile, as a panacea for all ills. Perhaps a proof of this is that the first positivists, such as González Prada and Javier Prado, were interested in this doctrine especially for the consequences it could have for politics, the practice of law and historical research, and therefore for a better understanding of Peruvian society, and not so much as a philosophical methodology or as an object of study in itself.

In the Peruvian case, positivism was, above all, a reaction to scholastic philosophy, the various forms of traditionalism, and what was seen as uncritical dogma and prejudice. The breadth with which positivism was understood is clearly seen since some philosophers saw

it as the necessary consequence of taking Kant to its most radical consequences or tried to reconcile it with Christianity. It is, therefore, a fact that few of the Peruvian positivists reproduced the classical positivist model; most of them interpreted it in connection with other authors, thus creating, in some sense, original positions. This was the case of Jorge Polar, who linked his Spencerism with Christianity, Kant, William James, and Croce, and, later, naturally, with Bergson and Boutroux. Joaquín Capelo did so with Leibnitz and Mariano H. Cornejo with Wundt.

The most important elements taken by Peruvian philosophers from European positivism were its basically anti-metaphysical attitude, naturalism, inductivism, empiricism, and its evolutionary conception of history, that is, the belief in epistemological and social progress. Javier Prado, for example, considers Darwin's and Spencer's evolutionism as the greatest contribution of the 19th century to truth, and thinks that its transcendence is comparable to that of Kant.

Not all positivists were materialists; for example, Polar was not, but they were scientific and inductivist. In this field, its importance in the scientific development of Peru was central, especially in medicine, where greater empirical research was generated that perhaps would not have occurred in its absence. Positivism was also applied to history, law, and even to the political and social interpretation of Peru. This was the case of González Prada, who basically reflected the naturalism of his time without major personal contribution in the philosophical field. However, his value was to have applied these doctrines to the social interpretation of Peruvian reality. But González Prada assumed ontological reductivism in a totally uncritical manner. In *Páginas Libres* (sic) [González Prada 1946: 46], he affirmed that “outside nature, there is nothing but illusory symbolism, mythological fantasies, metaphysical vanishings.” He also sustained methodological monism, as when he affirmed “admitting no other truths than those submitted to observation and experiment.” Thus, González Prada would be left with very few truths.

He also sustained a form of epistemological contextualism, as when he affirmed that all truth is provisional, proper to an epoch, and circumscribed to a time. The latter is curious, as it leads him to a form of perspectivism. His reasoning is that, since experience is the source of all knowledge, and since all knowledge is circumscribed to our experimental possibilities, belonging to a different point of view would give rise to a different kind of knowledge. However, these theses end up suggesting, paradoxically, certain metaphysical positions, as when González Prada defends a form of determinism among the causal connections of the events that constitute the great mechanism of nature. That same ontological monism leads him to hold the metaphysical position that only one substance is contained in all objects.

As will become clear, this type of positivism not only ends up entangling itself, in a totally inconsistent and paradoxical way, in metaphysical arguments, but also leads to another problem: its epistemology maintains that it is only rational to believe in that for which we have some kind of demonstration, empirical or logical. If this were so, to begin with, it would be irrational to believe in most of the beliefs we have, for which there is no kind of demonstration, but simply reasonable indications; and, secondly, the very concept of irrationality would vanish. The problem with this type of positivism is that its epistemological standards are so high that they are unattainable and, therefore, derive in the perspectivism that we see, for example, in González Prada. But this is precisely because epistemological concepts are being used under the definitions of traditional metaphysics, which is precisely what positivism tries in vain to escape from. This proves, once again, that the punishment

of the parricide is to repeat the acts of the father. Those positivists influenced by Kant, such as Javier Prado and Jorge Polar, maintained the impossibility of knowing that which is beyond the realm of the phenomenal, thus admitting the logical possibility of global skepticism, that is, the idea that all or most of our beliefs could be false. All positivists consider Kant as the great predecessor by radically questioning the excesses of the legitimate use of reason. In this, they are also heirs of Locke and Hume, although they are not inspired by them directly, but through Spencer.

Javier Prado [1881; 1896; 1908a; 1908b; 1915; 1918; 1941; 1997; 2003] worked especially on juridical positivism and, eventually, dealt with issues of the history of philosophy. But he had no truly original contribution to philosophy, apart from some journalistic articles on aesthetics. On the other hand, and in spite of not having been sufficiently appreciated as a philosopher, Jorge Polar devoted himself from the beginning to the discussion of authentically philosophical themes for their own sake, and not necessarily with the aim of applying them to other activities. Salazar Bondy maintains, and I think rightly so, that Polar was the first Peruvian academic philosopher to propose his own ideas. Polar is, moreover, an author in some way paradigmatic of the turn his generation underwent, so it is interesting to analyze in this author how this shift took place, why it occurred and what things it presupposed, as well as how radical the change was.

Polar [1896; 1897; 1903; 1925] sought to apply positivist principles to aesthetics. He even published a totally naturalistic manual of aesthetics in which he attempts to define aesthetic values in terms of physical processes, such as sound and light, without using any metaphysical concept. He thinks that beauty is only rhythm and combination of rhythms, or, as he calls it, eurythmy. The ultimate project of the positivist Polar was to build a positive science of beauty. Thus, beauty is understood as a rhythm of light and sound, which in turn are nothing but a rhythm of ether or air.

But what makes Polar a positivist is not his attempt to explain the aesthetic phenomenon through the use of the natural sciences, but his claim that the beautiful can be reduced to the physical, that is, his claim that this is the only epistemologically valid explanation of the aesthetic phenomenon. If he had accepted the viability of several possible non-reducible explanations, including physical explanations, he would have been several steps further away from positivism. In his last stage, Polar pointed in that direction, but he never developed a solid position on the matter. However, his ultimate goal was to be able to elaborate an explanation that did not resort to the concepts of traditional metaphysics, which, in his opinion, led to nothing but confusion and error. Naturally, for him as for most positivists, the word 'metaphysics' alluded to any kind of discourse that could not be reduced or analyzed in terms of spatio-temporal physical objects or logical concepts. The case of Polar is particularly interesting. His intellectual journey began with his scholastic education at the Universidad Nacional de San Agustín de Arequipa, where he studied law and literature, passing through a Spencerian positivism with a Kantian air and finally ending up in the spiritualism of Boutroux, as he recounts in his finely written intellectual autobiography, *Confesión de un catedrático*, of 1925. However, throughout his work, including his positivist stage, Polar tried to reconcile positivism with his Catholic faith, a task not easy to accomplish, so it is common to find gross contradictions in his approaches. He thinks, for example, that all knowledge must be rationally demonstrated, and believes that rational knowledge of things in themselves is not possible, but he maintains that the existence of God can be rationally known from the principle of causality, which can be considered a remnant of his scholastic stage. He also

affirms the existence of the soul, although he holds that the soul “is a series of formulas that determine the laws of the phenomena of consciousness” [Polar 1896: 13]. What is clear is that Polar's positivism is constituted, above all, from an ambivalent rejection of the Spanish scholasticism in which he had been formed.

If, on the one hand, Polar affirms that all metaphysics is an abuse of reason, on the other hand he maintains the possibility of rationally knowing a metaphysical object: God. There is here an unresolved contradiction that should have led him to develop a more complex conception of knowledge, which he did not manage to do even in his later time as a spiritualist. At the end of his life, as he recounts in his *Confesión de un catedrático* (1925), he returned to his hometown Arequipa to take his aesthetics classes and to enjoy life in the tranquility of the countryside, but he did not manage to develop, or at least not in writing, a new non-positivistic epistemology.

Although Kant's influence led positivists to hold that facts belong to the phenomenal and not to the noumenal realm, the idea of knowledge as representation did not undergo major modification. Polar thinks, for example, that Kant and positivism taught us not to pretend to have knowledge of the real in itself, but only of the phenomenal, whose knowledge is possible if the appropriate scientific method is followed. This idea is, naturally, linked to methodological and ontological monism, which affirms that there is only one valid scientific method, just as there is only one form of existence, the material, which is properly spatio-temporality. Also associated with this idea is the assumption that there is only one concept of knowledge underlying the various disciplines.

Most Peruvian positivists had a special interest in aesthetics and art, which was not always easy to integrate with scientism; moreover, some of them were also poets, such as González Prada and Polar. All this would prepare the ground for the final abandonment of positivism towards pluralism, which seems to me to be a better way of describing the diversity of positions that emerged after the collapse of positivism, because not all the positions that were generated were directly influenced by Bergson, as the term 'spiritualism' erroneously suggests.

This shift occurred in other areas as well. For example, in the thought of Honorio Delgado, there is a movement from a positivist and biologizing conception of psychoanalysis, which precisely he introduced in Peru, towards a closely dualistic position, which holds that mental life is irreducible to biological explanations.

Alejandro Deustua also received a basically positivist philosophical formation, but he began to dissociate himself from it towards the end of the 19th century. He became familiar with spiritualist doctrines around 1898 and his break with positivism was complete by the end of the century.

In 1907, in his memoir as dean of the Faculty of Letters of the University of San Marcos, Javier Prado also evidenced his distancing from positivism, a change shared by most intellectuals of his generation. It is interesting to wonder how it was so easy for most positivists to slide into the various forms of spiritualism that later emerged, in such a fluid and untraumatic way. The rapidity and ease of the shift proves again the breadth and perhaps also the vagueness of Peruvian positivism, but on the other hand suggests that the transformation was not total. Javier Prado does not adhere to Bergson's philosophy, but he does take an interest in Nietzsche, William James, and other post-positivist authors of the time, all of whom are imprecisely described as spiritualists. In his last period, Prado censures positivism for not fulfilling its own expectations and acceding to another form of metaphysics, as well as Bergson's extreme spiritualism. However, while Prado abandons some

elements of positivism, he does not abandon all of them. He continues to maintain, for example, that philosophy is a science of science, which is a typical positivist thesis. Likewise, both metaphysics and religion are seen, in the manner of Kant, as natural and inevitable dispositions of human beings toward the transcendent, even though these activities do not provide any real knowledge. It will be seen here that there is still a concept of representational knowledge inspired by the model of the natural sciences.

But, certainly, these were not the only limitations of our positivists. Although they all believed that the scientific method *par excellence* is induction, none considered Hume's famous paradox. This is the paradox according to which induction cannot be demonstrated by deduction or by experience so the only justification we have for believing in induction is induction itself; that is, we trust induction because so far, it has enabled us to correctly predict the course of nature. But, as Hume saw, if one regards the scientific method as induction, justifying induction in induction itself has the consequence that the whole edifice of science, of which the positivists were so proud, ultimately rests on a circularity. If so, how could science be the paradigm of true knowledge? Our positivists did not have sufficient knowledge of classical epistemology to ask themselves these questions that challenged the very foundations of their approaches.

Thus, spiritualism, also called vitalism or intuitionism, emerged as a reaction to positivism practically at the beginning of the 20th century. Interestingly, spiritualism arose as a reaction to the reaction against idealism that positivism signified.

Those most influenced by Bergson were the intellectuals closest to Deustua: Mariano Iberico, Ricardo Dulanto, Humberto Borja García, and Juan Francisco Elguera. But the Arielist generation is also commonly considered spiritualist, which shows how loose the classification is: Riva-Agüero, the García Calderón brothers, the Miró-Quesada brothers, as well as Felipe Barreda Laos. Close to them were the late Honorio Delgado, Julio C. Tello, Rubén Vargas Ugarte and Hermilio Valdizán. Mejía Valera mentions Clemente Palma, Alejandrino Maguiña, Ezequiel Burga, Guillermo Salinas Cossío and Juan Bautista de Lavalle, among others, as intellectuals who were influenced by their interest in aesthetics in their shift towards spiritualism [Mejía Valera 1963: 155].

The spiritualists reacted against empiricism and scientific reductionism, developing theses where they argued the possibility of a non-material creative intuition, responsible for freedom and autonomy. Thus it was that the concept of freedom became central to the thought of Alejandro Deustua. But it was conceivable that positivism would go into decline, especially since its main enemies had written before it appeared. With Kant, above all, and the neo-Kantians, the dichotomy between natural determinism and autonomy of the will suggests that the mere nomological explanation, proper to the natural sciences, cannot explain some of the most important human phenomena, precisely such as freedom, genius and creative intuition. The development of post-Kantian ideas and the later hermeneutics of Dilthey, as well as the appearance on the scene of Nietzsche, would put an end to positivism and allow spiritualism to enter Peru. It is important to note, however, that these German philosophers were not known first hand until much later.

Deustua seeks to reconcile the notions of order and freedom that, in his opinion, positivism cannot integrate. This seems to reproduce one of the themes that Kant addresses in the *Critique of Judgment*: the reconciliation between determinism and autonomy of the will. But in order to achieve this synthesis, Deustua does not consider both concepts as symmetrical but gives priority to freedom. In this way, he excludes all determinism and all social explanation in terms of laws. He also maintains that “what determines aesthetic val-

ue is freedom” [Deustua 1923: 121]. He thinks that the emotional experience of the beautiful comes from a feeling of empathy between the subject and the aesthetic object. But, in his view, this is made possible by freedom, which is reflected in the beautiful object. Although the concept of freedom is central to Deustua's thought, it is a matter of debate whether he manages to articulate a truly consistent conception of it. It could be argued that he fails to explain how human freedom is possible in a natural world governed by determinism. Deustua's answers to these questions give the impression of employing other equally complex concepts, such as creative intuition, without the reader feeling that there is any real clarification of the problem.

Deustua affirms that freedom is not only the absence of conditioning factors but creative energy, action and will to act; in this way he thinks that the subject is constituted. Freedom is therefore the essential characteristic of spiritual life, of the psychic, of action and, therefore, of the human. Likewise, he affirms that spiritual progress is the primacy of freedom over order, even though freedom and order (understood in the sense of structure, law and harmony) are the two elements that allow the constitution of the human subject. However, Deustua does not seem to be clarifying the concept of freedom but rather gives the impression that he is redefining it by means of other terms that in some way already presuppose the concept of freedom, such as the concepts of creation, intentional action, spirit, etc.

Thus, Deustua develops a sort of epistemological pluralism that is expressed in his confidence, following Bergson, that the aesthetic and ethical phenomena cannot be known as nature is known, through representation, but through intuition. But the concept of scientific knowledge that Deustua employs remains, in the main, representationalist.

In relation to the values known through intuition, Deustua is still a monist, for he thinks that the most important value of all or “the value of values” is the aesthetic one. Only a monist could believe that there must be one value superior to the others and that there could not be several values with the same status. This was clarified by the second Wittgenstein, who showed how Western philosophy lives obsessed with finding the 'real' order of things, which would coincide with that of the concepts contained in language. The impression that one can get, then, is that with Deustua the way is opened for a pluralist epistemology, but that this does not germinate, since Deustua still has both representationalist and monistic presuppositions, which do not allow it.

Analogously to how the term 'positivism' designated a very varied category of positions, which although they have some important features in common also have many differences, the word 'spiritualism' designated a reaction to the above that encompassed a diversity of authors and positions that probably had little in common, except the rejection of the main positivist theses. This is the case of authors such as Bergson, Boutroux, Croce, Eucken, Ravaisson, Wentschen and William James, among others.

The thesis that there is not only one concept of knowledge but several, which is present in Bergson and which is undoubtedly the beginning of the collapse of positivism, is maintained, although confusingly, by Deustua, Iberico and Pedro Zulen [Quiroz et al. 2015]. This thesis, which appears and is hidden in different ways throughout Western thought, has the same fate in Peru. It is present in spiritualism and also in the Arielist generation, but is later hidden by the influence of Marxism and the strong positivist elements in it.

Pedro Zulen also approached the problem in a suggestive way, elaborating a sharp critique of Bergson in his book *La filosofía de lo inexpresable. Bosquejo de una*

interpretación y una crítica de la filosofía de Bergson, published originally in 1920. In that book, Zulen [Quiroz et al. 2015] argues that intuition can provide information from the realm of the psychological, but not from reality as such. Therefore, it does not have sufficient epistemological or metaphysical value. He thinks that Bergson's style is rhetorical but not demonstrative; it may be evocative and metaphorical but does not provide knowledge. Here Zulen presupposes, like the positivists, that there is only one concept of knowledge, the representational and demonstrative, and uses that yardstick to measure the epistemological value of various human activities.

However, perhaps the Peruvian philosopher who came closest to recognizing the complexity and diversity of the concept of knowledge was Mariano Iberico, who also had an early positivist phase, adhering to Bergson's spiritualism later on. Finally, he developed some of his own ideas, especially on aesthetic issues, although with some interesting epistemological and ontological correlates of a certain neo-Hegelian influence. Iberico attached importance to art, metaphysics and religion, as forms of connection with the absolute. This was to be achieved through sympathy, to achieve a fusion with the whole. But this absolute is not to be understood as static and fixed, in the Eleatic manner, but as dynamic and living, more in the Hegelian sense. What there is not in Iberico, however, is an explicit discussion and defense of the thesis that there is a diversity of forms of knowledge, all of equal importance and depth. This may have been developed by the spiritualists from their readings of William James, especially by Polar and Zulen who knew him, and by Iberico, from his interest in poetry, but neither of them dwelt at length on the epistemological side of this kind of pluralism.

Religion is understood by Iberico as a way of giving meaning to life, but not strictly speaking as a form of knowledge. It can be said that, in a strict sense, Iberico does not get out of the representationalist conception of knowledge. On the other hand, there is a strong anti-intellectualism in him, coming from the same attitude in Bergson. There is in Iberico an explicit rejection of reason, precisely because the concept of reason employed is the Cartesian theorist one that splits theory from praxis. Thus, my impression is that there is a rejection of theory, of reason, of logical thought, of the cognitive, precisely because these concepts are being understood in their most Cartesian and Kantian sense. Iberico opposes thought to intuition because he continues to have positivist assumptions about the concept of thought, which he does not manage to overcome. Peruvian positivists used to think that positivism was a radicalization of the Kantian model, they assumed this claim even in their latter spiritualist period. Thus, Iberico's philosophy is full of the same dichotomies of the positivists, only now he puts himself on the other side of the line. He says: "There is only one way to truly know: to become the known object and yet retain one's own individuality; in other words, to live another life in our own." [Iberico 1920: 127]

The core of this position is appealing, although the use of the word 'truly' may be a bit disconcerting. If positivists used to postulate that there is only one correct form of knowledge, through science, now Iberico will say that science is illusion and only art constitutes true knowledge. It is clear, then, that both the positivist dichotomy and some form of monism are still present.

Interestingly, Iberico also presents a dualism of truths: those of science, which are static, rational, and fixed, and those of the self, considered living and Dynamic [Iberico 1926: 163]. Thus, there is tacitly an epistemological pluralism that is not sufficiently developed.

But Iberico falls back into monism when he maintains that true knowledge is that of intuition since science is nothing but instrumental.

In *La aparición*, Iberico distinguishes between symbolic and conceptual thought. [Iberico 1950: 13] The conceptual is the correspondence between object and representation, while the symbolic is the harmony between expression and meaning. Just as the epitome of conceptual thought is science, the epitome of symbolic thought is art and poetry and, in the case of language, metaphor. In his book *Estudio sobre la metáfora*, Iberico asks what metaphorical knowledge consists of. He answers that it is “an intuitive knowledge that knows the reality within the soul.” [Iberico 1965: 23]

Thus, Iberico's thesis is that scientific knowledge is reductive, tends to identity, is analytical, instrumental and describes the external world. Metaphorical knowledge, on the other hand, is intuitive and analogical, elaborates similarities between objects that are not associated in reality, and knows the interiority of the internal psychic world. He argues that while scientific knowledge is objective, metaphorical knowledge is subjective, although the latter presupposes an intersubjective community. [ibid.: 25].

We have established the subjective character of metaphor, although this subjectivity does not imply isolation but rather presupposes intersubjective community.

David Sobrevilla thinks that spiritualism was a setback in the historical process of Peruvian philosophy. [Sobrevilla 1980] I disagree. In the first place, because this statement presupposes the existence of an objective criterion of progress in philosophy, which I doubt it is possible to establish, other than simply the similarity with the positions of those who make the assessment or the present consensus. However, if going beyond that detail, we establish our point of view as a criterion, I will say that the spiritualists had intuitions about the plurality of forms of knowledge that, although vague and imprecise, allowed us to reformulate phenomena such as science, religion and art in a more subtle and complex way than positivist reductivism. On the other hand, I think that positivism and spiritualism have not only been two opposing positions in Peru from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, reflecting what was happening in Europe, but also two possible general attitudes towards philosophy.

With the arrival of Marxism in Latin America at the beginning of the 20th century, the philosophical panorama became even more complicated. Peruvian philosophy was no longer a mirror of European philosophy but had an original contribution, especially with José Carlos Mariátegui [2021] and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre [2010]. These two authors elaborated Marxist thought by giving it an interpretation of their own, with greater or lesser luck, which is not a subject we can discuss here, but at least they did not limit themselves to reflecting European thought. I think it is at this time, that is, with Zulen's and Iberico's reading of the spiritualists and with Mariátegui's and Haya's interpretation of Marxism, that the intellectual melting pot that is current Peruvian philosophy, begins to take shape. However, I think that the positivist elements contained in Marxism, above all the unity of the concept of knowledge, epistemological as well as ontological monism, and a certain although nuanced historical determinism, were maintained in Peruvian Marxist thought in the 20th century. The consequence of this was that spiritualism passed too quickly, without giving it a chance to establish itself, consolidate and develop more creative positions. That is why I think that spiritualism was a truncated enterprise in the Peruvian philosophical process, although I also suspect that several of its intuitions are sufficiently valuable to merit further discussion.

In recent years, philosophy in Peru has benefited from the increasing diversity of influences from the most important philosophical traditions: phenomenology and hermeneutics, Marxism and the Frankfurt School, French post-structuralism, post-analytic and post-Kuhnian philosophy, pragmatism, among others. In this, curiously enough, we have a certain advantage over the regions of the world that have strongly consolidated philosophical traditions: they often lack the disposition or sufficient interest to get to know neighboring traditions. But this is not the case in Peru. Here we are witnessing a flourishing of diverse positions, schools, and problems, where it cannot be said that any of them takes precedence over the others. There is, rather, a dialogue and an elaboration of traditions that mutually enrich each other.

Thus, philosophy in Peru today is no longer a mirror but, in any case, a game of mirrors. But it should not be assumed that it remains a repetition without its own elaboration. Nor, of course, is it necessarily a guarantee of originality, but a promise or a possibility. When they reflect each other and intertwine their images, the mirrors create new forms, tones, and shades that were not in the reflected reality. This, it seems to me, is the most valuable process of authentic creativity, and these could be the characteristics of a dialogue that we Peruvian philosophers could develop between us.

REFERENCES / СПИСОК ЛІТЕРАТУРИ

- Ballón, J. C. (2011). *La complicada historia del pensamiento filosófico peruano, siglos XVII y XVIII*. Lima: UNMSM.
- Barreda Laos, F. (1909). *Vida intelectual de la colonia (educación, filosofía y ciencias): ensayo histórico crítico*. Lima: Imprenta La Industria.
- Barreda Laos, F. (1937). *Vida intelectual del Virreinato del Perú*. Buenos Aires: Talleres gráficos argentinos L.J. Rosso.
- Castro Carpio, A. (2009). *La filosofía entre nosotros: Cinco siglos de filosofía en el Perú*. Lima: PUCP. <https://doi.org/10.18800/9789972428869>
- Deustua, A. (1923). *Estética general*. Lima: Imprenta Eduardo Rávago.
- Espinosa Medrano, J. de. (1688). *Philosophia Tomistica seu Cursus Philosophicus*. Roma: ex Typographia Reu. Cam. Apoft.
- Espinosa Medrano, J. de. (1938). *El hijo pródigo*. París: Desclée de Brouwer.
- Espinosa Medrano, J. de. (2005). *Apologético en favor de don Luis de Góngora*. Lima: Universidad de San Martín de Porres, Academia Peruana de la Lengua.
- Espinosa Medrano, J. de. (2010). *El robo de Proserpina y sueño de Endimión*. Lima: PUCP, IFEA, Instituto Riva Agüero.
- Espinosa Medrano, J. de. (2011). *La novena maravilla*. Lima: Fondo Editorial del Congreso de la República.
- González Prada, M. (1946). *Páginas libres*. Lima: P.T.C.M.
- Haya de la Torre, V. R. (2010). *El antiimperialismo y el Apra*. Lima: Fondo Editorial del Congreso de la República del Perú.
- Iberico, M. (1920). *Una filosofía estética*. Lima: Biblioteca del Mercurio Peruano.
- Iberico, M. (1926). *El nuevo absoluto*. Lima: Editorial Minerva.
- Iberico, M. (1950). *La aparición. Ensayos sobre el ser y el aparecer*. Lima: Imprenta Santa María.
- Iberico, M. (1965). *Estudio sobre la metáfora*. Lima: Casa de la Cultura del Perú.

- Lorente, S. (1853-1854a). *Curso elemental de Filosofía para los colegios del Perú: Psicología*. Ayacucho: Braulio Cárdenas.
- Lorente, S. (1853-1854b). *Curso elemental de Filosofía para los colegios del Perú: Metafísica*. Ayacucho: Braulio Cárdenas.
- Mariátegui, J. C. (2021). *7 ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana*. Lima: Revuelta Editores.
- Mejía Valera, M. (1963). *Fuentes para la historia de la filosofía en el Perú*. Lima: Imprenta de la Universidad de San Marcos.
- Polar, J. (1896). *Discurso pronunciado por el señor rector D. Jorge Polar al inaugurar el año escolar de 1896*. Arequipa: Tipografía Cáceres.
- Polar, J. (1897). *Discurso pronunciado por el Dr. D. Jorge Polar en la apertura del presente año escolar*. Arequipa: Empresa Tipográfica.
- Polar, J. (1903). *Nociones de estética*. Arequipa: Tipografía Cáceres.
- Polar, J. (1925). *Confesión de un catedrático*. Arequipa: Tipografía Cáceres.
- Prado, J. (1891). *La evolución de la idea filosófica en la historia*. Lima: Imprenta de David Torres Aguirre.
- Prado, J. (1896). *El problema de lo bello y el arte*. Lima: Revista Ateneo.
- Prado, J. (1907). *Reforma de la Facultad de Letras*. Lima: s.l.
- Prado, J. (1908a). *La clasificación de las ciencias en Bacon*. Lima: Revista Universitaria.
- Prado, J. (1908b). *Memoria del decano de la Facultad de Letras de la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Dr. Javier Prado y Ugarteche*. Lima: Imprenta El Lucero.
- Prado, J. (1915). *El problema de la enseñanza*. Lima: Imprenta del Centro Editorial.
- Prado, J. (1918). *El genio de la lengua y de la literatura castellana y sus caracteres en la historia intelectual del Perú*. Lima: Imprenta del Estado.
- Prado, J. (1941). *Estado social del Perú durante la dominación española*. Lima: Editorial Gil.
- Prado, J. (2003). *El método positivo en el derecho penal*. Lima: Universidad Ricardo Palma.
- Quintanilla, P. (2004a). Del espejo al caleidoscopio. Aparición y desarrollo de la Filosofía en el Perú. *Areté*, 16(1), 43-79. <https://doi.org/10.18800/arete.200401.003>
- Quintanilla, P. (2004b). *Jorge Polar y el desencanto del positivismo*. In M. L. Rivara de Tuesta (Ed.), *La intelectualidad peruana del siglo XX ante la condición humana* (T. I, pp. 64-73). Lima: Editorial Gráfica Euroamericana.
- Quintanilla, P. (2016). *Cien años de Filosofía en el Perú: un retejido de tradiciones*. In M. Valdez (Ed.), *Cien años de Filosofía en Hispanoamérica (1910-2010)* (pp. 136-158). México: FCE y IIF de la UNAM.
- Quintanilla, P. (2018). Pedro Zulen y la filosofía peruana en los inicios del siglo 20th. *Histórica*, 42(2), 141-151. <https://doi.org/10.18800/historica.201802.004>
- Quintanilla, P. (2024). *La filosofía en el Perú. El Perú en la filosofía*. Lima: Heraldos Editores.
- Quiroz, R., Quintanilla, P., & Rojas, J. (2015). *Pedro S. Zulen. Escritos reunidos*. Lima: Fondo Editorial del Congreso de la República.
- Rivara de Tuesta, M. L. (2000a). *Tres ensayos sobre la filosofía en el Perú*. Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos.
- Rivara de Tuesta, M. L. (2000b). *Pensamiento prehispánico y filosofía colonial en el Perú*. Lima: FCE.
- Salazar Bondy, A. (1965). *Historia de las ideas en el Perú contemporáneo. El proceso del pensamiento filosófico*. Lima: F. Moncloa.
- Sobrevilla, D. (1978). *1880-1980: 100 años de filosofía en el Perú*. In B. Podestá (Ed.), *Estado de las ciencias sociales en el Perú*. Lima: Universidad del Pacífico.
- Sobrevilla, D. (1980). *Las ideas en el Perú contemporáneo*. In F. Silva-Santisteban (Ed.), *Historia del Perú* (T. XI). Lima: Juan Mejía Baca.

Sobrevilla, D. (1988-1989). *Repensando la tradición nacional I. Estudios sobre la filosofía reciente en el Perú*. Lima: Hipatia.

Sobrevilla, D. (1996). *La filosofía contemporánea en el Perú; estudios, reseñas y notas sobre su desarrollo y situación actual*. Lima: C. Matta.

Received / Одержано 19.10.2024

Pablo Quintanilla

Origins and Development of Peruvian Philosophy

This paper argues that there were five distinct periods of Peruvian philosophy after the arrival of the first Europeans: 1- The reception of scholasticism during the 16th and 17th centuries and the Peruvian philosophy produced under its influence. 2- From the 18th century until the mid-19th century, there was a move away from scholasticism and the Peruvian reception of modern European philosophers. 3- The paper focuses mainly on the ideas developed from the mid-19th century to the beginning of the 20th century when Peruvian philosophers were mainly influenced by French and English Positivism (Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer) and Darwinism. 4- Early to mid-20th century, when Peruvian philosophers moved away from Positivism and embraced what in Latin America was called 'spiritualism,' which is the name chosen to describe the vitalism or intuitionism of Henri Bergson. In this period, Marxism also exerted a strong influence. 5- From the mid-20th century to the present day. This period is characterized by diverse influences, mainly from continental European philosophy, Anglo-American philosophy, and the philosophies of other Latin American countries. Interestingly, the philosophy produced in Peru today has the traits of creativity that a mixture of influences typically produces. Thus, it is now easier to find Peruvian philosophers who are well acquainted with philosophers from different traditions, which means that they are used to suggesting and defending ideas from different perspectives. This kind of creativity could be characteristic of the globalized philosophy we will see in the coming decades. Thus, this paper explains how and why Peruvian philosophical debates have the shape they have today.

Пабло Кінтанія

Походження і розвиток перуанської філософії

У статті доводиться теза про існування п'яти окремих періодів перуанської філософії після прибуття перших європейців: 1. Сприйняття схоластики протягом XVI та XVII століть та перуанська філософія, що виникла під її впливом. 2. З XVIII до середини XIX століття, відхід від схоластики та перуанське сприйняття сучасних європейських філософів. 3. У статті основна увага приділяється ідеям, що розвивалися з середини XIX до початку XX століття, коли на перуанських філософів переважно вплинули французький та англійський позитивізм (Огюст Конт і Герберт Спенсер) і дарвінізм. 4. Від початку до середини XX століття, коли перуанські філософи відійшли від позитивізму і прийняли

те, що в Латинській Америці називалося «спіритуалізмом», що є назвою, обраною для опису віталізму або інтуїтивізму Анрі Бергсона. У цей період марксизм також мав сильний вплив. 5. Від середини XX століття до наших днів. Цей період характеризується різноманітністю впливів, що походять переважно від континентальної європейської філософії, англо-американської філософії, а також від філософій інших латиноамериканських країн. Особливо цікаво, що філософія, яка розробляється в Перу сьогодні, має риси креативності, що зазвичай породжуються поєднанням впливів. Таким чином, зараз легше знайти перуанських філософів, які добре знайомі з філософами різних традицій, а це означає, що ці перуанські філософи звикли пропонувати та захищати ідеї, що походять з різних точок зору. Такий вид креативності може бути характерним для глобалізованої філософії, яку ми побачимо в найближчі десятиліття. Тож у статті пояснюється, як і чому перуанські філософські дебати мають таку форму, яку вони мають сьогодні.

Pablo Quintanilla, PhD, Principal Professor of Philosophy in Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (Lima).

Пабло Кінтанія, PhD, професор філософії в Понтифікальному католицькому університеті Перу (Ліма).

e-mail: pquinta@pucp.edu.pe
